

**SAFE FILE: Germany: Max 1941-1944**

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Berlin, May 16, 1941. We.

Agriculture

1.

The official statistics regarding the operating expenses give a good idea of the technical equipment of German agriculture in the war.

The attached memorandum analyzes the statistical data on the operating expenses in German agriculture for the fiscal year 1939-40.

The provisional figures on the operating expenses for the fiscal year 1940-41, which are drawn up on the same bases as the previous memorandum regarding the fiscal year 1939-40, show that all figures for expenditures indicate an increase. This increase amounts to from 10 to 12 percent on the average. Hence it is sufficient, to get an approximate idea of the operating expenses of the farms in the second year of the war, to raise the figures at hand regarding the fiscal year 1939-40 by some 10 to 12 percent.

This memorandum permits definite conclusions to be drawn regarding the status of the productive capacity of German agriculture under control. Expert opinions can themselves be formed from these data.

2.

In the attached documents, further statistics are added on the figures for agricultural production. The

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tables include:

- a. status of vegetable crops at the end of April 1941;
- b. final figures for the cereal crop of 1940;
- c. slaughtering and meat supply statistics in March 1941.

3.

The most important points are stated in brief, below, according to the official reports on the requirements and future capacity of agriculture:

a. In agreement with the Office of the Price Commissioner, the Reich Ministry of Food and the Reich Food Office will undertake to raise prices for the fiscal current year, in the interest of further and more rapid increase in agricultural production. This applies to the production of both cereals and feeding-stuffs, and also to the main branches of the cattle business.

A further stimulus to agriculture, in addition to this direct raising of prices, is also said to be aimed at by having the prices of manufactured goods which are directly necessary for carrying on farming operations: farm machinery, tools, etc., lowered within the framework of the general scheme for diminution of profits and reduction of prices.

b. After the releasing of the quotas for the machine industry, technical agricultural apparatus, machinery and  
other

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other things made for field work and stock raising are to be delivered at an accelerated rate and to a larger extent. The persistent shortage of farm labor is to be counteracted by this mechanization.

c. Lastly, a broad program is being worked out: the improvement of the village, which is to form the basis for a total reorganization of the conduct of farming operations, in collaboration with all governmental, professional, industrial, communications and other organizations concerned. The amount needed for investment for the improvement of the village, that is, from the agricultural standpoint, the erection of dwellings for farm hands, shifting of population and villages, and general improvements, are estimated at from 60 to 75 billion.

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Amount of Meat Available from Slaughtering and from  
Excess Imports of Meat

<u>March 1941</u>	<u>Total 100 kgs.</u>	<u>per head of population - kg.</u>
Horsemeat	39,953	0.05
Beef	846,946	1.05
Veal	214,718	0.27
Pork	2,159,712	2.68
Mutton	21,642	0.03
Goats' meat	15,754	0.02
Total meat	3,298,725	4.10

<u>March 1940</u>		
Horsemeat	28,399	0.05
Beef	803,605	1.01
Veal	224,709	0.28
Pork	2,565,432	3.22
Mutton	22,941	0.03
Goats' meat	12,759	0.01
Total meat	3,654,312	4.59

Statement of Statistics on Slaughter-weight and Meat  
Supply in the German Reich (Old Reich) including  
Austria and Sudetenland, in the month  
of March 1941

<u>Whole German Reich:</u>	<u>March 1941</u>	<u>March 1940</u>
Horses and other ungulates .....	251	265
Steers over 2 years old .....	335	335
Steers up to 2 years old .....	196	228
Bulls over 2 years old .....	334	343
Bulls up to 2 years old .....	195	211
Cows .....	236	247
Heifers .....	207	221
Horned Cattle, all together	243	254
Calves up to 3 months old .....	34	38
Hogs: professional slaughtering...	96	96
home slaughtering .....	114	114
both .....	--	--
Sheep .....	22	23
Goats .....	16	15

Status of Vegetable Crops at end of April 1941

	Early white cabbage	Early red cabbage	Early savoy	Early cauli- flower	Early kohl- rabi	Spring spin- ach	Field let- tuce Lamb's let- tuce	Head let- tuce spring and summer let- tuce	Carrots early Carrots
German Reich	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.9

Ratings: 1 - very good; 2 - good; 3 - medium; 4 - poor; 5 - very poor

Final Figures for Cereal Crops 1950

States	Winter Wheat			Summer Wheat			Bath Wheat			Sorghum and Corn			Wheat and Sorghum			Grand Totals											
	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune	Area hectares	Yield per hect. 100kg	Total tune									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	
Prussia	3447254	15,8	5439432	47755	13,4	64036	3494809	15,7	5533448	740 844	22,7	1 660 408	203 215	24,2	638 214	1037 059	22,7	2 328 620	3 636	14,9	5 415	1049 685	22,7	2364 594	4335 594	17,5	7087 404
Prov.-Ostpr.	734290	14,1	1034196	4307	10,0	4307	728017	14,1	1030523	66 215	12,8	85 086	23 239	14,3	33 240	83 454	13,2	118 332	-	-	83 454	13,2	118 332	808 071	14,0	1156 055	
Stadt Berlin	3049	13,2	4025	190	12,2	232	3420	13,1	4257	93	15,0	140	37	12,6	47	130	14,4	187	-	-	130	14,4	187	3 369	13,2	4 444	
Mark Brandenburg	497395	13,8	685516	8139	10,5	10157	505014	13,8	695467	52 195	23,4	123 420	23 508	22,3	52 410	74 303	23,1	136 036	-	-	74 303	23,1	136 036	501 817	15,0	871 705	
Prussia	559976	15,9	890541	3123	11,3	10336	569099	15,8	560877	48 852	22,6	110 391	15 888	23,5	35 758	44 046	22,9	146 341	-	-	44 046	22,9	146 341	633 139	16,5	1047 226	
Schlesien	523259	13,4	700603	6418	12,6	8225	529577	13,4	703028	152 012	19,1	290 336	69 383	21,8	151 023	221 395	19,9	441 559	-	-	221 395	19,9	441 559	15,5	1150 187		
Sachsen Prov.	226372	16,8	380 434	4031	14,5	5865	230402	16,8	380299	112 053	24,5	275 253	101 224	28,0	285 339	213 477	26,2	558 592	-	-	213 477	26,2	558 592	443 879	21,3	944 011	
Schleswig-Holst.	113068	10,6	121929	3160	15,2	4790	116568	10,6	121719	47 523	25,1	120 076	2 490	23,5	5 353	50 413	25,0	126 629	-	-	50 413	25,0	126 629	167 388	20,5	342 708	
Hannover	342609	18,0	617717	3386	14,7	7909	347995	18,0	616526	58 363	26,0	151 471	28 545	28,0	80 660	86 906	26,6	231 551	-	-	86 906	26,6	231 551	434 901	19,7	877 177	
Westfalen	175684	19,8	348614	2207	16,3	3601	177091	19,8	352215	56 300	23,7	133 902	2 845	20,5	5 805	59 225	23,6	139 787	-	-	59 225	23,6	139 787	237 126	20,7	491 928	
Hess.-Rheinl.	117377	19,9	235453	1047	16,6	1738	118424	19,9	235191	61 971	22,5	139 396	5 093	23,0	11 727	67 064	22,5	151 103	-	-	67 064	22,5	151 103	185 498	20,8	386 296	
Rheinprov.	150038	21,7	325756	3719	18,3	6822	156755	21,7	328508	63 027	25,5	224 313	16 133	23,6	38 023	104 160	23,2	262 406	-	-	104 160	23,2	262 406	362 431	23,0	601 215	
Wohlfahrts- sche Landes	400	15,4	624	28	12,2	34	428	15,4	650	3 328	15,6	5 146	542	15,2	823	4 432	15,5	6 969	-	-	4 432	15,5	6 969	8 439	15,2	12 824	
Bayern	304727	14,7	447972	36354	14,0	53504	340881	14,7	501476	295 435	17,7	524 283	67 392	18,6	126 414	362 037	17,9	650 697	-	-	362 037	17,9	650 697	705 553	16,4	1354 706	
Sachsen	113264	17,6	199836	6900	15,1	10442	170864	17,4	200058	71 760	22,2	159 235	30 808	21,1	42 352	91 876	21,8	201 507	-	-	91 876	21,8	201 507	231 940	19,4	410 645	
Hamburg	16163	15,7	25358	2772	14,2	3931	10925	15,5	25809	101 107	18,5	186 779	16 822	18,4	30 378	117 929	18,5	217 197	-	-	117 929	18,5	217 197	264 386	16,0	46 549	
Baden	20035	16,7	33467	2356	13,4	3165	33191	16,5	33452	59 198	18,5	109 435	5 490	18,1	9 934	64 088	18,5	119 387	-	-	64 088	18,5	119 387	165 236	17,7	293 599	
Thüringen	53036	18,2	96520	2956	17,2	4365	55592	18,2	961294	43 456	21,6	93 760	30 119	24,9	74 842	81 577	21,1	168 542	-	-	81 577	21,1	168 542	162 396	17,1	180 747	
Sachsen	42654	19,4	82707	540	17,1	938	43182	19,4	82845	27 438	22,2	60 798	8 034	24,7	19 071	35 452	22,8	80 849	-	-	35 452	22,8	80 849	137 180	21,1	289 488	
Sachsen	20020	18,9	37844	2172	16,6	3602	20481	18,9	37845	335	22,4	733	59	17,8	52	364	22,2	1 790	-	-	364	22,2	1 790	5 443	18,9	6 498	
Schlesien	196470	19,2	390 348	2272	16,6	3602	196973	19,2	390377	46 302	24,9	115 331	7 560	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-	53 037	24,8	133 395	252 320	20,9	527 262	
Brandenburg	200775	21,6	433006	402	17,9	7160	200775	21,6	433006	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	13165	18,0	23705	127	16,6	2105	13165	18,0	23705	12 137	21,6	25 714	15 716	21,6	34 706	33 563	21,6	72 656	-	-	33 563	21,6	72 656	92 620	17,3	184 194	
Brandenburg	46311	17,1	79101	276	14,8	3249	46311	17,1	79101	1 811	23,4	5 812	333	20,5	17 974	53 037	24,8	133 395	-	-							



Figures from the statistics on slaughtering in the German Reich  
in the month of March 1941  
Ergebnisse der Schlachtungsstatistik im Deutschen Reich im Monat  
März 1941.

March 1941.														
Horses & other ungulates Pferde und andere Einhufer	over - up to 2 years old Über bis 2 Jahre alt	Bulls over - up to 2 years old Bullen Über bis 2 Jahre alt	Cows Kühe	Heifers Färren bis zum 1. Kalb	Total horned cattle Rinder zusammen	Calves up to 3 months old Kälber bis zu 3 Monaten alt	Hogs commercial gewerbliche domestic Haus- Schweine Total zusammen	Sheep Schafe einschl. der nicht- beschnittenen Lämmer including unspiced lambs	Goats Ziegen einschl. der nicht- beschnittenen Lämmer					
German animals	16 680	22684	6794	27689	30900	190452	66563	345 082	713099	1030967	1118418	2157385	109 010	146 639
Foreign animals	941	5582	-	1265	9	11878	1153	19 907	-	64523	-	64523	428	
Slaughtering of both German and foreign animals in March 1941	17 621	28266	6794	28954	30909	202330	67716	364 969	713099	1103490	1118418	2221908	110 230	146 639
February 1941	19 517	32976	7497	28460	30838	212779	68202	380 752	596511	1022596	1407859	2430455	107 136	32 855
January 1941	25 018	46570	9352	31043	32764	246222	77512	443 463	627685	981931	1617528	2599459	160 497	35 761
March 1941 Old Reich including Austria and Sudetenland	15 912	26895	6174	27237	27001	178682	57276	323 265	639463	1004261	1037533	2041794	101 115	145 323
February 1941	17 734	31989	6894	26908	27922	191102	59924	344739	594058	935622	1342863	2278485	98 464	31 616
March 1940	10 701	20992	3903	28246	25767	172957	56061	308 806	591955	1242359	1226243	2460602	103 403	154 827
Of the foreign animals slaughtered in March 1941, there were from:														
Denmark	17	386	-	766	-	9427	214	10 793	-	31820	-	31820	-	-
Holland	-	2	-	10	9	561	39	621	-	24179	-	24179	-	-
USSR (formerly Lithuania)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	218	-	218	-	-
Hungary	84	4889	-	448	-	1882	893	8 132	-	1251	-	1251	428	-
Yugoslavia	596	305	-	41	-	8	7	361	-	7055	-	7055	-	-
Slovakia	244	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
from the statistics on slaughter weights and meat supply in the German Reich (old Reich) incl. Austria and Sudetenland, in month of March 1941.														
ne der Schlachtgewichts- und Fleischvermögensstatistik in Deutschen Reich (Altreich) einschl. Ostmark März 1941.														
Whole German Reich, incl. Austria and Sudetenland, in month of March 1941	251	335	196	334	195	236	207	243	34	96	114	-	22	16
March 1940	265	335	220	343	211	247	221	254	38	96	114	-	23	15

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# Final Figures for Cereal Crops 1940 (including corn)

States & Districts	Winter Wheat			Summer Wheat			Both			Oats			Winter Intermediate Crops			Summer Intermediate Crops			Both Intermediate Crops			Corn			Total Cereals		
	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total	Area	Yield	Total
	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.	hectares	per hect.	100kg.
	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Prussia	232550	20.6	773036	209665	20.3	437650	742223	20.4	3317486	1930 761	20.4	3957174	55 048	13.0	104 024	576 472	17.0	500 724	631 520	17.2	1005 548	18 079	22.2	41 061	8056 975	18.4	34009 593
Ostpreussen	1907	13.7	2618	171997	14.2	244001	173904	14.2	247839	227 820	12.2	278152	4 915	14.9	7 313	205 601	12.9	264 260	255 585	12.9	271 501	468	21.6	1 022	1460 769	13.6	1955 099
Stadt Berlin	20	13.6	27	306	16.6	500	326	16.4	535	059	16.0	1373	22	11.7	26	275	13.0	350	297	12.9	304	71	19.5	139	4 921	14.0	6 075
Brandenburg	19277	18.5	35978	78178	21.8	372751	98455	21.2	200329	168 714	19.5	328856	3 423	14.9	5 090	57 824	17.5	99 421	61 257	17.1	104 511	4 649	22.4	10 397	914 872	16.7	1253 796
Pommern Prov.	19446	20.4	39727	82430	20.2	166412	101936	20.2	206149	279 784	19.2	538463	3 448	15.4	5 387	60 531	18.1	245 403	35 379	18.0	150 790	1 242	2.32	2 758	1100 600	17.7	1945 566
Schlesien	25770	18.3	47112	158036	20.7	328560	184406	20.4	375672	325 687	19.7	641369	6 142	16.2	9 973	68 125	20.0	135 546	74 867	19.7	146 519	8 005	20.5	10 109	1344 717	17.3	2331 936
Sachsen Prov.	31205	20.7	64658	124206	26.6	330251	155491	25.4	294309	180 048	25.4	483131	2 913	18.7	5 455	55 116	20.6	70 086	38 029	19.9	75 541	1 279	25.9	3 316	818 748	23.0	1079 802
Schlesw.-Holst.	28793	22.5	53655	12897	24.3	31327	36696	23.2	43048	119 567	24.6	297100	5 192	23.0	11 959	58 127	21.6	125 464	63 319	21.7	137 423	234	25.0	590	387 137	22.0	652 643
Hannover	32006	22.7	72844	20067	21.5	43048	52558	22.2	115092	123 043	22.6	505884	5 649	10.4	10 415	49 425	18.9	93 327	55 074	18.8	105 742	867	23.5	2 041	766 058	20.7	1282 736
Westfalen	33721	20.7	69791	13890	20.1	23830	45581	20.5	93621	120 310	21.6	201535	16 235	21.8	35 356	15 144	21.9	33 162	31 379	21.8	68 510	420	27.9	1 172	444 806	21.1	936 768
Hessen-Nassau	14889	19.5	29090	14889	19.8	29434	29788	19.6	58532	109 504	22.1	241409	1 926	19.5	3 754	3 222	20.6	6 433	5 148	19.8	10 187	146	26.8	392	330 074	21.1	696 094
Rheinprovinz	30304	21.3	64574	27454	20.6	56665	57758	21.0	121739	147 469	22.9	384285	5 002	19.6	9 810	2 798	20.5	5 651	7 760	19.9	15 461	609	27.9	1 650	494 767	22.7	1123 056
Rheinland-Pfalz	124	12.4	154	5603	17.8	9973	5727	17.7	10127	5 833	16.4	9537	181	15.8	286	334	18.1	605	535	17.3	691	9	26.0	23	20 436	16.3	33 402
Bayerl.	15644	16.9	26366	371422	20.5	760717	387046	20.3	387083	393 343	19.2	752075	24 825	16.5	49 935	12 156	18.0	21 082	37 031	17.0	62 017	1 845	27.1	4 053	1524 840	18.1	2766 504
Sachsen	20519	19.2	39335	27304	22.1	80335	47823	20.8	99670	139 986	23.7	331594	1 532	16.9	2 590	6 464	20.3	13 150	7 996	19.7	15 740	405	23.1	934	408 150	21.0	858 503
Württemberg	4355	17.1	7464	97637	19.4	191656	108992	19.5	199120	85 277	19.2	163709	5 281	15.0	7 898	4 737	17.0	8 030	10 018	15.9	15 908	872	29.3	2 610	364 135	18.5	674 970
Baden	6664	18.0	12542	47049	19.5	91631	53713	19.4	104173	50 115	19.0	99458	12 569	17.7	22 233	1 056	16.8	3 081	14 635	17.6	25 374	3 846	25.4	9 683	724 495	18.7	413 435
Thüringen	5414	18.9	10213	55605	21.3	129785	61018	22.9	139999	76 944	21.1	177966	2 551	17.3	4 412	20 269	21.2	43 066	22 810	20.8	47 470	217	24.3	522	298 186	22.0	655 813
Hessen	3075	22.4	8672	36473	24.1	87701	40214	23.9	56379	41 636	22.9	95159	1 020	18.0	1 731	534	19.8	1 100	8 584	17.9	2 031	624	28.7	1 708	162 313	22.2	361 045
Sachsen	212	19.3	409	218	19.1	415	432	19.2	464	33	19.6	4425	30	18.0	1 177	30 029	21.2	65 139	35 724	21.7	68 524	364	23.0	851	471 739	22.5	133 036
Mecklenburg	19378	20.4	39251	29301	23.2	68022	48673	22.1	107877	138 570	24.8	343904	1 965	20.4	3 106	1 981	17.9	2 828	3 779	18.4	5 305	122	24.7	301	90 365	18.0	182 279
Oldenburg	1306	21.1	2737	3882	20.7	7860	5108	20.8	10617	26 317	18.9	3065	20	16.1	32	146	15.4	0 166	1 166	15.4	2 224	129	25.7	311	99 500	25.9	258 096
Bayernschweig.	15619	23.0	24467	3882	20.7	7860	5108	20.8	10617	26 317	18.9	3065	20	16.1	32	146	15.4	0 166	1 166	15.4	2 224	129	25.7	311	99 500	25.9	258 096
Preussen	45	15.0	87	154	18.2	283	201	17.4	350	16 476	25.2	77726	2 217	23.9	5 293	1 650	24.1	3 379	3 867	24.0	9 212	43	22.7	464	75 081	23.2	175 201
Altealt.	3540	20.9	7427	13645	19.8	453	5615	21.7	12582	16 476	25.2	77726	2 217	23.9	5 293	1 650	24.1	3 379	3 867	24.0	9 212	43	22.7	464	75 081	23.2	175 201
Lippe	5303	21.8	11729	229	19.0	453	5615	21.7	12582	16 476	25.2	77726	2 217	23.9	5 293	1 650	24.1	3 379	3 867	24.0	9 212	43	22.7	464	75 081	23.2	175 201
Sachsenburg-Lippe	734	23.7	1742	152	24.0	379	806	23.9	2645	2465	28.6	7047	443	19.0	169	148	14.7	218	292	14.9	882	15	15.2	23	34 000	24.6	89 814
Sachsenburg	12959	13.7	17780	197900	15.7	310669	210959	15.5	320841	274 979	14.1	287911	6 329	12.3	7 792	10 131	14.0	14 141	16 490	13.3	21 911	72 599	20.8	150 613	1304 733	13.9	1533 207
Oldenburg	1829	15.0	2387	97325	18.4	184214	90962	18.9	186794	172 628	17.8	206577	852	13.5	1 084	4 591	15.0	7 198	8 410	15.2	8 242	560	12.4	766	522 156	16.3	850 850
Oldenburg	2759	14.2	7906	109355	18.3	200291	112144	18.7	204156	100 401	16.9	169813	376	16.2	624	64 592	18.5	120 345	64 903	18.2	120 345	775	28.1	2 152	785 858	16.1	1262 424
Oldenburg	8155	16.0	13042	127011	18.6	249037	135766	19.4	262879	104 436	17.2	251 396	5 079	14.7	8 377	62 842	17.7	111 492	64 721	17.4	119 069	1 939	27.8	4 313	1619 032	15.5	2515 586
Oldenburg	444850	24.7	1096822	1508456	20.8	3129730	1953366	21.7	4279757	3282 583	20.7	6601468	107 222	19.6	216 607	804 436	17.5	1411 014	927 474	17.5	1627 219	103 433	21.5	222 843	3984 996	18.9	38579 659
Oldenburg	444850	24.7	1096822	1508456	20.8	3129730	1953366	21.7	4279757	3282 583	20.7	6601468	107 222	19.6	216 607	804 436	17.5	1411 014	927 474	17.5	1627 219	103 433	21.5	222 843	3984 996	18.9	38579 659

925910



GS  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Stockholm  
Dated July 27, 1941  
Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

453, July 27, noon.

Having just returned from a week or so in Germany  
where travelled a good deal and spent two days at  
Goering's headquarters, 500 miles East of Berlin,  
Dahlerus in a long conversation yesterday among other  
things stated the following

One. Goering told him that Japan had been granted  
a free hand in east Russia and might be expected to try  
to take Vladivostok and other coastal places.

Two. Despite German surprise at number, size and  
strength of armament of Russian tanks Goering now felt  
that power of Russian armies will be crushed in about six  
weeks from now.

Three. It is then planned to divide Russia into  
small states, Goering to be economic dictator and Rosen-  
berg political dictator in conquered areas.

Four. In retreating Russians have effectively put  
manufacturing establishments out of commission but  
efforts to destroy crops have not been successful and  
Germany expects to reap most of coming harvest and has

no

25101

-2- 453, July 27, noon from Stockholm

no compunctions at starving Russians if necessary to keep flow of food and raw materials moving to Germany indefinitely.

Five. Dahleru (\*)op whatever of invasion of British is less and felt it possible it was no longer planned. Hitler is now preparing for a long drawn out war and no peace suggestions will be advanced by Germany at conclusion of Russian campaign as had been predicted in other quarters in Sweden. As soon as German forces are released in case all out effort will be made by air against England and in battle of Atlantic.

Six. Goering was much perturbed at American occupation of Iceland.

Seven. From his intimate connections in other quarters in Germany I felt that influence of army over prty was somewhat in a (?)ancy.

Eight. He felt as have other visitors that German civilian population was thoroughly war weary.

Nine. Goering is not isolated nor does he seem to have lost favor with Hitler. British propaganda to effect that Goering and Hitler differed over Russian campaign are false.

Ten. Goering is very much annoyed with Sweden for having been so little cooperative in connection with  
other

-3- 453, July 27, noon from Stockholm

other requests when troop transit to Finland came up. Nevertheless no threats were made because of this.

Eleven: Dahlerus, as Department is aware, has been hoping to be an instrument in bringing about peace even since before war commenced in 1939 now feels less hopeful about <sup>it</sup> than at any time and expects complete destruction of Europe as inevitable (?) of continued hostilities unless some peace proposal is submitted from neutral sources.

GREENE

EMB

25603

Press

Lark

RS  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

BERN

Dated July 29, 1941

Rec'd 6 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

149, July 29, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

My 141, July 2, 3 p.m.

Informant attributing to German General Staff  
and other reliable sources made following statements:  
German eastern front losses of men and material and  
fuel have been colossal, the men including reserves  
now being completely exhausted physically. Fourteen  
successive nights of effective bombing of Rumanian oil  
fields, pipe lines and loading ports would, unless  
Germany could find substitute oil supplies, terminate  
war by end of August. Desperate German situation makes  
absolutely essential that Turks be ready for surprise  
thrust to Caucasus oil fields. Two German combat di-  
visions have just been added to Bulgarian forces now  
completing mobilization against Thrace. Italians con-  
centrating in Greece and islands. Turks still seem  
undecided and to counter Nazi propaganda must be held  
in line by Russian guarantee backed by parallel Ameri-  
can English guarantee of Turkish territorial inviol-  
ability in event of Russian victory. Earlier than

expected

-2-, No. 149, from Bern, July 29, 1941; 6 p.m.

expected the decisive psychological moment has now arrived for heavy blow by England against Germany where civilian army and party morale fast declining. Hitler group greatly fears destruction of Rumanian ? army will bring Italy in collapse, stagger Spain, make up Weygand's mind and be disastrous inside Germany. Imports except foods would be cut off as they are shipped to Germany. Spain puts foreign exchange at German disposal.

HARRISON

CSB

PM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Bern

Dated July 29, 1941.

Rec'd 4:50 p.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

149, July 29, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Frontal attack by England in France and low  
countries now preferable to attacks on flanks, since  
only forty German occupational divisions, all landsturm,  
plus one panzer division spread thin from Bordeaux  
to Amsterdam, constitute entire German force in west.  
Reinforcements at present unavailable. Nearly all  
anti-tank artillery shipped east. Morale of landsturm  
is bad. Results of questionnaires among German  
officer corps and rank and file indicate, firstly  
that their continued adherence to Hitler and regime  
solely due to fear of partition Germany and creation  
thereby of terrain favorable for a future "Hitler"  
and, secondly, that (coupled with effective offensive  
by England) a positive declaration by the President  
that there will be no such partition will destroy  
last hesitancy of army to abandon Hitler and his  
regime and also permit creation of confederation  
under Wittelsback with south and west German sections  
balancing

025003

-2- #149, July 29, 1941, from Bern.

balancing expansionistic Prussia.

Vichy and Japan have formed military alliance for common action against England and China. French commander and troops in Indochina have gone north ostensibly to avoid clashes with Japanese, but actually to prepare attack on Burma. Japan will send half million men to Indochina.

Informant laid greatest stress on assurances from General Staff friends that decisive psychological moment now has arrived for England to break Germany in order to terminate war within weeks rather than perhaps months.

Military Attache requests that War Department be informed. (END MESSAGE).

HARRISON.

CSB

n25c04



*Luck*

RS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERN

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

152, July 31, 4 p.m.

Your 152, July 30.

Following just received by informant my 149,  
July 29:

All oil reserves tapped very extensively for east; especially infantry, sometimes whole units incapacitated by new eye inflammation from dust; during past ten days strong replacements, morale low, four motorized and panzer elements sent east; a second Italian division, morale very low, passed through Salzburg on twenty-fifth; new assignment to be given Rommel probably east front as British deemed incapable African offensive now; arms distribution during week ending July 26 to workers in many central and south German factories officially explained as against English parachute troops, but believed actually anticipation internal disorder; repeated that this is psychological moment British offensive and entry United States to end war by September; as Japanese

025d01



-2-, No. 152 from Bern, July 31, 1941; 2:45 p.m.

Nazis plan sink ships Panama Canal, recommends exclusion Spanish and Japanese ships.

Source my despatch 1780, July 2 reports that in southwest Germany, Nazis still believe in Russian defeat by year end, others believe war protracted to spring. Slight anxiety and growing uneasiness now noticeable among the people.

Military Attache desires War Department be informed.

HARRISON

LMS

a25d02

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

To:

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

My dear Mr. President -

The attached is much like the information I relayed to you from Saigon - 2 months ago. Also it resembles the report from one of our people which has come in by way of Is [unclear] to the Navy - which you may have - is not all sent. [unclear]

PSF  
Safe  
Germany

a25e01

October 1, 1941

TO: Coordinator of Information

FROM: W. D. Whitney

There is attached a detailed memorandum of our talk with Stallforth at 1647-30 St., N.W. on September 30, 1941, at 5:00 p.m. (His name is omitted from the attached memorandum, in which he is referred to as the informant.)

RE  
UNC-  
25002

UNCL

TO: Coordinator of Information

FROM: W. D. Whitney

This is a memorandum of conference held at 1647-30 St., N. W., September 30, 1941, 5 o'clock p.m., between the informant (whose name is given on a separate memorandum), Colonel Donovan, and W. D. Whitney. The informant's story follows, using the first person singular:

In 1940, about the end of June or early July, I was in Berlin and had a personal conversation with Goering. He proposed a peace plan, after conferring with Hitler. The plan was:

- 1) British Empire in status quo, except certain colonies for Germany.
- 2) Political independence for France, Belgium, and Holland (except Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg to Germany).
- 3) Germany to have free hand in the East, including Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

On August 12 I arrived in the United States and submitted this plan to Wilson of the State Department and to Drury, a British representative. I understand that it came to the attention of the Prime Minister and the President, and was of course turned down.

At the beginning of May, 1941, I was again in Germany, this time on the business of negotiating the sale of ships belonging to Axis-controlled countries in the Western hemisphere, and for which, although the ships were not German owned, German consent was necessary. I inquired for Goering, but this time he refused to see me. I was later advised that this was because Ribbentrop was in complete charge--and that all were confident of complete victory, so that Goering did not dare see me.

In talks with the Army, I was told that the plan to invade Russia had been fully agreed upon in early November and indeed the very day of June 22 had been set. There had been two disappointments:

- 1) That Russian tanks were three times as many as expected,
- 2) That the Russian troops were loyal to Stalin instead of showing the bad moral that had been expected,

but that the German General Staff still expected:

- 1) To annihilate the Russian armies by the end of October, this representing only a two month's delay beyond their original estimate of the end of August,
- 2) That the Russian political situation would be fully in hand by the spring of 1942.

Goering had recommended to Hitler that a boundary be put upon the German names in Russia and that an all-out effort to conquer Russia should be abandoned. The next morning he found his home, the Kerinhalle, surrounded by SS men. He could not go out and his telephone wires had been cut. (I was informed of this by Frau Goering, who told me the whole story.) The basis of Goering's ideas on the Russian campaign was that the German people's morale would not stand up to it.

I was also reliably informed that Mussolini asked Hitler to make peace, saying that Italy must have peace. It was believed that Mussolini was the only man that could say this to Hitler without being locked up. But Hitler was merely rather amused by Mussolini, regarding him as sort of a naughty boy.

I also know that Von Pfeffer, who was the organizer of the Nazi party in Prussia, made the same recommendation to Hitler and was immediately arrested and ordered to be shot, but due to the intercession of Frau Von Pfeffer he was reprieved and put in solitary confinement.

Note by Whitney: I know that the informant was intimate with Von Pfeffer as I attended a private luncheon in informant's room with Von Pfeffer in a Berlin hotel in 1936, at which Von Pfeffer outlined the then plans for an ultimate Russian campaign. This is the only corroboration that I can personally give to the informant's story.

I was called in by General Udet, Chief of the Luftwaffe, because I had had a long prior acquaintance with him, and through him I met Brauchitsch and Keitel and through them in turn many other officers. As a consequence I was invited to a rather formal luncheon at which were officers (not the top officers, but the second men) in each of the military establishments,--General Staff, Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe. The course of the conversation ran as follows:



They: We are still confident that we will conquer Russia, but we are anxious at all costs to avoid war with the United States of America and wish to know what the USA wants.

I: We will make no peace with the present German government, and neither would Great Britain.

They: What if Hitler and Goering were to disappear or to resign.

I: That would not be enough. No party member would be accepted by the USA today, but I personally believe that the USA and Great Britain would likely make peace with a new constitutional government in which every private citizen would be recognized and have full normal rights.

They: How about a monarchy?

I: That would do, I think; if it were a constitutional monarchy on the English model.

A few days later, one of them came to me and the following conversation ensued:

He: Suppose,--always suppose--that the army replaces the present regime and offers peace.

I: I think that it is possible that the USA and Great Britain would treat with the army under those circumstances.

He: The army's conditions would then be:

- 1) No double crossing of Germany, as happened after Germany's acceptance of Wilson's Fourteen Points;
- 2) The army to remain in control to avoid chaos and thus of course disarmament could not be immediate.

I: I think something could be arranged.

He: Whom would you suggest to meet with you.

I: I suggest Donovan, Willkie, and General Wood. (I thought of these three men to show that America was united, and to negative the idea that Willkie or Wood would not cooperate with the President.)

He further explained to me that they did not even ask who would be the emissary from England as they have full confidence in England, but indicated that they would prefer energetic men like Beaverbrook. They hate us more than the British, because we are spoiling their success; whereas they rather admire the British. He indicated that they would likely send Falkenhansen, Haltner, Stupnagel, and others of that type. They distrust Keitel; they believe that Brauchitsch will come over at the last. As a civilian member, they would probably send Von Hassel, son-in-law of old Tirpitz, and who, as a former ambassador to Rome, claims to be a friend of Phillips.

It was further explained to me that:

- 1) Everything against Hitler and the regime must originate from Germany. The German people must not get the idea that the disposition of Hitler has been organized from outside, as then they would line up to protect him.
- 2) If we consider their plan at all, we must do so very promptly, before hatred of the USA gets worse in Germany.
- 3) But as soon as it becomes plain to the German people that the change means peace, they will let Hitler go, as they put peace first in their affections and Hitler second.
- 4) The German army fears that the President or Churchill would kill any such plan, as they have been convinced by their own propaganda to the effect that the President and Churchill as individuals have a special and violent animosity against Germany while all the rest of the USA and Great Britain understand them. I of course explained that this was absurd and that the USA and the UK were definitely behind their two chiefs, but mere explanations do not surmount months of skillful propaganda. This does not of course mean that they would not be glad to deal with Churchill and the President, but they think that the President and Churchill would, for reasons of blind hatred, refuse even to consider reasonable solutions.

I showed them the eight points which they had not seen. (I got them from the Embassy in Berlin.) They read them over carefully and said they were satisfactory, except the last point about disarmament. They said there should be an economic union of Europe, but that politically they would be prepared to evacuate all territories, except only Austria. Germany and Austria should remain intact. They suggested the Kaiser's grandson as the new sovereign, because in the legitimate line.

a25e06

The British Admiral Miles reported from Moscow:

Russian scorched earth policy is everywhere being carried out with great thoroughness and relentlessly. Removal of unfinished hulls and machinery from Nikolaev and the destruction of immovable gear showed that the Soviet Navy could do their share.

Leningrad is the only Baltic Russian Naval repair base.

Kronstadt is too small to base the entire Russian Baltic Fleet, and, although very strongly fortified, is vulnerable to attack from the main land.

Should Leningrad fall the Russians are faced with the four following courses of action for their Baltic Fleet:-

1. To scuttle.
2. To suffer capture by the enemy.
3. To sail through the Baltic to the North Sea.
4. To surrender for internment to the Swedes.

The Russian Fleet to our knowledge has not so far shown the same determination as their Army, except for the destruction at Nikolaev when incompletd ships were destroyed.

The Russians are notorious for their dislike of the sea.

The arrival of the Russian Fleet, although expected, would be highly distasteful to the Swedes, and, swollen by this unwieldy gift, Sweden's neutrality would not remain inviolate for long.



## AXIS SHIPPING

### Eastern Mediterranean

Practically the whole of the Axis shipping between Italy, the Aegean and the Black Sea has been engaged in the carrying of war material and supplies, particularly oil from the Roumanian oil fields.

Recently it was reported that they intended running a regular service between Trieste and Istanbul with three ships:- "CAPO ARMA" (3,175 tons), "ALBA JULIA" (5,701 tons) and "BALCIC" (3,600 tons). The first is Italian and the other two Roumanian. They left Istanbul in company on the 2nd of August and arrived at Trieste on the 15/16th with cargoes of oil cakes, oil seeds, olive oil, skins, valonea and aero engines.

During the months of June, July and August, the total tonnage from the Black Sea to the Aegean was approximately 100,000 tons, representing 26 sailings. Of the ships engaged (23) it is claimed three were sunk by British submarines in the Aegean whilst another was sunk by submarine in the Black Sea. The four ships sunk represented a tonnage of 17,616 tons. The majority of the ships were oil tankers.

The following extracts are from the Report of Ministry of Economic Warfare:

### OIL

Germany's overland transport routes are not thought at present to be capable of handling more than the current Roumanian oil export surplus of some 350,000 tons a month. In order to carry on the Russian campaign Germany has to draw heavily upon her stocks, which are at present inconveniently situated in that some 1,000,000 tons, or half of her free reserves, are in Roumania. Although these are to some extent available to the southern sector of her army, they cannot be made available in the North by a direct route until considerable repairs and alterations to rail communications in Western Russia have been effected. Unless, therefore, Germany can increase the rate of output from Roumania, free stocks in Western Europe may become exhausted, while there are still considerable reserves in Roumania. Unless some cure can be found this may result in a severe limitation in Germany's future strategy. The only cure that is available is the removal by the sea route of Roumanian stocks through the Dardanelles.

It seems reasonable to assume that Russian naval activity will decline in the Black Sea as the German advance proceeds and that as the result of this the tanker traffic through the Dardanelles will be speeded up. The importance of the successful interception of tankers proceeding towards the Black Sea cannot be over-emphasized. Not only will the lifting of stocks from Constanza and the supplies to Axis forces in the Mediterranean be retarded, but also the enemy will be deprived of a tanker reserve within the Black Sea which would be of the

Commodities other than oil.

With the close blockade in the west, Germany had done her best to exploit the resources of Turkey and Asia Minor to the fullest. Up till the time of the Greek campaign goods from this area had passed to Germany either by rail on the Orient line from Istanbul or by steamer from Turkish Black Sea ports to Bulgarian and Roumanian ports and thence by rail. The main Orient rail communications were cut during the Greek campaign and coasting traffic in the Black Sea was brought to an end by the outbreak of the Russian hostilities. At a time, therefore, when Russian goods and goods from the Far East were denied to her, the Axis was also faced with the loss of supplies from Asia Minor which she had taken great trouble to develop. It was not surprising, therefore, to learn that a service between Trieste and Istanbul was being organized as a matter of urgency. So long as the Black Sea is closed it must be assumed that the Axis will do their utmost to develop this service, which is their only transport link with the Near East. There is every indication that this will, in fact, happen, and the road lorry system is being built up in Anatolia to act as a feeder service. The commodities to be carried by this route are principally wool, cotton, oilseeds and tanning materials, all vitally important to Germany's war effort.

PSF  
Life: Germany

KEY

The translation of the German writing on  
the map appears to be as follows:

On the right: - "Fuel reserves for Trans-Atlantic  
traffic -

- (a) with what capacity,
- (b) Whom to interest for installation,
- (c) Estimate."

On the left: - "(1) Is a fuel monopoly planned?  
(2) Can private capital participate  
in expansion?

Under what conditions?

- (3) To what extent will Mexico F  
participate in installation  
and expansion F as furnisher  
of fuel? Lacks fuel reserves."



GEHEIM

SKIZZE 3



*2. Luftpostflüge für die Hauptlinien  
1) mit anderen Hauptlinien  
2) von für andere Hauptlinien  
3) Hauptlinien?*

*1) 7. Luftpostflüge geplant?  
2) kann die Luftpost auf den  
Hauptlinien ausbauen? oder  
neue Hauptlinien?  
3) kann man die Hauptlinien  
ausbauen und die Hauptlinien  
ausbauen?  
Fall der Luftpostflüge*

**LUFTVERKEHRSNETZ  
DER  
VEREINIGTEN STAATEN  
SÜD-AMERIKAS  
HAUPTLINIEN**

PSF

~~SECRET~~

*PSF*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
MONOGRAPH No. 3

# THE GERMAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POSITION

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION



RE  
UNC

DECEMBER 12, 1941

COPY No. 13  
The President

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The most serious consequences of the Russian war for the German position have been the following:

1. Manpower losses, especially within the age group 21-28.
2. The strain on transport, especially the railways.
3. The reduction of petroleum stocks, as a result of the high military consumption rate on the Eastern front.

## B. GERMAN ECONOMIC POSITION

Prior to June 1941 the German industrial machine exhibited few signs of strain, having been bolstered by the stocks and resources acquired in the campaigns of 1940. These minimized the consequences of the Allied blockade.

The large scale and prolonged operations in the East, however, have evoked three types of strain on the German economic system. First, pressure on total manpower and transport resources has been measurably increased, causing further incursions into the supply of civilian goods and services and some net decrease in the efficiency of the industrial machine. Second, the continuance of the war at its present level of intensity has accentuated the problem of depreciation, with respect to the railways, industrial equipment, and durable consumer's goods. Third, the large demands of the present campaign have exposed and accentuated certain specific German weaknesses:

1. The further withdrawal of manpower of military age, from agriculture and industry, has necessitated the substitution of less efficient over-age workers, women, foreigners, and war prisoners. In addition to this general dilution of the labor supply, shortages exist for special types of workers, notably industrial technicians, railway workers, and administrators of all types.

2. The large foodstuff demands of the Army have accentuated somewhat the underlying German weaknesses with respect to meats, fats, and oils; although the consequences of that weakness will be greater in 1942-43 than in the current harvest year.

3. The necessity for maintaining military production at a maximum level has caused withdrawals from stockpiles in the following instances: Tin, copper, antimony, and the steel-hardening alloys taken as a whole.



4. The current rate of petroleum consumption is being maintained out of stocks; and there is some evidence, although the data are inadequate, that the petroleum stock-pile may be exhausted within the year 1942. On the whole, this seems unlikely.

5. The present transport situation has caused local shortages in civilian and some industrial supplies. The present strain would be markedly accentuated if the current winter is severe, and the internal water-ways frozen for prolonged periods.

6. German morale has been somewhat impaired by the prolongation of the Russian war. Heavy manpower losses and the increasing remoteness of ultimate victory have necessitated a defensive shift in the nature of official German propaganda.

### C. CONCLUSIONS.

The data are inadequate to assess these weaknesses fully. The following tentative conclusions, however, appear justified:

1. The strains induced by the Russian war have reduced the absolute strength of the German military machine and economic machine; and further limited the supplies at the disposal of civilians.

2. Some of these strains, such as those in manpower and transport facilities, can perhaps be alleviated by a period of respite from military operations on the present scale. Others, however, reflect the gradual exhaustion of stock-piles of strategic raw materials—a process which is not greatly affected by the scale of military operations, except in the case of petroleum.

3. German leadership is thus faced with a dilemma in timing: whether to hold military operations down to a defensive minimum, while maximizing preparations for new offensives next spring; or to push on during the winter into areas possessing supplies of needed raw materials in order to strengthen immediately the basic position. Many facts unknown to us, or known imprecisely, will influence the decision. It seems likely, however, that in the coming months German military operations, whether directed towards strategic or economic goals, will be on a much reduced scale.

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## THE GERMAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POSITION DECEMBER 1941<sup>1</sup>

### I. *Military Manpower and Materiel Position of Germany, June 22, 1941*

#### A. MANPOWER

Roughly 9,000,000 men were organized in German military and semimilitary formations at the outbreak of the Russian war. This excludes the troops of Italy, Finland, Rumania, and other allies, totaling roughly 44 divisions.

Ground forces totaled 7,500,000 organized in 300 divisions of which 25 were armored and 35 were motorized.

The German air force personnel totals about 1,200,000 including pilots, signal corps, antiaircraft forces, parachute troops, and other attached services.

It is estimated that 179 divisions has been the maximum engaged at one time in the Russian campaign. This may have amounted, including all supporting and service forces behind the combat areas, to 4,500,000 men.

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<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this study is to consider the fragmentary information available concerning German military gains and losses in the Russian campaign in relation to the German economic position as of December 1941. Its conclusions are subject to revision in the light of a special report, now being prepared by the Eastern European Section, on German gains in the Russian campaign.

## B. MATERIEL

1. Combat planes. It is estimated that Germany had approximately 24,000 combat planes available at the outbreak of the Russian war, as follows:

	First Line	Reserve	Total
Bombers, heavy (including long-range reconnaissance).....	220	220	440
Bombers, medium (including reconnaissance).....	4,250	4,250	8,500
Bombers, light (Stukas).....	1,190	1,190	2,380
Pursuit, single engine.....	2,400	2,400	4,800
Pursuit, twin engine.....	2,250	2,250	4,500
Observation and cooperative.....	900	900	1,800
Flying boats, navy fighters and amphibians.....	(?)	(?)	(?)
Total.....	11,660	11,660	23,320

Approximately 50 percent of the German first line plane strength has been employed on the Russian front; i. e., about 6,000 planes.

2. *Tanks*.—It is estimated that Germany had 30,000 tanks on hand at the opening of hostilities. It is to be noted that Germany is favoring the use of medium and heavy types of tanks.

3. *Artillery*.—An average estimate of 13,500 guns is submitted as between a British estimate of 15,000 and an American of 12,000. Heavy antiaircraft guns amounted to an additional 9,000. The number of antiaircraft (47 mm.) on hand is not known, but it is to be noted that these are employed for antitank purposes as well.

4. The percentage of total equipment used on the eastern front is approximately in proportion to the number of divisions operating there.

### C. MILITARY MATERIEL PRODUCTION RATES

1. *Planes.*—The present estimated monthly production rate of German combat airplanes by types is as follows:

Bombers (including heavy, medium and long-range reconnaissance).....	770
Light bombers.....	230
Pursuit.....	730
Army cooperation, coastal, etc.....	230
Total.....	1,960

2. *Tanks.*—Monthly production rate is estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,700 tanks, with heavy and medium types predominating.

3. *Artillery, light, heavy and antiaircraft.*—It is estimated that field guns and howitzers were being produced in April 1941 at the rate of 235 per month; while heavy antiaircraft guns were produced at a rate of 150 per month.

4. *Trucks.*—Production in Germany and occupied countries may amount to 10,000 per month.

## II. German Military Losses in the Russian War

### A. MANPOWER.

Two announcements have come from German official sources regarding German casualties in the Russian war. The first, emanating from the High Command, estimated losses to August 31; the second, made by Hitler, December 11, presented figures up to December 1. These estimates, together with a derived estimate of the losses from August 31, to December 1, are presented in the following table:

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
June 22-Aug. 31.....	85,896	296,770	20,299	402,965
June 22-Dec. 1.....	162,314	577,767	33,334	773,515
Aug. 31-Dec. 1.....	76,418	280,997	13,035	370,550



The two official estimates are roughly consistent, in that the proportions among killed, wounded, and missing are similar. They would indicate, however, a much lower casualty rate for the latter three than for the first two months of the campaign. Average daily casualties, from these official German figures, would be roughly 5,750 to August 31, only 4,072 from August 31 to December 1. While it is certainly true that with lengthened supply lines and weakened Russian resistance, the numbers of German troops actually engaged has decreased, it must be remembered that in the period August 31 to December 1 the following actions against heavy resistance have taken place: capture of Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Rostov, the Crimean campaign, the closing of the ring around Leningrad, the Dnieper crossing and two major drives on Moscow, the first of which (Vyasma-Bryansk) was announced by Hitler as the "greatest military onslaught in history."

Various arguments, nevertheless, have been advanced in favor of accepting the German published figures as accurate. It is said (a) that since the war against Russian communism is popular in Germany the army has no particular inducement to understate losses; (b) that a gross understatement would be too easily detected by the German people; (c) that in the case of earlier statements by the High Command which can be checked, the statements have proved to be accurate; (d) that the German figures are not unreasonable from what is known of German tactical methods, making due allowance for the character of the engagements and the size of the forces involved.

None of these arguments is conclusive. If losses are heavy there is always a strong inducement to understatement; nor is detection of such understatement an easy matter. The accuracy of past statements of losses *may* be explained by the fact that these losses were small. Though there is every evidence that German tactical methods have been designed to minimize manpower losses, this does not necessarily mean that losses in fact have been small.

The only alternative, however, to an acceptance of the German figures appears to be a choice among the estimates of a number of official and unofficial "observers". These range all the way from

an estimate of 800,000 in the first 5 months of war to the Russian "estimate" of 6,000,000 as of early December. None of these estimates appear to be based on a method of calculation which commands respect. Any estimate of German losses in excess of 3,000,000 for the first 6 months of the Russian war would have been incompatible with the magnitude of the German effort in this area, up to the time that the German offensive was broken off. On the other hand, a figure considerably in excess of the German reported losses is probably compatible with this effort.

A calculation based on German losses in the Polish campaign may afford a clue. Germany officially admitted 665 killed per day in the Polish campaign of 1939. Five armies were involved as against 13 on the Russian front. Assuming the same rate of loss for all armies, over a period of 170 days (i. e. to December 10) yields a figure of 294,000 killed. Using a World War ratio of 1 killed to 4 wounded indicates total casualties of approximately 1,500,000.<sup>1</sup> Resistance on the Russian front has undoubtedly been more serious than in Poland. On the other hand, with lengthening supply lines, the German forces engaged in combat have declined. In view of these considerations a figure of 1,500,000 total battle casualties to December 10 seems not unreasonable.

If the figures on plane losses given below are correct, the loss of pilots in the 5 months ending November 22 may be well over 2,000.

<sup>1</sup> This calculation represents total battle injuries; and makes no allowance for possible losses due to other causes. The following statement from the Office of the Surgeon General is revealing: "It may be presumed that the type of warfare in Russia affected by tanks, motorized infantry, aviation, excessive cold, rapid movements, supply difficulties, fatigue, etc., will produce high mortality rates. Typhus fever, always endemic in this area, is probably running wild, as there is little opportunity for delousing and bathing. Dysenteries may be taking a heavy toll and pneumonia, meningitis and other respiratory borne infections are probably on the increase. Without definite figures, it may be presumed that mortality rates for specific age groups of German males are higher in the Russian front than they would be for same groups at home during normal conditions. As to German soldiers in quiet areas the rates should not be higher than normal."



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## B. MATÉRIEL LOSSES

Losses include both matériel destroyed in battle and the considerable percentage which must be replaced under the hard conditions of active service.

1. Best available reports seem to indicate that the German Air Force lost approximately 1,500 planes in the first two months of the Russian campaign. If subsequent losses have been proportionate, then total losses in the first six months of war have probably been about 4,500 planes of all types. It is estimated that perhaps 10-15% of this equipment could be made serviceable through repairs. It will be noted that the monthly rate of loss appears to be less than the monthly plane production rate, for all types; although a considerable additional loss has undoubtedly been suffered due to accidents, break-downs, and other non-combat causes.

2. Estimates of loss of other types of equipment are not available. Military advice is to the effect that matériel losses, from all causes, can be replaced from existing stocks and current production. German losses have been mitigated, as well, by the fact that Germany has gained control of most of the battle fields, and thus held a good part of its own and Russian damaged equipment.

3. Total military petroleum consumption since the outbreak of the Russian war is considered to be in the neighborhood of 620,000 tons per month of which approximately 75,000 tons are consumed by the air service. This rate of consumption involves some incursion into petroleum stocks.

## OTHER FACTORS

Reflection on the fragmentary material available concerning German losses suggests that although replacement of lost manpower and equipment has not presented serious difficulties to date, the following considerations may be important:

1. If German casualties are concentrated in the age group 21-33 (but particularly in the age group 21-28), replacements of losses by soldiers drawn from the same age group may become difficult, due

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1945 GERMAN

MEN

age groups

46-65

7.5 MILLION

11. MILLION

23-45

24. MILLION

4.5 MILLION

2.5 MILLION



killed

wounded

missing

out of 9 million men  
in the German armed forces

TOTAL MEN 38,800,000

GRAND TOTAL

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# WOMEN

and groups

1935



Greater Germany

Germany  
Austria  
Sudetenland

93-27

TOTAL WOMEN 40,600000

7,400,000 PEOPLE

125612

to the unnaturally small size of that group within the German population.

2. The extension and maintenance of a 2,000-mile front, at increasing distances from German centers of production, has created a disproportionate demand for railway equipment and other transport facilities.

3. Since German plane losses have been principally in bombers, they are somewhat more serious than the over-all figures would indicate. In view of reserves and the current production rate, however, plane losses are not to be regarded as a major German cost in the present campaign.

4. The magnitude of oil consumption in Germany and occupied countries when combined with military consumption, seems definitely to create, at least temporarily, a situation in which consumption is at a greater rate than production.

### III. *The German Economic Position*

#### A. GERMAN MANPOWER RESOURCES

1. As early as 1935 the present regime in Germany began to extend a system of controls over employment; by 1936 a large-scale plan for the control of employment and the inventory, training, re-training, and allocation of labor was in effect. As a result of the carrying out of this plan Germany is in an extremely good position to make the most flexible and efficient use of her labor supplies.

2. At the outbreak of the war in 1939 the potential manpower resources of Greater Germany were already utilized to an extraordinarily high degree. It is estimated that employment in 1939 was 20 percent higher than in the prosperous year 1929.

3. Before the outbreak of the war in 1939, 2,500,000 men were withdrawn from employment into the armed services. At the outbreak of the Russian campaign this number had been increased by approximately 7 million.

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4. Estimates based on German sources indicate that, in partial replacement of the 7 million withdrawn from employment, Germany since 1939 has made the following additions to its labor force:

Foreign civilians.....	1,600,000
Prisoners of war.....	1,500,000
Women.....	500,000
Men.....	500,000
Volksdeutsche.....	150,000
	<hr/>
	4,250,000

5. Qualitative impairment of the labor force has been as important as the net reduction in numbers. Prisoners of war, Polish and Italian civilian workers, men called back from retirement, and women workers do not provide adequate replacement for the men of active age drawn into military service.

6. Industrial output per hour worked showed no net increase between 1933 and 1939, and has undoubtedly declined since 1939, even among those employed in their normal occupations. This decline has been accentuated by the qualitative impairment of the labor force. The decline in average productivity per man-hour has been only partially offset by an increase in the number of hours worked per week.


7. As a result of the reduction and dilution of the labor force, together with some material shortages and transportation difficulties, there has occurred a decline in the volume of industrial output in Germany since 1939 which has been estimated by the BMEW to be as much as 20 percent. While evidence is lacking to support this figure, it is clear that total output has fallen. This decline was concentrated in the goods and services available to civilian consumers, while production of war materials probably increased.

8. Previous to 1939 the shift in production from civilian to military output had been such as to reduce per capita production and consumption of civilian goods by 10-15 percent below the 1929 level. Since 1939 this shift has been accentuated. Perhaps the most illuminating evidence of the concentration of effort in war production is the increase in employment in the metal trades by approximately 2,200,000, an increase of roughly 50 percent.



**MAY**

**1939** Before the outbreak of the war in 1939 the 40 million workers in Greater Germany were practically all employed.



There were 2 million men in the armed forces

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
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1941

The number employed had fallen to about 37 million in spite of recruitment of about 4 million new workers.



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9. Judgment as to the existence of a general manpower shortage in Germany is a matter of definition. It is obvious that manpower resources under German control are not sufficient for the maintenance of normal output for German civilians plus the requirements of the present war effort. A more reasonable criterion would be the maintenance of the present war effort plus a tolerable level of civilian output. There are evidences that this standard is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in Germany, especially since the outbreak of the Russian war, despite the exploitation of Continental manpower and other economic resources.

It is, however, impossible to allocate exactly the extent to which a manpower shortage, as opposed to shortages in transport, raw materials, and productive capacity, is responsible for present strains. Specific evidences of manpower shortage, by this definition are the extraordinarily long hours of work demanded of German labor; and the extreme efforts made to employ special types of foreign labor; e. g., Polish miners, Belgian and Dutch engineers, etc. A general manpower shortage, however, must be regarded as one of several over-all limits to German output, rather than as a bottleneck capable, in itself, of precipitating crisis.

10. Germany's most decisive and least manageable manpower problem is the shortage of men suitable for active combat troops. Here foreign manpower can be used to a strictly limited extent, and war prisoners are useless.

Due to the great fall in the number of births in 1914-18, Germany has only 2,244,000 men between the ages of 23 and 28—about 1,500,000 fewer than if the pre-war birth rate had been maintained. Even including those now 21 to 23, and those 28 to 33, there are only 7.2 million men from 21 to 33, and this is the best age group for active combat.

Losses from this group, undoubtedly heavy already, are virtually irreplaceable. This shortage may prove serious in the face of protracted Russian resistance and may be decisive should the manpower resources of hitherto noncombatant areas ever be fully mobilized against Germany.

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## B. THE GERMAN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POSITION

1. Except in meats (rations for which were reduced 20 percent in June 1941) German food rations have remained about unchanged since early spring 1940. In order to assure most efficient use of available supplies, the German rationing system makes allowance for the differing requirements of various classes of consumers. They are largest for soldiers in active combat, and are larger for workers performing arduous labor than for other civilians.

2. Present German food rations can be most readily compared with pre-war consumption in the three important food groups—flour, meats, and fats and oils. For front-line soldiers, the rations of each of these items are somewhat larger than in 1936-37. For civilians as a whole, average flour rations have been reduced by 6 percent, fats and oils by 33 percent, and meats by 46 percent. The June 1941 cut in meat rations was announced as temporary. Restoration of the pre-June allotments would still leave consumer rations one-third below pre-war. German potato production is far in excess of human requirements, even though this consumption—which is not rationed—has increased by at least 50 percent for the old Reich as a whole. These increased shipments have further aggravated a transport situation which has, from time to time, created acute shortages of potatoes in some districts.

3. In terms of caloric, or energy, intake, present German diets appear adequate or nearly so; in terms of longer-run nutritional requirements for vitamins and calcium, diets are deficient. Besides lowering resistance to infection, these shortages will, if they persist, result eventually in deficiency diseases such as pellagra and rickets.

4. Without drawing on the Ukraine and without significant encroachment on existing stocks, Germany can maintain present flour rations during the crop year 1941-42. The 1941 grain crop appears to have been normal in Germany, and larger exports than in 1940-41 can be expected from the Danubian countries.

5. Present low meat rations can be maintained in Germany during the crop year 1941-42 without reduction in German livestock herds. This will involve, however, continued drastic restrictions on meat



consumption in German dominated countries as well as additional slaughter of herds in Denmark and the Netherlands. Supplies of animal feedstuffs are, in any event, inadequate to maintain livestock population in these countries. Restoration of German meat rations to the pre-June level would necessitate a reduction in German livestock numbers.


6. Fats and oils are the weakest element in Germany's food position. In the year 1940-41, the German fats and oil stockpile had to supply over 20 percent of her domestic human utilization of such foods. Stocks on August 1, 1941, were estimated at little more than one month's consumption. Domestic production can supply only about 60 percent of requirements at the current level of rationing. Further curtailment of consumption during the coming winter and spring is definitely called for, unless additional supplies not now in prospect can be obtained. The present supply position, however, permits a level of consumption above that of 1916-18.

7. The German standard of living in items other than food has undergone substantial curtailment since the outbreak of war. New clothing rations have been introduced in October which involve a reduction of 50 percent from those previously in effect. Leather has virtually ceased to be a civilian consumers good. Fuel for domestic heating has been available only in limited amounts. Most durable consumer goods, already sharply curtailed before the outbreak of war, have become unavailable. In general, however, these shortages are not as dangerous, potentially, as those in nutritional foodstuffs.

8. Only the German position with respect to meats, fats, and oils emerges, as of possible strategic importance in the area of the economy examined here. Supplies for the 1941-42 year, however, may not present any insuperable difficulties. But, Germany will enter the 1942-43 year with depleted stocks of these commodities. Her present sources of imports will be able to provide less than in the current year, and it is unlikely that a victory in Russia can appreciably add to her prospects. Germany will have to depend more upon home production, particularly of livestock—which supplies the bulk of domestic fats and oils, as well as meats.

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To some extent caloric deficiency resulting from reduced consumption of fats, meats flour and other commodities has been met by increased consumption of potatoes which are not yet rationed.

Percentages are based on consumption of average soldier in pre-war period (1934-'37) = 100

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9. Allotments of phosphate fertilizers in 1940-41 were about 40 percent of those in 1937-38. Crop yields in Germany may be adversely affected if increased supplies do not become available for next year's crops.

### C. THE GERMAN MINERAL SUPPLY POSITION

1. In the period 1933-39 Germany prepared for a major war by taking the following types of action with respect to minerals in which her domestic supply was deficient:

- (a) Large scale imports for stockpiling.
- (b) Rigid controls and, later, restrictions on civilian consumption.
- (c) The provision of facilities for the manufacture of substitutes on a large scale (notably oil).
- (d) The substitution of abundant for scarce materials (notably the light metals and zinc for copper).

The German mineral position was materially strengthened as a result of the campaigns of 1940 by the acquisition of additional stocks and of new mineral resources.

2. Deficiencies in certain commodities have, nevertheless, persisted, and the Russian campaign has probably accentuated them, insofar as it calls for increased output in the aircraft and armament industries. Excluding the steel-hardening alloys, examined below, the present position of the German mineral supply may be summarized as follows:

*German Position Secure:* Bauxite and magnesite, coal and lignite, iron ore, manganese (assuming Nikopol mines available), zinc ore, lead ore, and mercury.

*German Position Strained But Not Yet Critical:* Copper, tin, antimony, phosphates, and coke.

3. A shortage in the steel hardening alloys has persisted, despite extreme efforts at conservation and substitution. Wherever possible the alloys have been eliminated and the percentages used, reduced. In general, molybdenum and, to a lesser extent, vanadium have been substituted for the more scarce nickel and tungsten. A sum-

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mary of the German position with respect to each of the major alloys follows:

*Tungsten.*—Portuguese output being expanded and going increasingly to Germany. Despite this development and extensive substitution of molybdenum, the German stockpile is probably being reduced, since the Russian war cut off the Chinese supply.

*Molybdenum.*—Yugoslavia, Norway, French Morocco and other areas probably yield about 15% of world output to Germany. Extreme effort being made to expand Continental output. Stockpile position probably better than for tungsten, but being slowly reduced.

*Nickel.*—Perhaps most serious of all alloy shortages. Stockpile probably being reduced quickly. Limited crisis may develop unless Petsamo mines can be set to work in Finland. This seems unlikely in near future.

*Chrome.*—Conflicting evidence on amount of Balkan supply coming to Germany. Stockpile probably being reduced, although full exploitation of Balkan resources might check trend.

*Cobalt.*—Necessary for both steel and hydrogenation. French Morocco only major source of supply. Probably sufficient if freely exploited and transport made available.

*Vanadium.*—Probably sufficient supply to be drawn from steel slag and burnt oil residue.

*Manganese.*—Ample supply, if Nikopol production successfully mined and transported from Ukraine.

4. It is impossible to evaluate precisely the net significance of the various shortages within the German mineral supply position. There is no reliable evidence that either the quality or the quantity of German military production has yet suffered in consequence of such shortages; although it should be borne in mind that output could be maintained for a considerable period out of stockpiles. Stockpiles are being reduced in the case of copper, tin, antimony, nickel, chrome, and tungsten. The moment of their exhaustion can not be deduced from available evidence, although crises have been predicted by the British in copper and chrome in the course of 1942.

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#### D. THE GERMAN PETROLEUM POSITION

1. To ensure an adequate petroleum supply in case of a major war has been a prime objective of German policy since 1933. Between 1933 and 1939 the following types of action were pursued:

- (a) Large stocks were accumulated from abroad.
- (b) The domestic output of crude oil was sharply increased.
- (c) Large plant facilities were provided for the manufacture of synthetic petroleum products.
- (d) Less essential uses were curtailed.

2. The acquisition through conquest of the prime oil producing areas of Europe has probably constituted a net accretion to Germany's petroleum supply, although that accretion was limited by the simultaneous acquisition of responsibility for satisfying the minimum petroleum needs of Italy and the occupied areas.

Quantitative appraisals are subject to a wide margin of error, but the situation in the year between the end of the campaign in the West and the beginning of the campaign in Russia appears to have been roughly as follows:

(a) With the completion of the Western campaign in 1940 and with the Continent-wide application of stringent economies, it would appear that the relation between consumption and production was such as to permit at least a balance, at a level of 14-16 million tons annually, and probably some accretion to military stocks.

(b) This relatively secure situation, however, depended not only upon widespread use of substitute fuels and stringent economies but also upon the fact that the German armies were not used actively and on a large scale in the year following June 1940.

(c) Within the rough equilibrium or surplus that appears to have existed, there may have been shortages of particular products, notably Diesel fuel and lubricants; and some surplus, under existing economies, of certain types of gasoline. Some observers hold, however, that there is almost complete flexibility as regards the proportion of particular products available to Germany, provided the total basic petroleum supplies are adequate.



3. The Russian campaign has altered this situation in the following respects:

(a) Total consumption of petroleum has undoubtedly increased substantially, despite further curtailment in less essential uses.

(b) Difficulties of oil transport from Rumania to Germany, which had inhibited the effectiveness of this area as a source of supply, are reported to have been somewhat alleviated; and it has proved possible to send Rumanian oil directly North and East, to the Axis armies in the field.

(c) Russian petroleum supplies, previously available at the rate of about a million tons a year, have been cut off and this has been only partly offset by the acquisition of the Galician fields.

(d) Heavier R. A. F. bombings have probably impaired the operating efficiency of refineries and synthetic plants in Western Europe and destroyed some oil stocks.

Almost all estimates of current consumption indicate that Germany is at present maintaining its war machine partly out of petroleum stocks, accumulated before June 1941. Estimates of the rate at which depletion is proceeding vary; the extreme calculations, chiefly British, indicate that the present rate, if maintained, would exhaust German petroleum resources within the next calendar year.

4. The following factors make complete exhaustion unlikely within the next year:

(a) More moderate estimates of continental consumption suggest that the drain on stocks may be as little as 10 percent per year.

(b) The intensity of warfare, and therefore the oil consumption rate, will probably not remain steadily at its present high level.

(c) The possibility that Germany will gain control of the fairly accessible oil fields of the Northern Caucasus. In that case, substantial quantities of oil will probably be obtained, regardless of Russian sabotage and the difficulties of transport.

(d) There is still a small margin by which civilian consumption can be reduced; and the possibility of using producer and bottle gas equipment in motor vehicles and other industrial and commercial uses has not been fully exploited.

(e) New synthetic oil plants may be brought into production.



(f) The Rumanian oil fields may be exploited more fully.

5. On the basis of present evidence, therefore, it cannot be predicted that Germany will suffer a critical petroleum shortage in 1942.

## E. THE GERMAN TRANSPORT SITUATION

1. Upon the outbreak of war in 1939 the German transport system was probably in good physical condition. At that time, however, the limit of intensive utilization of rolling stock had about been reached; subsequent transport demands have been met largely by curtailing civilian services.

2. From 1939 the traffic burden of the railways has been increased by the reduction in coastwise shipping and in trucking, due to the gasoline shortage. The relocation of industry and the increased use of coal, wood pulp, bauxite, and potatoes in the development of substitutes have also increased the transport load. The acquisition of transport responsibilities in east and southeast Europe has probably involved some net liability to the German transport system. France and the Low countries, on the other hand, probably contributed an important accretion of rolling stock and locomotives.

3. Until the Russian campaign the transport facilities under German control proved adequate generally for the requirements of the war economy. This rough equilibrium was achieved by curtailing civilian services, by avoiding coincidence between the harvest peak load and large scale military movements, and through the above-mentioned accretion of rolling stock. The greatest period of strain occurred during the winter of 1939-40, when the unusually severe freeze immobilized the inland waterways (which carry 25 percent of all freight).

4. The additional burden imposed by the Russian campaign has been sufficient to cause symptoms of a transport shortage, potentially capable of reducing the total efficiency of the German war economy; coal has accumulated at pitheads in Silesia, crop movements have been delayed, measures to increase the use of waterways have been taken, and efforts have been made to speed the loading and unloading of trains. Local shortages of consumers goods have accentuated

an already difficult civilian position, both in Germany and in occupied areas.

5. The significance of the present transport shortage is difficult to evaluate on the basis of present limited information. Thus far civilians have largely borne the impact of the new strains induced by the Russian war. Coal shipments to Italy and Sweden have been reduced and shortages of supplies for German war industries have been reported. The extent and the rate at which the output of military equipment and their supply to the fighting fronts may be affected can not be stated. The immediate seriousness of the situation can readily be exaggerated, but at the very least, the shortage means that organizational and material resources, which are vitally needed in uses that contribute more directly to military success, must be devoted to the alleviation of the transport difficulties. It may be possible to measure the degree of strain more closely during the coming winter, when pressure on the German transport system would, in any case, be expected to increase.

#### F. THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN MORALE

1. From 1933, and even before, German morale was prepared for the responsibilities and hardships of offensive military action. The advent of the National Socialist regime was accompanied by the institution of elaborate efforts to control and direct public opinion to this end.

2. Nazi propaganda theorists have realized that during a modern total war efforts to control public opinion work within narrow limits: The real underlying factors remain, as elsewhere, the success, actual and prospective, of military operations and the hardships and discomforts borne by the people.

3. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 until June 1941 the strength of German morale was unquestioned. This may be regarded essentially as a consequence of the great German victories and, perhaps more important, the feeling that total victory was certain and within sight.

4. The prolonged and difficult campaign in the East has affected German morale in the following respects:

(a) Civilian supplies of all kinds have been diminished due, in part, to the pressure on transport facilities and on the labor supply.

(b) British bombing has been intensified.

(c) Manpower losses have been sufficiently heavy to impress themselves upon the public.

(d) Perhaps most important, total victory has ceased to be an immediate prospect for Germany.

5. The official response of the propaganda ministry to this situation has been to present total victory against total annihilation as the only real alternatives for the German people.

6. This suggests that the necessary condition for a "collapse of German morale" is the universal realization, as a result of serious military set-backs, that ultimate defeat is inevitable. Further drastic reductions in the civilian standard of life are capable of weakening morale in such a way as to make it more susceptible to military reverses and to collapse.

7. Another possibility must be recognized, however. Should the tide of the war run strongly against Germany it is possible that German public opinion will shift from its present offensive attitude to one of last-ditch defense; and the full power of the propaganda ministry will be directed to that end. In that case, a distinct "collapse of morale" may not occur. But even this possibility is contingent upon a belief in some chance of German victory, coupled with a conviction that Allied victory would bring vengeance and disaster to the German people rather than peace and better living.

AF

PLAIN

Bern

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

452, twenty-seventh.

German press twenty-sixth devoted to American participation in war and Japanese successes, without mentioning Axis reverses, Eastern Front, North Africa; all newspapers give prominence to Hitler's decree death penalty for misuse winter clothing collected for Front soldiers. VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER calls for enlistment noncommissioned officers for air force schools. Beginning April 1, 1942, applicants seventeen to eighteen years old enlist for twelve years. Same paper states "before Winston Churchill entered White House he was faced with fait accompli in contrast to his prototype Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt has shown himself to be a good business man. Roosevelt stated with air of dictator that agreement had been concluded between United States and Canada, head of which still remains George VI, which entirely subordinates Canada's war production United States. This agreement, advantageous to United



-2- #452, December 27, 1941 from Bern.

to United States, is another proof of steady bleeding to death British possessions and colonies, whereby Roosevelt makes England pay for America's help. This is only reason for Churchill's visit to Washington." Christmas number FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG quotes Ribbentrop interview with Spanish newspapermen thus "Mister Roosevelt is entirely responsible for extension of this war; he wanted to cut Japan off from its natural supplies of raw materials in Far East and wished to subject Japanese to laws of Wall Street millionaires. He wanted to strangle Japan just as Mister Churchill and Mister Roosevelt attempted to strangle Germany and Italy in Europe. Mister Roosevelt's method was so aggressive, insulting and meaningless that normal person must ask whether this crazy attitude could have been dictated by a sane mind". Ribbentrop stated he had been told that for some time past Mister Roosevelt has suffered from ever increasing hallucinations. Ribbentrop denied cooperation between Axis powers for attack on democracies had been planned long in advance affirming original idea of Tripartite Pact had been front against Bolshevism. When he was German Ambassador in London he had made every effort to persuade Great Britain to join Anti-Commintern Alliance. If

a25:02



-3- #452, December 27, 1941 from Bern.

Mister Roosevelt now claimed Tripartite Pact had been signed purpose conquering world, this could only be considered statement of psychopath suffering from persecution mania; actually such statement but thinly veils intentions of a megalomaniac who himself wishes to conquer world and to camouflage his intentions, accuses Tripartite partners of what he himself is striving to attain. Ribbentrop statement commenting on Washington conference ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG states conference between two statesmen is proof of catastrophic position in which two powers find themselves result destruction American Pacific fleet and threatened loss Singapore. In Berlin little interest shown in outcome of conference but symptomatic significance under present military developments strongly emphasized. Certain controversies between British and American press have already led to differences regarding tactical and strategic leadership joint campaign as remarkably revealed Washington conference. British radio comments are considered remarkably interesting giving unmistakable proof that American fleet which according to declaration Secretary Knox was seeking Japanese fleet has not hurried to rescue Philippines or Singapore.

DD

HUDDLE

a25103

*Part*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

July 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached cable from Harrison at Bern, while, of course, without confirmation, is of such possible importance that I wish to be sure that you see it.

S CH:ARK

*C.H.*

925:01

*Bern - Russo-German Peace Talks PSF  
Safe: Harrison*

MEC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Bern

Dated July 27, 1942

Rec'd 6:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3467, July 27, 6 p.m.

My 3184, July 8. Same source has obtained following from informant he considers sure.

Some time prior offensive Russia this summer Germans asked Japs sound out Soviets view separate peace. When Hitler discovered Japs using mission their own advantage administered rebuke and started offensive. Boris, knowing Hitler interested in effecting deal with Soviets, sent his brother-in-law to meet Hitler's personal physician in Switzerland while he contacted Soviets who showed willingness to talk. Exchange of views took place in Geneva. No information available how far talks have got but are continuing. Endeavoring confirm. Will report further.

HARRISON

WWC

925:02

Dec. 14.

Dear Miss Tully:

Will you try to get me some kind  
of an answer on this?

*J.F.C.*

*Bob*

a25 k01

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"  
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112  
Metropolitan 4113

December 14, 1942.

REPORT ON KEY NAZIS.

Henry Field and I have the attached list of 400 key Nazis, and expect to have a total of 4,000 such Nazi officials in the near future, on whom we are getting brief, essential biographical data. We thought that you might be interested in having the files, as they are completed, to supplement those already supplied to you by O.S.S. The entire cost of this project will be about \$1,000 and I am prepared to pay it out of the funds already assigned for this Unit, but before making any commitments I wanted to know whether such a file would be of any practical value or interest to you.

J.F.C.

a25k02



December 10, 1942

LIST OF KEY NAZIS

A

ADAM, Wilhelm . . . . .	Generalleutnant
ADANCZYK, Joseph Joachim . . . . .	Landeshauptmann der Provinz Oberschlesien Untergauleiter der NSDAP Oberschlesien
ALBRECHT, Conrad . . . . .	Vizeadmiral
ALBRECHT, Herbert . . . . .	Ph.D. agr. Reichsredner Gauleiter
ALLWOERDEN, Wilhelm von . . . . .	Senator in Hamburg Obergauleiter in Altona
ALPERS, Friedrich . . . . .	Staatsminister in Braunschweig
d'ALQUEN, Gunter . . . . .	Schriftleiter des Voelkischen Beobachter SS Obersturmfuehrer
ALTEN, Karl Wilhelm Victor von . . . . .	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Gau 15
AMANN, Max . . . . .	Verlagsdirektor Praesident der Reichspressekammer
AMEND, Otto . . . . .	Rechtsanwalt Gaufuehrer im Stab der Rechtsabteilung der Reichsleitung
AMMERLAHN, Gotthart . . . . .	Obergebietsfuehrer der H.J.
ARAUNER, Richard . . . . .	Diplomlandwirt, Siegelbewahrer des Deutschen Reichsbauernrates
ARNDT, Guenther . . . . .	Gaufuehrer des Arbeitsgaues II
ARNOLD, Alfred . . . . .	Landesbauernfuehrer in Wuerttemberg
AUTRUM, Otto . . . . .	Leiter der Oberpostdirektion

a25K03

B

BACKE, Herbert . . . . .	Reichslandwirtschafts- minister
BALLARIN, Hans-Georg . . . . .	Abteilungsleiter im Amt fuer Volkswohlfahrt
BANGERT, Heinrich . . . . .	Gaubetriebszellenobmann, Duesseldorf
BANNEMANN, Emil . . . . .	Senator Kreisamtsleiter der NSV fuer Luebeck
BARTELS, Friedrich Georg Christian . . . . .	Dr. med. Ministerialrat im Reichsministerium des Innern
BAUER, Arthur Emil . . . . .	PH.D. Hauptabteilungsleiter IV der Landesbauerns- chaft, Sachsen
BAUER, Robert . . . . .	Beauftragter der Parteileitung
BAUMANN, Hans . . . . .	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Gau 30
BEERMANN, Johannes . . . . .	Evangel. Bischof van Danzig
BEINTKER, Paul . . . . .	Referent im Aufklaerungs und Presseamt bei der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes
BEINZGER, Walter . . . . .	Landesobmann fuer die baeuerliche Selbstver- waltung Weimar
BELDING, Robert . . . . .	Reichsbetriebsgruppen- leiter Textil der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
BENNINGHOFF, Wilhelm . . . . .	Direktor Technisches Vorstandsmitglied der BVG
BENZE, Rudolf . . . . .	Ph.D Ministerialrat im Preussischen Kultusm.

BERNDT, Alfred-Ingemar . . . . .	Hauptschriftleiter des Deutschen Nachrichtenbureaus
BERNHARDT, Otto H. . . . .	Konsul von Siam a.D. Senator in Bremen
BERTRAM, Kurt . . . . .	Braunschweigischer Staatsrat
BESOLD, Andreas, Wilhelm Otto . . . . .	Praesident der Reichspostdirektion Nuernberg
BEST, Werner . . . . .	Dr. jur. Gesandter in Daenemark
BIALLAS, Hans . . . . .	Hauptschriftleiter des Fachpresseamtes der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Berlin
BEIBER, Rudolf . . . . .	Adjutant des Generals Loerzer, Berlin
BISCHOFF, Willi . . . . .	Fuehrer des Reichsverbandes Deutsche Zeitschriften
BLANK, Max . . . . .	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Duesseldorf
BLUME, Hermann . . . . .	Sonderbeauftragter des Reichsarbeitsministers fuer Musikwesen, Berlin
BOCK, Fedor von . . . . .	Generalfeldmarschall
BODMANN, Franz . . . . .	Praesident der Industrie- und Handelskammer fuer Suedhannover, Goettingen
BOENOLD, Otto . . . . .	Reichsfachschaftsleiter des NS-Lehrerbundes, Berlin
BOERGER, Wilhelm Heinrich . . . . .	Treuhaender der Arbeit Preussischer Staatsrat, Koeln
BOHLE, Ernst Wilhelm . . . . .	Gauleiter, Staatssekretaer im Auswaertigen Amt Leiter der NSDAP im Stabe des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers
BOLLMANN, Hans . . . . .	PH.D. Hauptschriftleiter im Deutschen Nachrichtenbureau, Berlin
BOLTZ, Wilhelm . . . . .	Polizeipraesident von Hamburg

BONGARD, Oscar . . . . .	Militaerintendant Referent im Reichsministerium des Innern
BONSEN, Rudolf zur . . . . .	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesident Stettin
BOUHLER, Philipp . . . . .	Reichsleiter, Muenchen
BRAUCHITSCH, Walter von . . . . .	Generalfeldmarschall
BREDOW, Reinhard . . . . .	Landesbauernfuehrer im Reichsbauernamt
BRESGEN, Hermann . . . . .	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesident Schneidemuehl
BRETZLER, Joseph . . . . .	Dr. rer.pol. Stabsleiter des Generalsekretariats beim Reichsstand des Deutschen Handwerks, Berlin
BRILL, Justin . . . . .	Dr. rer.pol. Referent des Fuehrer des Reichsbundes des deutschen Beamten, Berlin
BRINCKMANN, Paul A. . . . .	Schatzmeister der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
BRINKMANN, Edgar F.H. . . . .	Verlagsdirektor Amtsleiter der Reichsleitung der NSDAP
BRIX, Emil . . . . .	Oberbuergemeister der Stadt Altona
BRUCKER, Ludwig . . . . .	Leiter des Amtes fuer Sozialversicherung in der Deutschen Arbeitsfront Beauftragter des Reichsarbeitsministers zur Fuehrung des Reichsverbandes der Ortskrankenkassen, Berlin
BRUECKNER, Friedrich Wilhelm . . . . .	Adjutant des Reichskanzlers und Ober - Gruppenfuehrer der SA
BRUECKNER, Helmuth . . . . .	Oberpraesident van Schlesien Gauleiter, Breslau
BUCH, Walter . . . . .	Reichsleiter des Obersten Parteigerichts

a25k06

BUERCKEL, Joseph . . . . .	Gauleiter
BURCHARD-MOTZ, Wilhelm . . . . .	Dr. jur. Senator 2. Buergermeister in Hamburg
BURGSTALLER, Ulrich . . . . .	Senator Luebeck
BUSCH, Karl . . . . .	Hauptschriftleiter des "Deutschen" und Amtsleiter der Obersten Leitung der PO der NSDAP
BUSCH, Walther . . . . .	Dr. Jur. Oberbuergermeister, Meissen
C	
CARIUS, Karl . . . . .	Gaubetriebszellenobmann Suedhannover, Braunschweig
CERFF, Karl . . . . .	Gebietsfuehrer Abteilungsleiter Rundfunk in der Reichsjugendfuehrung Beauftragter des Reichsjugendfuehrers in der Reichssendeleitung, Berlin
CHRIST, Ludwig . . . . .	Oberbuergermeister der Stadt Trier
CHRISTIANSEN, Carl Friedrich . . . . .	Polizeipraesident von Harburg-Wilhelmsburg
CHRISTIANSEN, Friedrich . . . . .	General der Flieger; Militaergovernor von Holland
CLASSEN, Franz . . . . .	Treuhaender der Arbeit Wirtschaftsgebiet Pommern Stettin
CONTI, Leonardo . . . . .	M.D. Staatsrat Ministerialrat im Preussischen Ministerium des Innern, Berlin
COSSEL, Maximilian von . . . . .	Adjutant des Reichskriegsopferfuehrers, Berlin
CSAKI, Richard . . . . .	PH.D. Leiter des Deutschen Auslandsinstitutes, Stuttgart

a25k07



D

DAITZ, Werner . . . . .	Gesandter Leiter der Abteilung Aussenhandel im Aussenpolitischen Amt der NSDAP, Berlin
DALUEGE, Kurt . . . . .	Ministerialdirektor im Reichsinnenministerium; General der Preussischen Landespolizei now: Heydrichs successor in Prague
DAMRAU, Hans . . . . .	Dr. Jur. Kommissarischer Oberbuergermeister, Iserlohn
DAUSER, Hans . . . . .	Staatssekretaer, Obermenzing b. Muenchen
DEECKE, Karl . . . . .	Landwirt und Domaenenpaechter, Landesobmann
DEWITZ, Hermann von . . . . .	Hauptgeschaeftsfuehrer im Reichsstand des Deutschen Handels, Berlin
DIECKELMANN, Bruno . . . . .	Gaubetriebszellenleiter Reichsbetriebsgruppenleiter, Oldenburg
DIETRICH, Hans Albert . . . . .	Prof. Dr. med. Landesobermedizianalrat Direktor der Landesfrauenklinik
DIETRICH, Otto . . . . .	Dr. rer.pol. Reichspressechef der NSDAP, Berlin; Staatssekretaer im Propagandaministerium
DIETZE, Paul . . . . .	Landesgruppenfuehrer im Reichsluftschutzbund, Berlin
DOEHLA, Heinrich . . . . .	Polizeigeneral und Inspektor der uniformierten Staatspolizei, Muenchen
DOENECKE, Werner . . . . .	Dr.jur. Buergermeister, Blankenburg
Drechsler, Otto Heinrich . . . . .	Buergermeister Luebeck
DREIER, Karl . . . . .	Landespraesident, Bueckeburg
DRESSLER - ANDRESS, Horst . . . . .	Ministerialrat Leiter des gesamten deutschen Rundfunkwesens, Berlin

DREYER, Otto . . . . .	Landeshauptabteilungs- leiter III, Gollenberg
DUENNEBIER, Helmuth . . . . .	Polizeidirektor von Zwickau
DUNKEL, Hermann . . . . .	Hauptabteilungsleiter II der Landesbauern- schaft Westfalen
DUSCHOEN, Ernest . . . . .	Landesobmann der NSBO Bezirksleiter der DAF, Koenigsberg
E	
EBERT, Karl Wilhelm . . . . .	Praesident des Landesfinanzamtes Leipzig
EGGELING, Joachim Albrecht . . . . .	Landesbauernfuehrer Sachsen-Anhalt Staatsrat
EHLERS, Hans . . . . .	Praeses der Gewerbekam- mer Bremen
EICHINGER, Friedrich . . . . .	Reichsstabsleiter der Reichshauptabteilung IV des Reichsnahrstandes Berlin
EISENBECK, Martin B. . . . .	Gauebreitsfuehrer, Frankfurt/O.
ELTZ-RUEBENACH, Kuno . . . . .	Reichsfreiherr Landesbauernfuehrer der Rheinprovinz, Burg Wahn
ELTZ-RUEBENACH, Paul . . . . .	Freiherr von Reichsminister fuer Post und Verkehr
ENGEL, Fritz Karl . . . . .	Polizeipraesident, Stettin SS-Oberfuehrer
ENGEL, Johannes . . . . .	Bezirksleiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront Stadtrat fuer das Volkschulwesen, Berlin
ENGELBRECHT, Otto . . . . .	Leiter des Organization- samtes der National- sozialistischen Kriegsopferversorgung, Berlin

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ENGELKEN, Dietrich, Windelar . . . . .	Senator, Hamburg
EPP, Ritter von . . . . .	Reichsstatthalter von Bayern, Muenchen
ERBERSDOBLER, Otto . . . . .	Praesident der niederbayerischen Handelskammer Passau. Regensburg
ERDMANN, Walter . . . . .	Landesobmann der Landesbauernschaft Sachsen
ERNST, Robert . . . . .	Dr. rer.pol. Bundesfuehrer des Deutschen Schutzbundes, Berlin
ESSER, Hermann . . . . .	Bayerischer Wirtschaftsminister, Muenchen
ETTERICH, Arthur . . . . .	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Koblenz
EVERS, Emil . . . . .	Landrat, Koethen
EXSS, Ernst . . . . .	Polizeihauptmann, Stettin
F	
FAATZ, Fr. Wilhelm . . . . .	Gauarbeitsfuehrer Wiesbaden
FABRICIUS, Hans Eugen Stephan . . . . .	Dr. Jur. Oberregierungsrat Berlin
FIEBING, Hermann . . . . .	Landeshauptmann der Provinz Grenzmark-Posen-Westpreussen, Schneidemuehl
FIEHLER, Karl . . . . .	Oberbuergermeister, Muenchen
FISCHER, Hugo . . . . .	Stellvertretender Reichspropagandaleiter der NSDAP Reichsfachschaftsfuehrer der NSRDW, Muenchen
FISCHER, Ludwig . . . . .	Dr.jur.Reichsamtsleiter stellvertretender Leiter der Rechtsabteilung Reichsleitung der NSDAP SA Standartenfuehrer

FLECK, Wolfgang . . . . .	General
FLORIAN, Friedrich Karl . . . . .	Gauleiter der NSDAP, Duesseldorf
FOERSTER, Friedrich . . . . .	Oberbuergermeister, Ulm
FOERSTER, Richard . . . . .	Admiral
FORSTER, Albert . . . . .	Preussischer Staatsrat Gauleiter Danzig
FRANK, Hans . . . . .	Reichsjustizkommissar; Generalgouverneur von Polen; Staatsminister der Justiz Praesident der Akademie fuer Deutsches Recht Fuehrer des Bundes Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen, Berlin
FRANZ, Hermann Friedrich . . . . .	Polizeidirektor, Plauen
FREISLER, Roland . . . . .	Justiz-minister Preussischer Staatsrat, Berlin
FREY, Kurt . . . . .	Treuhaender der Arbeit fuer Bayern, Muenchen
FREYTACH-LORINGHOVEN, Axel . . . . .	Freiherr von, Dr. jur. Universitaetsprofessor Preussischer Staatsrat
FRICK, Wilhelm . . . . .	Dr. jur. Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin
FRITSCH, Karl . . . . .	Saechsischer Staatsminister des In ern und stellvertre- tender Gauleiter, Dresden
FRITSCH, Theodor, Frohmund Herbert . . . . .	Obergruppenleiter der NSDAP, Leipzig
FRITSCH, Hanns . . . . .	Dr. jur. Ordentliches Mitglied der Akademie des Deutschen Rechts
FROMM, Ernst . . . . .	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesi- dent des Regierungsbezirks Potsdam

FROMM, Fritz . . . . . - 10 - General

FUNK, Walther . . . . . Reichswirtschaftsminister

G

GAREIS, Hanns . . . . . Dr. rer.pol. Diplomland-  
wirt Reichsnaehrstand,  
Berlin

a25 K12



GELBERG, Wilhelm Eberhard.....	Polizeipraesident, Krefeld Sturmbannfuehrer
GERCKE, Achim .....	Der Sachverstaendige fuer Rassenforschung beim Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin
GIESECKE, Gustav.....	Landesbauernfuehrer, Braunschweig
GOEBBELS, Joseph .....	Ph.D. Reichsminister fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda, Berlin
GOERDELER, Carl Friedrich .....	Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeister, Leipzig
GOERLACH, Richard Wilhelm Dietrich ..	Oberlandwirtschaftsrat Reichskommissar Reichsministerium fuer Ernaehrung, Berlin
GOERING, Hermann .....	Ministerpraesident Reichsminister der Luftfahrt, Berlin; etc.
GOERLITZER, Artur .....	Stellvertretender Gauleiter, Berlin
GOHDES, Otto .....	Reichsschulungsleiter der NSDAP und DAF Leiter des Amtes Ausbildung der NS- Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude"
GOLTZ, Ruediger.....	Graf von der, Generalmajor a.D.
GOLTZ, Ruediger.....	Graf von der, Dr. jur. Preussischer Staatsrat Stellvertreter des Fuehrers der Gesamt - organisation der Wirtschaft, Stettin
GREINER, Erich .....	Dr. jur. Ministerialdirektor im Reichs-ministerium fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propa- ganda, Berlin

GRIMM, Wilhelm ..... Reichsleiter der NSDAP, Muenchen  
GRIMME, Hans ..... Generalleutnant a.D. Praesident  
des Reichsluftschutzbundes,  
Berlin  
GROHE, Josef ..... Gauleiter des Gaues Koeln-Aachen  
Preussischer Staatsrat  
GROSS, Hermann ..... Diplomlandwirt,  
Gruender der Bauernschaft Saar  
GRUNERT, Richard ..... Polizeipraesident Muenchen-Gladbach,  
Rheydt  
GUETT, Arthur ..... M.D. Ministerialdirektor  
Leiter der Abteilung Volksgesundheit  
im Reichsministerium des Innern  
GUNZER, Karl ..... Leiter der Landesstelle Schlesien des  
Reichsministeriums fuer Volksaufklae-  
rung und Propaganda, Breslau  
GUTSMIEDL, Franz ..... Reichsbetriebsgruppenleiter  
Landwirtschaft der Deutschen  
Arbeitsfront, Berlin  
  
H  
HAAKE, Heinrich ..... Landeshauptmann, Rheinprovinz,  
Duesseldorf  
HABES, Wilhelm ..... Landesbauernobmann der Provinz  
Westfalen, Muenster  
HADAMOVSKY, Eugen ..... Reichssendeleiter  
Direktor der Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft,  
Berlin  
HAID, August ..... Fuehrer der Deutschen Angestelltenschaft,  
Berlin  
HAMANN, Erhardt ..... M.D. Vorsitzender der Aerztekammer  
Sachsen, Halle

HANKE, Karl.....Staatssekretaer im Reichsministerium fuer  
Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda, Berlin

HARDT, Otto .....Generalstaatsanwalt Koenigsberg/Pr.

HASSELMAYR, Friedrich....SA Gruppenfuehrer, Muenchen

HAUSHOFER, Karl.....Universitaetsprofessor, Muenchen; General a.D.

HAYLER, Franz .....Reichsbeauftragter fuer den Deutschen  
Einzelhandel, Muenchen

HEINKEL, Ernst .....Flugzeugkonstrukteur

HEINZE, Bruno, Otto, Hermann...Gauarbeitsfuehrer Oberschlesien, Oppeln

HELLDORF, Wolf .....Graf von, Polizeipraesident von Berlin

HERRMANN, Fritz .....Polizeipraesident von Hagen

HESS, Fritz .....Bauer und Buergermeister, Dannenfels

HESS, Rudolf Walter Richard..Stellvertreter des Fuehrers a.D.  
now Prisoner-of-War in England

HESSE, Wilhelm ..... Ph.D. Oberbuergermeister, Braunschweig

HIERL, Constantin .....Staatssekretaer fuer den Arbeitsdienst

HILDEBRANDT, Richard ....SS - Brigadefuehrer, Goerlitz

HILGENFELDT, Erich.....Amtsleiter im Amt fuer Volkswohlfahrt  
bei der Obersten Leitung der PO der NSDAP,  
Berlin

HILLEBRANDT, Albert.....Oberbuergermeister, Muenster

HILLMER, Theodor.....Dr. jur. Praesident des Landesfinanzamtes  
Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel

HIMMLER, Heinrich ..... Reichsfuehrer der SS  
Kommandeur der gesamten deutschen Polizei

HINKLER, Paul ..... Polizeipraesident von Altona-Wandsbeck

HOFFMANN, Heinrich ..... Reichsbildberichterstatter der NSDAP, Berlin

HOFFMANN, Hans Georg.....Regierungspraesident von Ober- und  
Mittelfranken Obergruppenfuehrer der SA  
Suedost, Ansbach

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JOEL, Georg.....Ministerpraesident, Oldenburg

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Preussischer Staatsrat, Halle

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SCHIRACH, Baldur von . . . . .	Reichsjugendfuehrer
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Glienicke Admirak<sup>l</sup> a.D.

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a.D.

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in Bayern

WAGNER, Robert . . . . . Gauleiter  
Reichsstatthalter, Karlsruhe

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Herby folder

FOR THE PRESIDENT



C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

*Lock Box*

FROM: Lt. Comdr. Earle  
TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins

DATE: 2 October 1943

REFERENCE MY LAST TELEGRAM REGARDING POSSIBLE GERMAN REPRISALS. MAVROUDI TURKISH CITIZEN OF GREEK BLOOD CORRESPONDENT HERE LONDON TIMES GIVES ME FOLLOWING: GERMAN WOMAN CONSIDERED RELIABLE TELLS HIM SHE PERSONALLY SAW 3 WEEKS AGO LETTER ADDRESSED TO ALL HIGH GERMAN OFFICIALS FROM BERLIN TELLING THEM TO HAVE NO WORRY ABOUT MILITARY SITUATION AS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME AN ATTACK SO TERRIBLE WOULD BE MADE ON ENGLAND THAT FEW BRITISH INHABITANTS WOULD SURVIVE. THE NATURE OF THE ATTACK WAS NOT GIVEN. MAVROUDI WITH ME BELIEVES THIS IS GERMAN PROPAGANDA BUT HE AND I ARE NOT SO SURE. I ASK MYSELF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: FIRST WOULD HITLER, GOERING, GOEBBELS REPEATEDLY PROMISE TO GERMAN PEOPLE TERRIBLE REPRISALS FOR SO CALLED BRITISH TERROR RAIDS REALIZING FAILURE OF THESE REPRISALS TO MATERIALIZE WOULD INTENSIFY ALREADY BAD GERMAN MORALE AND COMPLETELY DISCREDIT THEMSELVES. SECOND ARE THE NAZI LEADERS SO STUPID AS TO BELIEVE CIRCULATION OF VAGUE AND OMINOUS WHISPERS OF IMPENDING DOOM WOULD MODIFY UNITED NATIONS TERMS OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THIRD IS COMPARATIVE INACTIVITY OF LUFTWAFFE AN INDICATION OF PREPARATIONS FOR SOME GREAT BLITZ.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 904001

By HRM/SG, NARA, Date 2/15/91

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL RETIRE

~~SECRET~~

FROM: ANKARA, BEYOGLU, TURKEY  
TO: MR. EARLY/ROPSINS  
DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1943

ITALIAN AIR ATTACHE CALLED TODAY TO ANNOUNCE READINESS  
COOPERATE. HE SAYS RELATIVE INACTIVITY OF LUFTWAFFE DUE  
FUEL SHORTAGE AND GIVES NO CREDENCE TO GERMAN THREAT DESCRIBED  
IN WY 031313.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

GSD Letter, May 3, 1972

By *DM*, DATES 3/22/55

~~SECRET~~

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*100-111111*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*- Safe File: Germany  
PSF*

September 20, 1944.


This is a very rough suggestion  
made by me -- among others -- for a  
subdivision of Germany after the peace.

F.D.R.

*25*

GERMAN IV

No. 221



GOODE'S SERIES OF BASE MAPS  
REVISED EDITION

Prepared by Henry M. Leppard  
Published by the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois  
Copyright 1918 by the University of Chicago

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5-12-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Breck Long asked me to give  
this to you.

E.M.W.  
E.M.W.



Safe : German

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sure you will be interested to receive the attached memoranda marked 5 and 5a of the series and of which this is #2 of this paper. It is translated from the German. It is secret and is being used in the same manner its predecessors have been used. In case you should care to show it to others, please be good enough to impress upon them that it must not be alluded to nor quoted from. Our information is definitely confirmed to the effect that the whole series represents an authoritative disclosure of the situations with which they deal.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

Memorandum 5;  
Memorandum 5a.

The President,  
The White House.

~~Secret~~

# 2

5.

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SUPPLEMENT TO THE ECONOMIC BALANCE  
SHEET

The Food Situation

1.

The economic situation was discussed in special memorandums of January - March of this year, the following fields being covered:

1. Reich finances;
2. Situation with respect to raw materials;
3. Labor;
4. Establishment of the "new order" in Europe;

The developments show further aggravation of the situation in all fields. In detail:

1. Diminishing supplies of industrial raw materials for military equipment or supply and for the supplying of the civilian population;

2. Unavoidable shortage of trained male workers in industrial plants and farm operations; an unsystematic organization of the plants by the use of foreign labor;

3. Stringencies in the financial position; deficiencies in taxes in consequence of restriction of consumption by the population; further credit inflation of the Reich and accelerated and constantly greater immobilization of the credit system (banks, savings institutions, insurance companies, etc.)

2.

The Balance of Foodstuffs and Feedi

The voluminous memoranda and statistics, as well as the plans drawn up in the agrarian sector in January-March of this year for agriculture in the economic year 1941-42 show as the result the following picture of the situation:

A. For the territory of Greater Germany;

B. For Greater Germany under the influence of Italy and the occupied territories in western and northern Europe (without eastern and southeastern Europe.)

With the use of the existing reserves of foodstuffs in Germany and counting on the new and smaller consumption quotas for man and beast in Germany, Italy and the occupied territories, which differ in amount and quality for all the different countries, and including the still expected amounts of imports from the tripartite pact countries and from Russia, the following figures for the balance are found, according to a summary of the results of the memoranda referred to:

	Germany %	Occupied Europe (& Italy) %
Supply of bread . . . . .	.90	70 - 75
Supply of fat . . . . .	.60 - 65	40 - 50
Supply of meat . . . . .	80 - 85	80
Balance of feeding-stuffs . . . .	70 - 75	50 - 60

These

These figures will go up or down according to the development of weather conditions and possibilities of cultivation, the labor available, etc., in Germany and the occupied territories.

3.

No opinion can be stated as to the winter wheat. The damage done during the winter appears to be less, however, than in 1940.

For 1941 the plans for cultivation have been made. Their accomplishment depends on the provision of farm labor and machinery, fertilizer and the further course of war demands.

The shortage of two and a half million farm laborers is to be made up for by agricultural workers from Poland and other eastern states, prisoners of war from the west, etc., However, the lack of agricultural overseers remains a decisive factor.

The supply of horses and farm machinery is inadequate. The machine industry can not supply tractors and other machines. Systematic joint use of the machinery available is to fill in the gaps.

The plan for cultivation is to keep the areas under cultivation for grains hitherto and also to open new areas to cultivation for a larger yield of root crops, such as potatoes, sugar beets and feeding-stuffs containing proteins.

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# 2

April 1941.

Prefatory remark:

This statement is based on the same tested reports and data as designated in the January memorandum. All data are from the period up to the end of March 1941.

I.

Further Preparations for the Opening of  
German Offensive Operations.

1.

The putting into line of 10-12 divisions for the Balkan theater of war has been accomplished.

Because of the military front against Yugoslavia it is proposed to double the number of the German forces that it was expected to use. The putting of the armies from Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria into line is contemplated, partly on the new Balkan front and partly to counterbalance the withdrawals from the German eastern front.

2.

Systematic reenforcement of the strategic positions for concentration on the border of Soviet Russia, partly by fully motorized divisions.

The troop contingents for use under numbers 1 and 2 come from the army corps stationed at home, as well as detachments from the units of the armies of occupation in the occupied areas of the west, also from the invasion army corps in particular.

3.



- 2 -

3.

The disposition of the troops used against Soviet Russia is said to be as follows, according to the preparations for concentration:

Part One - Operation: East Prussia and the Baltic (with subsequent union of the advancing German armies, in combination with contingents from northern Norway, Sweden and Finland also being drawn in.

Part Two - Operation: Northern Ukraine, with Kharkov as final objective.

Part Three - Operation: Bessarabia and southern Ukraine, with Rostov as final objective.

May was set as the time for the conclusion of the groupings now going on, and of all supply organizations.

This time could not be adhered to in consequence of the greater seriousness of the Balakn situation.

4.

Regarding the Channel offensive or landing operation against England:

a. See the data in the memorandum of January of this year.

b. The main effort in connection with the continued further preparations consists chiefly in expansion and strengthening of the air arm; great increase in all branches, in aircraft and personnel. To the known and improved types

of scouts, pursuit planes, demolition planes, light and heavy bombers, etc., the following have recently been added:

Large landing and transport planes. The new planes have a carrying capacity of from 125 to 150 men with full equipment. In addition there are special types for the transportation of one-man tanks, artillery arms and engineer material, as well as other offensive and defensive weapons of all types for close and long-range combat (such as flame projectors, bombs, shells, anti-tank arms, rapid-fire and other arms).

The transport planes are combined with several rather large gliders. As the result of new inventions, the latter are hooked onto the transport airplanes. Take-off, transportation in the air and release are effected by automatic devices and releases. In February these landing planes were tested with positive results. The construction procedure is that of Messerschmidt, of Augsburg and Regensburg.

The production calculated is based on the transportation of 300,000 men (about 100 divisions) within a given number of hours, including take-off and landing. The air distances are calculated. There are besides the special transports for the heavy munitions of war.

Aircraft

Aircraft production was further shifted during the winter months of 1940-41, as for example Messerschmidt, Augsburg-Regensburg, etc. For example, Junkers and Heinkel have compact production centers (building of engines and assembling) at Dessau and Rostock. The rate of production has been reduced by decentralization.

5.

Operations at sea. Besides the known crossing boats, there are newly built fighting boats and assault boats with the most modern defensive and offensive weapons for sea and coastal fighting. Special significance is attached to the torpedo arm, which is being developed at Eckernförde, northwest of Kiel, the only experimental and testing establishment.

II.

The Generally Operating Forces of a Military  
and Strategic Nature.

The demands made on the German army, air force and Navy to an increasing extent since January of this year are due to:

1.

The dropping out of the Italian army, including the air force and the navy; this means an unexpected tying up of rather strong German forces in the Mediterranean area (including North Africa), as well as in the Balkans facing

Greece

Greece (and now Yugoslavia). The command of the German army has to make dispositions in advance in accordance with the internal political developments in Italy itself (peril to the Fascist regime from within), so that other divisions must remain in Italy itself, ready for combat.

2.

The tying up and maintenance of a high percentage of troop contingents and arms of all kinds on the eastern frontier, facing Soviet Russia.

3.

The excessive demands on the landing corps and air force, as well as the maritime combat forces on the coasts of the western front, against England, by tactical exercises, inspections, tours of duty in readiness for action, training in offensives, etc.

III.

The Periods Fixed

The use of offensive action can, it is said, take place in all fields of combat at once or in time stages.

Coordination of certain single actions can also take place. This is true for example:

a. With regard to the plans for crushing and rolling up the Balkan and Russian fronts in offensive thrusts prepared on a large scale strategically and well prepared



tactically, the so-called territorial solution;

b. With regard to the plan for liquidating the English-Balkan front and at the same time starting an extensive "trial" landing offensive against the English coast.

The plan under a means the delaying of the landing offensive against England, in consequence of the shifting of forces. To make up for this, reinforcements are provided for repelling English and American air and naval attacking operations against the invasion areas in France and the German industrial and armament centers in western and central Germany. It also means a renewed intensification for the completion of the preparations for a subsequent air and landing offensive against England.

The plan under b means the adaptation of the offensive plans in the Balkans to a possible trial invasion operation against England. It means at the same time a strengthening of the military pressure on Russia until the completion of the operations in the Balkans and against England.

Although in the months of April and May approximately one million more men will be placed under arms in the standing army, the not unlimited military technical forces make



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Although in the months of April and May approximately one million more men will be placed under arms in the standing army, the not unlimited military technical forces make

On the other hand, the military preparations of Japan in the Amur region and against the Coastal Province have been carefully gone over between the sections of the German Army Staff and Navy Staff and those of the Japanese (military and naval missions of over 300 officers) in conferences since February of this year, according to the strategic plans submitted for that region, as well as for future spheres of operations in the Chinese South Seas, including the Netherlands Indies.

#### IV.

##### The Anticipated Advantages

Two decisive facts are given as the reasons for the necessity for eliminating all national armies, that is, practically every foreign soldier on the mainland of Europe, including Soviet Russia and the French fleet:

1. The necessity for carrying on the war against England and the United States for military and political reasons. This compels Germany to maintain a powerful army, to be sure of warding off any English-American air and sea offensive, no matter how powerful, against the strong points on the European continent and to be sure of warding off mass English and American air attacks on Germany's centers of production and industrial life in the west and in central Germany, the shipyards, ports, etc.

2. The

2. The development of conditions in German economic life which will not permit for any length of time excessive demands made heretofore.

There are specified as direct results of an actual conclusion of the European continental offensives and a total disarmament of all states:

a. The possibility of a regrouping within the German combat forces;

a<sub>1</sub>. The formation of a highly mobile motorized attack and protection army (all arms), for the occupation and protection of the regions of Europe;

b<sub>1</sub>. The release of from five to six million of trained German workers from the army, for agricultural, industrial and small shop operations;

b. The release for the German population, industry and agriculture of the military stocks of foodstuffs, raw materials, machinery, vehicles, horses, etc. no longer needed, both German and taken from foreigners;

c. The incorporation of the productive forces of all European states into the general system, for feeding and the covering of the most urgent needs of life in the conquered or friendly countries; the development of an exchange of goods under the principles of the German state direction of economy; likewise an exchange of available foreign labor

d. The incorporation into the general system of South Russian agriculture and of some sources of raw materials, especially oil and gasoline; the removal of the supplies secured; a large production under the new administration introduced, by the corps of emigrants trained in Germany;

e. The erection of a uniform administration in Europe in accordance with German regulations, and adjustment of the foreign autonomous national governments, and also their subordination to German military and administrative supervision; standardization of law, business agreements, etc.

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JUN 10 1941  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
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*Lab: Germany* PSF  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

June 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching hereto three more secret documents concerning Germany. These are a continuation of those which have been furnished formally concerning the military plans, labor conditions and the financial situation.

You will recall that they are not to be alluded to or quoted from and that this is necessary in order to protect our source of information.

*CH*



~~Secret~~  
6

#2

Berlin, April 24, 1941. We.

The reports on the condition of the crops at the beginning of April 1941 are based on extensive official statistics of the State and Reich offices on the status of foodstuffs. The results of the statistical tabulations are given below for the Great German Reich.

The figures refer to the following territory: the Great German Reich, including Austria, the Sudetenland and all of the Warthe Valley (Posen, Hohensalza, Litzmannstadt).

The meaning of the qualifying figures is the following: 1, very good; 2, good; 3, fair; 4, low; 5, very low.

I.

Condition of Crops.

Winter rye . . . . .	2.7
Winter wheat . . . . .	3.0
Spelt. . . . .	2.4
Winter barley . . . . .	3.1
Winter rape. . . . .	3.1
Rape-seed . . . . .	3.1
Clover . . . . .	3.0
Lucern . . . . .	2.8
Meadows without means for watering .	3.0
Irrigable meadows . . . . .	2.8
Pasture. . . . .	3.1

II.

I. RECEIVED  
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-2-

II.

Winter Moisture, Precipitation, Winter Damage,  
Loss of Potatoes

	<u>too little</u>	<u>right</u>	<u>too much</u>
Winter moisture	4	83	13
Precipitation	8	80	12

	<u>none</u>	<u>slight</u>	<u>moderate</u>	<u>severe</u>
Winter damage to cereals etc.	23	47	23	7
fodder crops	27	47	22	4
meadows	60	29	10	1
potatoes	7	58	30	5

III.

Condition of Spring Crops (beginning of April  
of this year)

	<u>None</u>	<u>1-20%</u>	<u>21-40%</u>	<u>41-60%</u>	<u>61-80%</u>	<u>81-99%</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spring wheat	76	8	3	4	3	1	5
Spring barley	83	8	2	3	2	1	1
Oats	72	14	4	4	3	2	1
plowed	18	8	7	15	26	19	7

IV.

Condition of Winter Intermediate Crops

Winter mixed crops . . . . .	2.8
Crimson clover (with admixture of grasses and legumes) . . . . .	3.1
Winter rye . . . . .	2.6
Kohlrabi, winter rape and turnips . . . . .	3.1

	<u>opinions altogether</u>	<u>good</u>	<u>fair</u>	<u>bad</u>
Keeping of winter intermediate crops over winter . . . . .	5,193	1239	3172	782
in % . . . . .	100%	23.9%	61.1%	15%
	<u>estimates altogether</u>	<u>favor- able</u>	<u>normal</u>	<u>unfavor- able</u>
Weather for the production of the winter intermediate crops . . . . .	5,368	184	1900	3282
in % . . . . .	100%	3.4%	35.4%	61.2%

V.

General Observations.

A deterioration of at least 10% in the condition of the crops during the month of April is to be counted on, because of dampness and cold. Hence the general figure for the crop condition at this date ought to be from 3.2 to 3.3. If the weather in May also remains unfavorable, a rather poor crop, 3.5, is to be counted on.

The winter damage is less than for the winter of 1939-40; it is to be calculated at about 35%, on the whole. The winter intermediate crops are in an average position (3).

Thus the general picture in the Great German Reich, with the inclusion of the famed granary of the East (the Warthe Valley, Posen to Litzmannstadt), is that of a poor harvest.

According to the general (not statistical) reports

of the experts of the agricultural offices of the Reich, the condition of the crops in the countries of Europe occupied and controlled by Germany is to be estimated as follows:

Western Europe . . . . .	3.2 - 3.6
Northern Europe . . . . .	3 - 3.2
Eastern Europe . . . . .	3.2 - 3.6
Southeastern Europe . . . . .	Great shortages in consequence of the war - probably 4.

As a general figure, the situation of the occupied areas (without consideration of the Spanish Peninsula, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Soviet Russia in particular) with respect to foodstuffs and feeding stuffs would be 3.5. Depending on the development and the further course of the war and the weather, this figure of 3.5 will become still worse, and perhaps rise to 4.

*Secret*  
7

RECORDED #2  
UNCLASIFIED

Late April 1941.

I.

Regarding the Raw Materials Balance Sheet.

1.

The statements and figures in the memorandum on the raw materials balance sheet are fully confirmed; likewise the calculations on the difficulties regarding raw materials that are to be anticipated in the fall of this year at latest.

Recent detailed investigations in the Reich Ministries that are concerned, regarding important raw material items, show a greater change for the worse than was anticipated, this being the result of the cessation of imports from the Balkans, as well as from northern and eastern Europe, which were counted on with certainty. The additional amounts from unoccupied France and Soviet Russia are less than expected; the shortages from the Balkans amount to as much as 75% of the amounts anticipated. This shortage in imports from Yugoslavia is to be completely overcome in some 3 or 4 months.

The allotments of raw materials both for large and small plants that are working for the needs of the army, as well as for private consumption, are subjected to changes constantly. The reduced allocations and the deteriorations in quality affect chiefly the supplying of the goods needed for daily consumption.

2.



rate of production in the occupied countries of Europe have, contrary to the expectations cherished, not improved markedly up to this time. The controlled governments in the occupied countries of Europe have not provided any surplus, despite the employment of German military and civil administrative executives. In these occupied areas the difficulties respecting foodstuffs, feeding stuffs and raw materials are felt more than in Germany, because there is a lack, to a great extent, of the positive economic conditions such as a population willing to work, orderly conditions as to transportation, and adequate stocks of materials.

Thus the surplus in Germany's military and economic potential that was calculated in the winter months of 1940-41 has turned out less than was expected and made the basis for military decisions.

3.

For the sake of an orderly course of business, portions of the valuable industrial plants of western, southwestern and northwestern Germany are constantly being moved to central and southern Germany and Austria, including Silesia and Bohemia-Moravia. Because of this, delays in production occur, overburdening of the railroads, difficulties in transplanting the labor forces, etc. It has not been possible to conduct this shifting

of the manufacturing plants producing articles for military use on the scale planned. In the end, it is to be borne in mind that the well known industrial centers have not been essentially changed; this is true in particular of the two kernels of German military industry: the Ruhr and Central Germany (coal, iron, chemicals, building of heavy machinery), as well as of the shipyards on the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic.

4.

The using up of labor, raw and other materials and equipment in the plants operating at full capacity shows a rising curve. This development necessitates the procurement of full relief, both with respect to the workers and the position as to raw and other materials. This is possible only by a military decision and the regrouping of all factors in domestic production, that is, by a reduction of the gigantic army of men and the consumption of materials, and by returning to agriculture, the production of industrial equipment, etc., the labor forces of millions that are tied up. Besides, the supplies hitherto tied up for the military supply offices and the striking production of foodstuffs, clothing, and machinery of all kinds must be released. According to the estimates as of April of this year, over 80% of production is operating for military equipment; of the

sound population normally engaged in agriculture, manufacturing (industry) and transportation, almost 65% of the male population between the ages of 18 and 45 will be in uniform by the end/<sup>of April</sup> of this year, in consequence of the new call for over one million men.

The estimates in the balance sheet of foodstuffs and feeding stuffs for 1941 have been reduced in consequence of the unfavorable weather conditions of the month of April of this year. The shortage for Germany must be estimated as rather high, in comparison with the spring calculations. That is true of almost all foodstuff items, and in particular of the situation with respect to feeding stuffs (compare the earlier statements).

~~Secret~~  
8  
RECORDED #  
UNCLASSIFIED

End of April 1941.

I.

The following new supplementary remarks are made on the same basis as the January report and the supplements belonging thereto.

1.

New measures related to the extension of the operations against the mainland of Turkey to the Greek islands with a view to protection of the Aegean Sea; besides, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as certain strategically important places on the Turkish coast, will be drawn into the military security zone.

These occupations of Turkish territory aim at absolute security of the sea route for the transportation of Russian supplies from the Ukraine and the Caucasus (sea route as far as Trieste, for the purpose of relieving the roads and railroads). The German admiralty staffs have long since been making the necessary preparations, using the help of the Italian fleet.

2.

The strategic plans for the campaign against Soviet Russia have been worked out by the Chief of Staff of the German Army, General Halder.

The fixing of a strategic objective consists in the planning of an encircling victory of the greatest spatial extent; the enemy is to be deprived of any possibility of

developing



developing a counter attack, an orderly retreat is to be rendered impossible, and, according to the large scale operations planned, capitulation is to be brought about. Broad possibilities of action are accorded the lower, middle and higher army headquarters; these small, middle and higher staffs are assigned special operations missions.

The offensive penetrations and advances will be executed by the use of armored divisions, motorized units, and all types of the air arm. The use of the air arm will extend to direct attack on the enemy's air forces, their bases and ground organization.

These plans of operation consist (like all military operations since 1939) in the exact working out of the strategic plans, the undisturbed building up of all offensive formations (and the technical equipment belonging to them), and the concealment of the decisive lines of advance of the main armies.

The basic requirement for certain success depends, as usual, on an undisturbed concentration. A counter thrust of the enemy must be precluded, as in the case of Poland, France and in the southeast.

The Soviet Russian armies are at present not completely constituted or disposed; the Siberian contingents can not make up for the known weaknesses.

The



The political and diplomatic preliminary work is to provide the formulas

a. in Turkey;

b. in Soviet Russia

that are needed to favor the final positions for attack, to gain time, and to maintain the treaty rights under the tripartite pact and the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Japanese treaties of neutrality.

The negotiations with Sweden and Finland for the purpose of bringing them into the planned offensive action in the Baltic, as far as St. Petersburg, are being accelerated.

## II.

### 1.

The liquidation of Soviet Russia is considered a necessity

a. from the standpoint of the internal economic situation and

b. from that of the coming military problems in the west.

The losses that will arise from the destructiveness of a campaign in the east are not estimated very high; they would be made up for at once by the direct application of the German military and administrative mechanism to grain and feeding stuffs, large and small animals, wood, coal, and minerals deposits, in particular petroleum

and manganese ore in the Caucasus, etc. (principal fields at Baku and Grozny, with direct pipe line to Tuapse on the Black Sea - good gasoline). In the main, the centers of the railroad system (Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov and Stalingrad) are to be seized first, as well as the main industrial centers, such as Yekaterinoslav and the Don area in southern Russia, the middle and southern Urals, the Kuznetsk region, as well as Kiev and environs, if the offensive thrust leads more smoothly and more quickly to the objective set than in the North.

2.

After the liquidation of the "last soldier" on the continent, the machinery for the "new order in Europe" will be set in motion, that is, all economic production of agriculture and industry will be employed for the benefit of Germany, according to the objectives set, the status of needs and the urgency of military requirements, the domestic needs of the conquered states, the eastern states in particular, being relegated to the background.

In addition to the mineral wealth and other products, the demobilized labor forces will be utilized fully for the benefit of Germany.

3.

By midsummer the freshly reenforced defensive front is to be established along the Atlantic Ocean (Belgium, Holland,

Holland, France), for the purpose of warding off enemy air attacks and also for the purpose of facilitating the attacks on England, with the maximum degree of military efficiency. The strength of the British air arm attained so far by deliveries from the U.S.A. will be more than equalized by the portions of the German air force that have been tied up on the eastern front up to that time.

### III.

#### 1.

The offensive preparations of England and the U.S.A. during the winter months of 1940-41 have not led to any active military operations against Germany or in any other theater of war. Fears were felt that during March the English-American air offensives on a large scale would be started, that is, that they would be executed day in and day out against the highly sensitive industrial centers of western Germany.

England's military incapacity allowed the liquidation of the unexpectedly changed Balkan situation, which, following the failure of the Italian armies (defeats in Albania and Africa), could be prepared for by Germany undisturbed during the winter months and could be executed in March and April.

This same English and American weakness permits the liquidation of Soviet Russia, and likewise the

concentration of German military forces in West against the island of England by preparation for the attack operations by air and by sea from the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts and portions of those countries against ports and munitions centers on English soil and from the defensive positions in western and northern Germany. Besides, the military forces for an intensive campaign in the eastern Mediterranean area can be released by fall. Other situations, as for example that concerning Spain, including Gibraltar, could be settled by arms before then, within the framework of the present general situation.

Political schemes of England and the U.S.A. are considered unimportant; proclamations of landings on the continent of Europe as military jests. The consolidation of Germany's military power position is going on and is considered unshakeable in the corps of leaders. The laying of the foundation of the economic existence of conquered Europe is expected in the course of this or next year, with the voluntary or compulsory inclusion of Russian supplies and productive forces.

From this standpoint, 1941 means the definitive decision, because the American-British economic boycott can not break the newly distributed and employed powers of Europe. This boycott will collapse of itself, because the "new order" in Europe is held together by military

force

force and can always fix an economic minimum, graded according to nations.

An organized and fully motorized army for order and protection, of 300 divisions, tested in battle, constantly kept up to date with the most modern armament, will be in a position to perform with absolute certainty any military mission inside Europe and an "invasion" against England.



**SAFE FILE: Great Britain**

NAVAL DISPATCH  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: ALHGBA LONDON 2303Z APR 40  
TO: OTHAV  
INFO:  
RELEASE: ANYLTCM

DATE: 5 APRIL 1940  
PRECEDENCE: TELETYPE  
TOR CODE ROOM: 10/6

ON THE 17TH HMS SUFFOLK BOMBARDED STAVANGER AIRDRIVE X SHE  
WAS PROBABLY ALONE EXCEPT FOR AN ANTI-SUBMARINE SCREEN X SHE  
FIRE 217 ROUNDS USING 5 RAF PLANES FOR SPOTS X THE FIGHTER  
PATROL NEVER ARRIVED X THIS WAS HELD PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR  
THE BOMB HIT SHE RECEIVED X THIS SINGLE HIT WHICH WAS AFT,  
THE RESULT OF 25 FIVE BOMBING ATTACKS IN WHICH 22 BOMBS WERE  
DROPPED (WITH SEVERAL NEAR MISSES) KILLED 47, WOUNDED 34,  
REDUCED SPEED, AND DISABLED THE STEERING GEAR X SHE WAS  
BEACHED IN SCAPA FLOW THE NEXT DAY TO PREVENT HER SINKING,  
AFTER HAVING REACHED THIS ORDER HER OWN POWER WITH THE STERN  
AWASH. UNDERSTAND BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE KNOWS THIS.

DISTRIBUTION

16 ACTION

10 13...13...NAVAIDE...FILE...

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIA 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *J. M. [unclear]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL  
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C."

226901

Private and Personal

Foot

3-25-42

With the Compliments  
of  
Field Marshal Sir John Dill

Harry Hopkins, Esq.,  
The White House.

relieving 3 Hussars and Skinners horse as Armd Regt  
Car Regt respectively.

a26 aa01

7. Sudan and Eritrea nothng to report. Sudan G  
and possibly two Bde Gps for service on Western fro  
should be most useful.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S.

Memc

1-17-73

By

RHO

Date

MAR 28 1973

/s..

V

MESSAGE

IN

RECEIVED:

FROM: Mideast

Time: 0104  
Date: 26/3.

TO: War Office, Rptd B.A.D. Washington.

NO: CS/864 of 25/3

\*\*\*\*\*

MOST IMMEDIATE. [REDACTED]

Private for F.M. Dill. Personal and [REDACTED] for C.I.G.S.  
from General Auchinleck.

Cairo 25 March. Situation review.

1. Northern Front. 10 Army Persia and Iran no change work on rear defence line Altun Kopru Fathah Haffa (on Euphrates between Abu Kemal and Ana) proceeding well. Sudden need to move large numbers Poles from Turkestan due Russian inability feed them entails large improvisations and will necessarily delay movement munitions from Persian Gulf to Russia. Arrangements are in hand. Poles on arrival will be concentrated Gaza neighbourhood in vacated Australian accommodation. Polish Depot moves from Alexandria to Gaza to receive them. Polish Bde Gp recently withdrawn from Western front will move to Gaza at end of April to assist in organising and training. No arms or equipment yet available but expected.
2. 9 Army Syria no change work on defences continues. Free French native Senegalese units mutinied Damascus last week and shot several white officers and N.C.Os. Causes inexperienced officers, fifth column activities, inactivity of troops and long absence from home. Situation in hand temporarily at any rate. Disaffected units being moved Palestine en route Chad or to Western front but future outlook not reassuring. Free French Bde Gp with 8 Army behaving well.
3. King of Greece now visiting Greek troops in Palestine will it is hoped be able to stop political intrigue which is active.
4. Yugoslav trouble still persists owing to unrealistic attitude Yugoslav authorities in London. Yugoslav Bn now helping to dig Salun Maddalena position and reported quite happy there. Czech battalion converting happily into Light A.A. Regiment.
5. N.Z. Inf Bde now en route via Nz base at Mapdi near Cairo to join remainder division at Baalbek in Syria.
5. Egypt political situation improving and General Election proceeding satisfactorily.
6. Cyprus reduction Garrison to one Bde Gp and three Bns in progress. All stores and equipment to enable Garrison to be reinforced rapidly by two Bde Gps with personal equipment only being left on island. 7 Ind Inf Bde of 4 Ind Div and Jaipur Bhopal Sultania and Rampur Bns relieving 5 Ind Div less 29 Ind Inf Bde with 8 Army and 161 Ind Inf Bde. Yorksqh and HCR relieving 3 Hussars and Skinners horse as Armd Regt and Armd Car Regt respectively.
7. Sudan and Eritrea nothing to report. Sudan Govt forming one and possibly two Bde Gps for service on Western front where they should be most useful.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S.

Memo

1-12-23

By

RHP

Date

MAR 28 1973

/8..

8. Army Libya. Work continues on Gazala Tobruk and Salum Maddalena positions which get continually stronger. 7 Armd Div now concentrating in reserve and for training in Capuzzo area. Recent recce in force satisfactorily concluded and produced valuable information besides contributing towards apparent evacuation of Italian fighters from Martuba to aerodrome further west. Enemy has apparently strengthened his outposts on Tmini Mechili line which is not undesirable. Primary object operation namely to draw off aircraft during passage Malta convoy apparently successfully effected but this should be treated as most secret. 2 S.A. Div now moving forward to replace Polish and 5 N.Z. Bde Gns in forward area under 13 Corps. 4 Ind Div less 7 Ind Inf Bde working on Salum Maddalena positions in anticipation relief by 5 Ind Div.

9. Morale high generally among troops excellent. Tank situation steadily improving and equipment new units proceeding well. Grant Tank generally most satisfactory in spite of difficulties connected with ammunition. Six pdr Anti-Tk guns now under issue to 7 Armd Div. Inclusion of Anti-Tk guns in motorised Inf Bns proving great success. Exchange of Indian Inf Bns from 4 and 5 Ind Divs on scale of one per Bde with similar number untried Bns from 6 and 8 Ind Divs of 10 Army about to begin and should result in valuable spread battle experience. Similar process will take place with Fd Arty Regts and Armd C units.



PSF Safe: Gt. Britain HE

2227

Viscount Halifax

Marquess of Lothian

IMMEDIATE.

1.5 a.m. September 12th [1940]

10.15 p.m. " 11th

Following received from Stockholm telegram No. 1011 of September 5th begins.

In view of the expressed views of H.M. Government on continuing the war, he begged me not to refuse at least to hear what W. had to say and pointed out that my refusal to meet him would certainly be reported to Hitler. Finally I asked for time to reflect before deciding. He asked me to at the latest by Saturday morning.

Please telegraph most immediately whether I may meet W. I should of course say nothing to encourage him but it might be of interest to listen.

GS

a26b01

2228  
of September 11th

IMMEDIATE

HE  
Lord Halifax

Lord Lothian

2.10 a.m. September 12th 1940

10.40 p.m. " 11th "

Following received from Stockholm  
telegram No. 1016 of September 7th. Begins.

I duly informed intermediary on September 7th that I could not see W. and that in any case the interview seemed to me useless in view of publicly declared attitude of H. M. Government.

A few hours later the intermediary in whose trustworthiness and disinterestedness I have full confidence, returned in a state of excitement and said he was convinced that the matter was of the first importance and that W. was acting at the instigation of Hitler in person. Only two men in Germany knew of his mission. Following were the main points of the proposal:

1. World to be divided into two economic spheres, one continental organized by Germany, the other maritime and colonial organized by the British Empire and the United States.

2. Political independence of European countries now occupied by Germany to be restored, including "a Polish State" but excluding Czechoslovakia. Economic division of Europe must, however, be brought to an end.

3. British Empire to retain all Colonies and such mandates as are needed for its political and military interests. Germany possibly to receive some compensation elsewhere.

4. Questions concerning the Mediterranean, Egypt and French, Belgian and Dutch Colonies to be open to discussion.

This was "the last chance" and the alternative to peace was a continuance of war on an intensified scale; special mention was made here of the loss to Great Britain of Egypt, the Middle East and ultimately India.

I gave the intermediary no encouragement whatsoever to believe that I should have any message for him but he has since twice returned to the charge obviously at W.'s instigation and informed me that W. has decided to prolong his stay here until September 12th as he is desperately anxious not to return empty-handed. He would stay here longer if it were any use. Any talks he said could/

:CL

could continue for the present through neutral personage.

I have reported all this more fully in personal letters to you and I have no reason to expect that the proposals are of interest to H. M. Government. At the same time since the date of departure of the bag is uncertain I have ventured to telegraph this summary in case you may wish me to make a further move before .. leaves. His final remark to the intermediary was that the absence of any message from me would be taken in Berlin as a definite refusal.

a26603

COPY

Tel. No. 2229 of September 12th.

from: Viscount Halifax

to : Marquess of Lothian

Following addressed to Stockholm  
telegram No. 726 of September 6th.

You should not yourself meet Weissauer  
in view of the obvious danger of misconstruction.

Moreover it would be quite useless for  
you to do so as you could not enter into a  
discussion and could only receive a message from  
him which it is always open to him to pass  
to you through the President of the High Court  
or any other channel. The attitude of His  
Majesty's Government has been made quite plain  
in reply to the King of Sweden (see my telegram  
1660) in which we alluded to the necessity of  
words being effectively guaranteed by deeds.

926604

COPY

el. No. 2233

of September 11th.

From: Viscount Halifax  
To: Marquess of Lothian

Addressed to Stockholm telegram No. 737 of  
September 11th repeated to Washington telegram No. 2233.

Your telegram No. 1016.

Personal and ~~Secret~~.

You should return a reply to the intermediary  
as follows:-

His Majesty's Government did not enter into this war for self defence aims, but for facts and general purposes affecting the freedom and independence of many states in Europe. Their position was defined at length towards German peace offers in maturely-considered statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on October 12th, 1939. Nothing that has happened since then has led His Majesty's Government to recede in any way from the principles and resolves which were then so clearly set forth. On the contrary, the intention of all the people of the British Empire is to prosecute the war and has been strengthened by the many horrible crimes committed by the rulers of Nazi Germany against the smaller states on her border, and by indiscriminate bombing of London without the slightest relation to military objectives. His Majesty's Government do not wish to prolong the war for a day longer than is necessary. It therefore lies with the German Government to make proposals by which the wrongs that Germany has inflicted upon other nations may be redressed. Moreover, it would be necessary before any such proposals could be considered, that effective guarantees by deeds not words should be forthcoming from Germany which would ensure in a general peace the restoration of freedom to France, and to other countries which have been deprived of it, as well as the security of Great Britain and the British Empire.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Gov't, Telegram 1/12/72

By *[Signature]* FEB 8 1972

a26605



Safe: Lt. Britton

COPY

From: Viscount Halifax  
to Marquess of Lothian

IMMEDIATE

Tel. No. 2234 of  
September 11th.

Personal and ~~Secret~~

You should inform the President in confidence of the contents of Stockholm telegrams Nos. 1011 and 1016 and of my telegrams to Stockholm Nos. 726 and 737.

I feel that the President should know at this moment when Hitler is battering London with indiscriminate attacks from the air he is also following his familiar technique of trying to seduce us with superficial fair promises of an illusory peace at the expense of everyone but ourselves. I am sure that the President understands that we are not unmindful of our responsibilities and that we shall meet all attacks and all blandishments with firm resolve to rid the world of this scourge.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. telegram, 1-12-72

By js

FEB 9 1972

a26606

*Safe: Dr. Brown*

Copy No. 1

BRITISH ADMIRALTY SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE.

Required for Operations.

- 200 A.T.L. - all completed by 1st February 1943.  
To start deliveries as early as possible  
for ferrying YTL's across Atlantic.  
Cross Atlantic on own bottoms.
- 300 Y.T.L. - all completed by 1st December 1942.  
Deliveries to commence as soon as  
possible.  
Have to be shipped and assembled.
- 200 T.L. or W. - All completed by 1st December 1942.  
Deliveries to start as soon as possible.  
Have to be shipped.
- 500 Y. - All completed by 1st December 1942.  
Deliveries to start as soon as possible.  
Have to be shipped.
- 100 Y.R. - All completed by 1st December 1942.  
Deliveries to start as soon as possible.  
Have to be shipped.
- 300 Large Raiding  
Craft. All to be completed by 1st December, 1942.  
Deliveries to start as soon as possible.  
Cross Atlantic on own bottom.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Memo, 1-17-4

By RHP Date MAR 28 19

5th May 1942

a26bb01

*PSF Life: Gt Britain*

AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

London

Dated October 26, 1940

Rec'd 9:26 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

3536, October 26, 2 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

Following is extract from telegram received by the Foreign Office which informs me full telegram was cabled to Washington for communication to you through British Embassy. (BEGIN GRAY) "The following comes from an absolutely sure source which must on no condition be compromised.

German peace terms for France:

For Italy: Department of Alpes Maritimes, half Algeria and Tunis.

For Spain: Morocco.

For Japan: Indochina.

For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an internationalized zone from Switzerland to the sea. Naval and air bases in north France for the duration of hostilities.

French

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

926001

AS-2- No.3536, Oct. 26, 2 p.m., from London.

French fleet at the service of the Axis.

A tripartite France-German-Italian mandate over all French colonies and at the moment of the cessation of hostilities the relaxation of colonial conditions imposed on France.

Pétain has refused but his ministers are equally divided. (END GRAY).

Lord Halifax would greatly appreciate it if the foregoing alleged German peace terms for France may be telegraphed to the American Consul General at Algiers with the request that if possible he communicate them urgently to General Weygand.

JOHNSON

WWC

RECEIVED  
UNCL. SERIALIZED

926c02

PSF safe: Great Britain

Private

February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:-

The enclosed memorandum was sent to me by Major General Patrick Hurley (former Secretary of War) whom you saw at Teheran.

This is for your eyes only. I rather like his general approach to the care and education of what used to be called "backward countries". From your and my personal observation I think we could add something about cleanliness as well.

The point of all this is that I do not want the United States to acquire a "zone of influence" -- or any other nation for that matter. Iran certainly needs Trustees. It will take thirty or forty years to eliminate the graft and the feudal system. Until that time comes, Iran may be a headache to you, to Russia and to ourselves.

You will remember that I suggested to Stalin that a free port could be set up at the head of the Persian Gulf, the management of the railroad internationalized, providing a through route for Russia and for the developing areas of Iran herself.

Would you let me have this copy back, as I have no other?

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
London,  
England.

(Enclosure)

a26cc01



~~SECRET~~  
COPY

Tehran, Iran  
21 December 1943.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On your departure from Tehran you outlined to me, during our conversation at the airport, a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations. In response to your suggestion and the directive which I received from the Secretary of State, I wish to submit the following for your consideration.

PART 1

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man as set forth in the Constitution of the United States and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of free enter-

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 2 1972

a26cc02

prise which will enable that nation to develop its resources primarily for the benefit of its own people. Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran to help herself. By this program of self-government and well directed self-help Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and to a degree freedom from fear.

To accomplish the above, the United States will furnish, upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisors in any or all of the fields of government. All experts and advisors furnished to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer. The United States will not ask or receive any special privileges for these services.

American advisors will be fully indoctrinated in the policy of our own government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department. This indoctrination and requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to direction of our policy and protection of our interests.

Modern history of this country shows it to have been dominated by a powerful and greedy minority. The people have also been subjected to foreign exploitation and monopoly. In extending American assistance to the building of an improved society in

a26cc03

Iran there must be imposed a sufficient degree of supervision and control over free enterprise and personal aggression to protect the unorganized and inarticulate majority from foreign and domestic monopoly and oppression.

Inauguration in Iran of the American pattern of self-government and free enterprise will be an assurance that proceeds from development of Iranian resources will be directed substantially to the building of schools, hospitals, sanitary systems, transportation and communication systems, irrigation systems and improvement of all facilities contributing to the health, happiness and general welfare of the Iranian people.

This plan of nation building may be improved through our experience in Iran and may become the criterion for the relations of the United States toward all the nations which are now suffering from the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression and imperialism.

The American people, single-mindedly devoted to independence and liberty, are fighting today not to save the imperialisms of other nations nor to create an imperialism of our own but rather to bestow upon the world the benevolent principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

#### PART II

The foregoing is a rather simple plan designed to promote the building of free nations. The job that confronts us is not an easy one. The success of the recent conferences in Moscow, Cairo and Tehran indicates that the major powers can cooperate in the prosecution of the war. The reaffirmatic

a26cc04



Charter indicates that there is a basis for post-war cooperation. Notwithstanding these evidences of good will I think that now is the time for us to attempt to analyse the opposition that the building of free nations will be likely to encounter.

Without any opposition from other nations and with the co-operation and support of the intelligent and patriotic leaders of Iran it will take generations to achieve in Iran free enterprise and a government based on the consent of the governed. The population of Iran is approximately 90% illiterate and it is composed, to a large extent, of disorganized and separated tribes. The intelligence and vigilance which will support liberty of the masses must be created. The education of the tribesmen and the establishment of a unity of purpose will require time, patience, diligence, efficiency, and a crusading spirit on the part of our advisors. Above all, the advisors must have the continuous support of the American people which in itself may be difficult to assure.

In addition to the obstacles within Iran, the principles of the above formula are in conflict with the principles of imperialism. Free enterprise may also come in conflict with any forced expansion of communism. Advocates of both of these doctrines may resist the proposed spreading of democracy.

In all the nations I have visited, I have been told, usually by British and Americans, that the principles of imperialism already have succumbed to the principles of democracy. From my own observations, however, I must say that if imperialism is dead, it seems very reluctant to lie down.

a26cc05

The imperialisms of Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal, and The Netherlands will, we hope, end or be radically revised by this war. British imperialism seems to have acquired a new life. This appearance, however, is illusory. What appears to be a new life of British imperialism is the result of the infusion, into its emaciated form, of the blood of productivity and liberty from a free nation through lend lease. British imperialism is also being defended today by the blood of the soldiers of the most democratic nation on earth.

The names of the imperialistic nations are sufficient to indicate that a large part of the world's population is still committed to the principles of imperialism. These names also indicate the opposition that will be encountered by any effort that has for its purpose the establishment of democracy in nations that are now subjected to the rule of imperialistic nations. We are approaching the irrepressible conflict between world-wide imperialism and world-wide democracy. It is depressing to note how many of our real friends in the world seem to be irrevocably committed to the old order of imperialism.

Woodrow Wilson's policy for America in the first world war was designed "To make the world safe for democracy" and to sustain Britain as a first class world power. Sustaining Britain as a first class power has for many years been the cornerstone of America's foreign policy. Personally I have supported that policy. I have long believed and have many times stated publicly that the ultimate destiny of the English speaking peoples is a single destiny.

a26cc06



We did sustain Britain in the first world war as a first class power but we did not succeed in making the world "safe for democracy". Instead, when we backed away from the League of Nations and failed to make the peace terms an instrument of democracy, we made the world safe for imperialism. In the quarter of a century which has intervened the processes of both eastern and western imperialism set the stage for this new world war.

An effort to establish true freedom among the less favored nations, so many of which are under the present shadow of imperialism, will almost inevitably run counter to the policy of sustaining Britain as a first class world power. This leads us to the conclusion that Britain today is confronted by the same condition that confronted our nation when Lincoln at Gettysburg said "That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom". Britain can be sustained as a first class power but to warrant this support from the American people she must accept the principles of liberty and democracy and discard the principles of oppressive imperialism.

Soviet Russia has earned for herself an assured place as a first class world power. Friendship and cooperation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are essential to peace and harmony in the post-war world. There must, therefore, be a mutual understanding and acceptance of the post-war patterns for freedom which the great powers among the United Nations are to offer to their less powerful associates. Without such agreement there would be jealousy, suspicion and conflict.

a26cc07

PART III

In considering the present status of relations between Iran and the United States it must be remembered that although American troops have been here more than a year their presence has not yet been officially recognized by the Iranian Government. Many Iranian officials believe that American troops are in Iran on the invitation and for the purpose of serving as an instrumentality of Britain. For a year or more we have had under negotiation with Iran a treaty wherein Iran would recognize the presence of American troops as an American operation. The ineffective presentation of the treaty has not been helpful to American prestige with the Iranians.

It is the responsibility of the State Department to effect the consummation of the treaty. The necessity for promptness in the negotiation of this agreement was pointed out by me in my report to you of May 13, 1943. I have not personally participated in any of the treaty conferences with the Iranians.

I think it important that we understand that since our troops entered Iran on the invitation of the British, without advance notice to the Government of Iran, it was natural for the Iranians to look upon us as a British instrumentality. In addition to this The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation which was first engaged in preclusive purchasing in Iran has since been selling American lend lease supplies to civilians and to the Government of Iran. Largely through our lend lease supplies, paid for by the American taxpayer, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has been attempting and, to a considerable degree, succeeding in establishing a complete trade monopoly in Iran. The United Kingdom Commercial

926cc 08

Corporation achieved this position by virtue of being on the scene when American lend lease supplies began entering Iran. United States representatives in Iran engaged the British Corporation, government owned but profit making, to serve as handling agent and middleman for the American goods. This arrangement, which evidently had the approval of the Lend Lease Administration and the State Department, has been profitable to the British Corporation.

There has been a United States Commercial Corporation, government owned, with offices in Tehran. When I was here a year ago, Mr. Philip Kidd was in charge of the corporation. Later Mr. Erik Eriksen was in charge. If we were going to enter the commercial field with lend lease goods, I do not know why we did not use our own corporation instead of the British Corporation. I refer again to my report to you on Iran dated at Cairo, May 13, 1943 and my report on Lend Lease in the Middle East dated at Delhi, November 7, 1943. Your Minister, Mr. Landis, has made great improvement in the administration of lend lease in the Middle East. Notwithstanding this I am still of the opinion that the present debate between the Americans and British on lend lease will be ended only when America has taken complete control of the distribution of our own lend lease supplies in this area.

The Iranians believe that the post-war monopoly plans of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation now have the support of the United States Government.

In addition to all this there have been conflicts between the British and American Ministries that have been evident to the Iranians. This situation has been damaging to both American and

a26 cc09



British prestige, To offset this impression the Iranians have witnessed the efficiency of the American operations of railroad and road transportation in passing war supplies to Russia. Finally they have been deeply impressed by your masterful handling of the three-power conference and especially by your skill in procuring from the conference the declaration of policy of the United Nations toward Iran.

Meanwhile, Soviet prestige has benefited from their own well ordered conduct and by their direct and positive relations with the Iranians.

#### PART IV

In a conversation with his Majesty, the Shah and certain of his ministers a few days ago, I was informed that from one source or another the tribesmen in the outlying provinces of Iran have acquired at least 50,000 rifles and ammunition. This the Shah thought made it imperative that our advisors to the Iranian Army and to the Iranian Police Force hasten the organization of the forces for security against internal disorder. He stated that certain foreign influences are being brought to bear on the tribesmen to cause internal disorder in Iran. While on this subject I informed His Majesty that I had heard that Russia had agreed to furnish the Iranian Army with a number of tanks, rifles and airplanes. The Shah admitted that there was such an offer but how much equipment Russia would give he was unable to say. I remarked that we were furnishing Russia equipment under lend lease because Russia did not have enough equipment for her own war necessities.

a26cc10

His Majesty said that he understood that fact but that Russia had offered to give his government this much needed equipment. He said he had hoped to acquire the equipment from the United States but had been unable to obtain satisfactory action. In my opinion Iran is able to pay for the equipment which she needs for both her Army and her Police Force.

It is a fact, however, that Britain is furnishing lend lease material to other nations at a time when she is being sustained in her war effort by American lend lease. Now Russia seems to be about to embark on a similar program. Britain has been giving and now Russia is about to give our lend lease supplies, or supplies that have been replaced or released by our lend lease supplies, to other nations in return for concessions or to strengthen their own ideologies in the countries to which the supplies are given. The least we should demand is that we be permitted to do our own giving.

#### PART V

Iranian officials have expressed a desire to establish a closer commercial relationship with the United States.

Under conditions now prevailing there will no doubt be a great rush on the part of American businessmen to get oil, mineral and other concessions in Iran. I suggest that the State Department, with the assistance of the other agencies of our government should be prepared to advise the Government of Iran definitely concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant for a concession.

a26cc11



PART VI

In proposing to commit you to a world wide plan of building associated free nations, I am not unmindful of the problems that confront you on the home front.

We should, of course, consider the effect of the present and future high taxes and of the expenditure of great amounts of our economic reserve. Our greatest danger, however, lies in the creation of a stupendous bonded indebtedness. If the war and our post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation commitments continue for a long period this indebtedness may become so overwhelming that it will create hopelessness, lethargy and despondency on the part of the world's freest and most resourceful people. We may again have soldiers being mustered out to disillusionment and unemployment. We may again have people shouting that "We can't eat the Constitution". They may even add to the non-edibles the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. This might lead to panic, bankruptcy and revolution. It is needless to add that if anything of this nature occurred at home, all our plans for the future of the world would be futile. Tyranny and oppressive imperialism would again be dominant.

I think the broader aspects of your world diplomacy are now in excellent form. But we can damage that position if we fail to be realistic in whipping the details into conformity with your general plan.

Respectfully yours,

s/ PATRICK HURLEY  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

a26cc12

*PSF La. : G. Britain*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1940


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am enclosing herewith the letter with enclosure which was left with me this morning by Mr. Butler.

I am also enclosing the London Embassy's telegram of this morning which covers the same ground.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A. V. Kelly'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'A' and a long horizontal stroke.

The President,  
The White House.

26401

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 26th, 1940

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a telegram received in the Foreign Office yesterday from the British Ambassador in Madrid.

I have been instructed when informing you of this message to call particular attention to Sir Samuel Hoare's remarks about the press. I have also been asked to inform you that the Foreign Office are endeavouring to convey information regarding the German terms to General Weygand via Tangier.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Harold Butler*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

Telegram from the British Ambassador  
in Madrid to the Foreign Office  
dated October 25th, 1940.

---

Following comes from an absolutely sure  
source which must on no account be compromised.

German peace terms for France:

For Italy: Departments of Alpes Maritimes,  
half Algeria, and Tunis.

For Spain: Morocco

For Japan: Indo-China.

For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an  
internationalised zone from  
Switzerland to the sea. Naval and  
air bases in North France for the  
duration of hostilities. French  
fleet at the service of the Axis.

A tripartite Franco-German-  
Italian mandate over all the French  
Colonies and at the moment of  
cessation of hostilities the  
relaxation of Colonial conditions  
imposed on France.

Petain has refused but his Ministers are  
equally divided. I think that Petain, reinforced by  
The King's letter, will win. Please have British and  
American press ready to intervene heavily on his side  
if he does not but do not let them take action until  
I wire. In the meantime keep them friendly to him.

Could you possibly transmit terms urgently  
to General Weygand? If you can, please conceal  
Madrid source.

---

a26d03

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report by General Wavell on Japanese  
Tactics, Technique and Equipment.

The following is a brief of a very interesting report  
that has come to us from General Wavell, on the above subject:

"The main object of an army is to fight. This idea  
is the foundation of all training. It has been proven  
by the Japanese themselves that they are not just imitators  
of the procedures of others. For example, they have made  
important advances in the development of landing techniques  
which include the designing and manufacture of specially  
constructed landing craft carriers, landing craft and as-  
sault boats used in landing operations.

"The Japanese have demonstrated that they are quick to  
take over the techniques of foreigners which they see suit-  
able for their own characteristics and special requirements.  
It is evident that they have made a close examination of  
the Nazi battle experiences of 1939. In Malaya modern tech-  
niques were displayed by : (1) The close cooperation of  
supporting arms with the infantry, especially in the coopera-  
tive action of light artillery and mortars. (2) By the  
use of radio-phone there has been effective cooperation of  
air forces with ground forces. The fact that the army has  
its own air arm facilitates this cooperation. (3) The  
Japanese have made use of great noise as an adjunct to their  
fighting and use live mortar bombs and fire crackers. (4)  
Trees are made use of as fire positions to give advantage  
over ground-bound opponents.


"Among other improved techniques of the Japanese is  
the skill they have shown in repairing bridges. Speedy ad-  
vances have been successfully made by reason of their  
ability to remove obstacles, especially for tank units.  
Thorough training of engineer units is evident.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



[REDACTED]

"The Japanese Army in Malaya has clearly demonstrated that it is highly capable of fitting modern tactics to various conditions and on short notice. Underlying their signal successes are (1) previous war experience, (2) high morale and good discipline, and (3) a high standard of training."

  
Chief of Staff.

-2-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

*PSF Life: Gt Britain*

*File*  
AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 6, 1940

Rec'd 9:10 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3984, December 6, midnight.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE  
UNDER SECRETARY AND FOR TRUITT MARITIME COMMISSION.

My 3965, December 5th.

The shipping situation is less favorable than it appears on the surface.

Vessels under the British flag aggregated 17,750,000 tons before the war. On October 27 the figure was 17,639,000, an apparent net loss of only 111,000 gross tons.

These figures do not indicate the true position, however. Neutral vessels which worked for Britain in the last war either are not available or are included in the foregoing figures. Moreover, 4,200,000 gross tons are currently under repair. This means that the working merchant marine at present consists of 11,739,000 gross tons. Some of this tonnage, however, must work in trades away from the United Kingdom. The total now available  
to

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

AS-2 No. 3984, Dec. 6, midnight, from London.

to serve the needs of this country is believed to be about 9,500,000 gross tons, all of which is, of course, greatly reduced in carrying capacity as a result of wartime conditions.


Please inform Truitt that more detailed figures were contained in a dispatch sent by the Naval Attaché to the Navy Department on December 5.

JOHNSON

TFV

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**EMDEN**

**K. 1338**

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PSF

Safe: Gt. Britain

Copy No. 1

BRITISH SUPPLY COUNCIL IN NORTH AMERICA

Willard Hotel  
Washington DC

January 5, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I inclose for transrission to the  
President the new statement of British Require-  
ments during 1941 and 1942 of -

Merchant Ships  
Aircraft  
Ordnance  
Steel  
Machine Tools

- which statement was promised in the Prime  
Minister's letter to the President of December  
8th, 1940, paragraph 16, and again in his cable  
of January 2, 1941.

Very truly yours,

*Arthur B. Harris*  
Chairman

The Secretary of the Treasury,  
Washington,  
D. C.

**STATEMENT OF BRITISH REQUIREMENTS**  
of Merchant Ships, Aircraft, Ordnance, Steel and Machine Tools  
for delivery from the United States  
during 1941 & 1942

	Unit of Measurement	Estimated deliveries from orders already placed or under negotiation in United States		Deficiencies to be provided for from United States		Total Deliveries Required from United States	
		1941	1942	1941	1942	1941	1942
<b>SHIPS (other than Warships)</b>							
Merchant ships & cargo liners, with engines.....	gross tons	50,000	250,000	3,200,000	2,550,000	3,250,000	2,900,000
Small Motor Craft.....	single	150	-	150	200	300	200
Marine engines.....	units	1,000	-	200	1,500	1,200	1,500
<b>AIRCRAFT</b>							
Bombers & General Reconnaissance.....	units	4,500	2,000	3,000	14,000	7,500	16,000
Pursuit.....	incl.	4,000	700	1,500	7,300	5,500	8,000
Flying Boats.....	spares	200	100	100	600	300	700
Miscellaneous.....		-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Total Operational.....		8,700	2,800	5,600	22,900	14,300	25,700
Trainers.....		1,100	350	2,500	5,950	3,700	6,300
Grand Total.....		9,800	3,150	8,200	28,850	18,000	32,000
<b>TANKS &amp; TANK EQUIPMENT</b>							
Infantry and Cruiser Tanks.....	single	2,300	1,350	3,400	-	5,700	1,350
Universal Carriers.....	items	-	-	3,200	5,000	3,200	5,000
<b>ORDNANCE</b>							
Field Guns.....		400	550	2,400	-	2,800	550
Medium Guns.....		-	30	1,200	-	1,200	30
Heavy Guns.....		-	-	400	-	400	-
Naval Guns (16 inch - 2 pounder).....	single	-	-	5,800	800	6,600	800
Tank & Anti-Tank Guns.....	items	5,100	3,700	11,150	2,700	15,250	6,400
Anti-Aircraft Heavy Guns.....		-	-	6,300	-	6,300	-
Anti-Aircraft Light Guns.....		80	600	4,020	-	4,100	600
20 mm. Aircraft Cannons.....		4,500	1,000	-	2,000	4,500	14,000
20 mm. Grenade Guns (Naval).....		1,000	1,000	6,000	2,000	7,000	3,000
.50 Machine Guns.....	single	21,000	40,000	21,500	31,000	46,000	80,000
.303 Machine Guns.....	items	-	-	168,000	-	168,000	-
.30 Machine Guns.....		48,000	42,000	77,000	-	75,000	42,000
Sub-machine Guns.....		92,000	4,500	61,000	-	160,000	4,500
Rifles.....		300	400	1,450	50	2,000	450
Revolvers.....	thousands	165	25	45	25	210	50
Anti-Tank Rifles.....		-	-	50	10	50	10
<b>AMMUNITION</b>							
Field Gun.....		7,600	9,200	-	19,800	7,600	29,000
Medium Gun.....		1,600	1,850	-	3,000	1,600	4,850
Heavy Gun.....		400	-	300	3,950	700	3,950
Heavy Anti-Aircraft.....	thousands	-	-	5,950	650	5,950	650
Light Anti-Aircraft.....		1,500	1,200	3,600	400	4,900	1,600
Tank & Anti-Tank.....		6,800	6,100	-	1,400	6,800	7,500
Aerial Bombs.....		550	10	not yet defined		not yet defined	
20 mm. Aircraft.....		10	15	-	140	210	165
.50 .....		85	165	115	75	200	240
.303 .....	millions	730	-	2,120	3,000	2,850	3,000
.30 .....		650	1,100	110	360	760	1,460
Pistol Calibre (excluding sub-machine gun).....		12	-	-	-	12	-
.55 Anti-Tank Rifle.....		-	-	25	20	25	20
<b>IRON &amp; STEEL</b>							
Ordinary Iron & Steel.....		6,500	6,500	-	-	6,500	6,500
Alloy & Special Purpose Steel.....	thousand	700	725	-	-	700	725
Drop Forgings.....	tons	14	14	222	192	240	210
Pig Iron.....		900	900	-	600	900	1,500
Steel & Iron Scrap.....		900	900	-	100	900	1,000
Machine Tools.....	\$ million	100	-	-	100	100	100

**NOTES ON REQUIREMENTS:**

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| A. Merchant Ships. | Based on maintenance of United Kingdom merchant fleet at existing level, i.e., after allowance for present rate of losses. |
| B. Aircraft.       | Based on present British Air Staff estimate of squadron requirements to give preponderance over enemy.                     |
| C. Tanks.          |  |
| D. Ordnance.       |  |
| E. Ammunition.     | Based on British War Office strategic calculations.  |
| F. Steel.          | Based on United Kingdom deficiency as a result of loss of Continental sources of supply.                                   |
| G. General.        | All of the above estimates assume the maintenance of British output.   |





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatches from the Naval  
Attache at Tokyo and the American Consul at  
Malta are forwarded as being of possible  
interest to the President.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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DECLASSIFIED

Date: 10/27/58 (9/27/58)

Date: 6/3/69

Signature: *gvl*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library January 17, 1941.


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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is an interesting account  
of German dive bomber attacks, forwarded by  
our Naval Observer with the British Mediterranean  
Fleet.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN



0715

SD WASHINGTON DC JAN 16:

OPNAV FROM STATE:

CONFIDENTIAL:

FOLLOWING IS A PRAPHRASE TELEGRAM NO 13 FROM LEGATION, CAIRO  
SENT JANUARY 14, 1941, NOON. RECD 550 AM 15TH.

QUOTE FROM OPIC FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

1. THE JANUARY 7 TO 13 MEDITERRANEAN SWEEP WAS MADE  
UP OF COVERING USUAL CONVOYS TO PIRAEUS AND TO AND  
FROM MALTA, LIKEWISE FOUR MERCHANT VESSELS, HURRICANE  
PLANES NUMBERING TWELVE, ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS NUMBERING  
TWENTY-FOUR FOR MALTA, AND TANKS, PLANES, GUNS, AND  
PERSONNEL OF THE R.A.F. TO GREECE TO PASS THROUGH THE  
STRAITS OF SICILY. FROM ALEXANDRIA TO MALTA THE FLEET  
WAS CONTINUOUSLY SHADOWED. HOWEVER, THE FLEET WAS NOT  
THE SUBJECT OF ANY AIR ATTACKS.

TWO ITALIAN DESTROYERS AT DAWN ON THE 10TH OF JANUARY  
ATTACKED THE SOUTHAMPTON, DONAVENTURA AND  
THE GLOUCESTER AS WELL AS FOUR DESTROYERS, WHICH  
VESSELS HAD ESCORTED WITH SUCCESS THE CONVOY THROUGH THE STRAITS.  
ONE DESTROYER WAS SUNK BY THE DONAVENTURA,  
WHILE THE OTHER, ALTHOUGH HIT, ESCAPED. THE PANTELLERIA  
SHORE BATTERIES DID NOT OPEN FIRE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE  
IN RANGE OF THE BRITISH CRUISERS. THE RETREATING  
DESTROYER WAS ATTACKED BY A BRITISH ANTI-SUBMARINE  
PATROL PLANE. HOWEVER, NO HITS WERE MADE.

THE DESTROYER GALLANT WHICH WAS ON THE STARBOARD  
BOW OF THE BATTLESHIPS AND SCREENING THEM HAD, AT NINE  
O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING, HER BOW BLOWN OFF TO NUMBER 1

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**DECLASSIFIED**

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

SHEET ONE

Date- 6/5/69

Signature- J. W. L. M.

GUN A SUBMARINE TORPEDO. THIS TORPEDO WAS AIMED AT THE WARSFITE. HOWEVER, FORTUNATELY, IT HIT THE GALLANT WHICH WAS NOT RUNNING AT THE DEPTH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. HAVING BEEN TAKEN IN TOW, THE CRUISERS SUCCESSFULLY ESCORTED THE GALLANT TO MALTA DESPITE ATTACKS BY BOMBING AND AIR TORPEDO.

SD 15  
SHEET TWO

TWO TORPEDO PLANES OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY ATTACKED OUT OF THE SUN AT TWELVE-THIRTY PM. THEY THEN FIRED TORPEDOES AT FIFTEEN HUNDRED YARDS, ONE HUNDRED FEET OFF THE WATER, FOLLOWING WHICH HAVING TURNED NINETY DEGREES THEY DEPARTED. THE EMERGENCY TURNED AWAY THE BATTLESHIPS, NARROWLY AVOIDING THE TORPEDOES. ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE OF AN INTENSE NATURE WAS NOT ABLE TO BRING THESE AIRPLANES DOWN.

THE BATTLESHIPS WERE LEFT WITH NO FIGHTER PROTECTION WHEN THREE FIGHTERS WERE SENT IN PURSUIT OF THE TORPEDO PLANES, THE TWO OTHER FIGHTERS BEING OVER THE CONVOY. WHEN THIS TOOK PLACE, APPROXIMATELY 24 GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS (JUNKERS-8B) CAME INTO VIEW. FOR THE PAST TWENTY MINUTES THESE PLANES HAD BEEN CLOSING IN ON THE FLEET. THE ILLUSTRIOUS WAS THE MAIN OBJECT OF THEIR ATTACK, ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO ATTACKED THE VALIANT AND THE WARSFITE. SINCE THE ATTACKS WERE DETERMINED AND PRESSED HOME, THE PLANES MUST HAVE BEEN PILOTED BY GERMANS. THE PLANES ATTACKED FROM THE QUARTER OR THE STERN, AND WHEN THEY DIVED THEY EITHER SPIRALED OR DIVED AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES AND MANEUVERED FROM 14,000 FEET TO 4,000 FEET. THEY PULLED OUT OF THE DIVE AT ABOUT 1,000 FEET, DROPPING DELAY ACTION ARMOR-PIERCING BOMBS, EACH WEIGHING 1,000 POUNDS. ALL SHIPS RECEIVED VERY CLOSE AND NUMEROUS NEAR MISSES. SIX HITS

020102



SD 15  
SHEET THREE

WERE RECEIVED BY THE ILLUSTRIOUS, THE AFT AND FORE  
ELEVATORS WERE WRECKED AND HER ARMORED FLIGHT DECK WAS  
DAMAGED, AND A NUMBER OF FIRES, DESTROYING SIXTEEN PLANES,  
WERE STARTED. THE STEERING GEAR WAS DAMAGED, THE  
OFFICERS QUARTERS WERE WRECKED, AND THE SHIP, AFTER BEING  
FLOODED FROM FRAME 136 AFT, SETTLED DOWN BY THE STERN  
EIGHT FEET. 60 WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, 40 SLIGHTLY AND 83 WERE KILLED.  
ALTHOUGH DIVE BOMBED BY TWELVE PLANES,  
BOMBED BY SIX PLANES FROM A HIGH LEVEL AND TORPEDO ATTACKED  
BY TWO PLANES, SHE WAS ABLE TO REACH MALTA BY STEERING BY HER  
ENGINES. THE HAWSE-PIPE OF THE WARSPITE WAS HIT AND  
ABOUT TEN MEN WERE WOUNDED ON BOTH BATTLESHIPS.

EIGHT FULMER FIGHTERS BROKE UP AN ATTACK ON THE  
CONVOY BY BRINGING DOWN SEVEN OUT OF TOTAL OF ABOUT  
TEN DIVE BOMBERS WHICH MADE ONLY NEAR MISSES.

TWELVE OF THE SAME TYPE BOMBERS LATE IN THE AFTER-  
NOON ATTACKED THE TWO BATTLESHIPS, ALTHOUGH HXXX THE VALIANT  
WAS PARTICULARLY CONCENTRATED ON. LUCKILY NO HITS AND  
ONLY VERY NEAR MISSES WERE MADE BUT THE ATTACK WAS  
DETERMINED, THE PLANES PULLING OUT AS LOW AS 100  
(REPEAT 100) FEET AFTER DIVING AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE AGAINST  
DETERMINED MASS FORMATIONS WAS AGAIN PROVEN BY THE  
FACT THAT ONLY ONE PLANE WAS BROUGHT DOWN IN ALL ATTACKS  
BY HEAVY ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE BY ALL AVAILABLE GUNS FROM  
ALL SHIPS. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FIGHTER PROTECTION.

ABOUT 200 MILES FROM ITALY AT 3 PM ON JANUARY 11,  
AFTER BEING SHADOWED DURING THE MORNING, THE SOUTHAMPTON  
AND GLOUCESTER WERE SURPRISED COMPLETELY BY AN ATTACK OUT OF THE SUN

026604



BY SEVERAL ITALIAN HIGH LEVEL BOMBERS

AND APPROXIMATELY TWELVE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS. THE AFTER ENGINE ROOM OF THE SOUTHAMPTON WAS HIT AND SEVERAL FIRES WERE STARTED THERE AND IN THE SURROUNDING OIL TANKS AND TURRET NUMBER THREE. THE SHIP BECAME UNTENABLE AND HAD TO BE ABANDONED AND SUNK WITH A LOSS OF ABOUT FIFTY LIVES BECAUSE THE FIRES COULD NOT BE GOT UNDER CONTROL AND THE MAGAZNEXXXXXX THE MAGAZINES COULD NOT BE FLOODED.

SD 15

SHEET FOUR

THE FORWARD DIRECTOR TOWER OF THE GLOUCESTER WAS HIT BUT THE BOMB FORTUNATELY DID NOT EXPLODE. NO ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE GLOUCESTER DURING THE TRANSFER OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE SOUTHAMPTON, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS SHADOWED CONTINUALLY.

2. A CRITICAL SITUATION FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET IS PRESENTED BY THE APPEARANCE OF A NUMBER, WHICH IS BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT TWO HUNDRED, OF GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS CAPABLE OF A RADIUS OF THREE HUNDRED MILES. WARSHIPS AND CONVOYS TO GREECE AND MALTA AND THOSE PASSING THROUGH THE STRAITS OF SICILY ARE IN GRAVE DANGER, AS SCREENS CAN GIVE BUT LITTLE FIGHTER PROTECTION. THAT THE FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS AT MALTA WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LOCATE AND TO ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THESE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS IS REVEALED BY PERSONAL CONFERENCE WITH ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM. EVEN MUSSOLINI'S FLEET WILL BXXXXX WILL PUT TO SEA IF FURTHER DAMAGE IS SUFFERED BY THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, AND BRITISH MIDDLE EASTERN GAINS COULD BE LARGELY COUNTERACTED. THAT THE FORMIDABLE, NOW AT BERMUDA, WILL BE SENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, IS EXPECTED BY THE ADMIRAL, BUT THERE WILL STILL BE A LACK OF FIGHTERS. THE ADDITIONAL FORCE WHICH IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY HIM TO FOLD UP

SD 15

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION....16

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Seguin



Seguin



Reparation vehicules



Traitement thermique

~~MOST SECRET~~

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
ATTACKED 3/4 MARCH 1942

286 hho1





Atelier gde vitesse



7



Forges fabricant matrices



8

Fonderie malleable ~~NOT SECRET~~

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ATTACHED 3/4 MARCH 1942

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
Seguin Montage tourisme

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RENAULT FACTORY BILLANCOURT PARIS FRANCE ATTACHED 3/4 MARCH 1942





Usinage bielles, soupapes, moteurs

32

Reparation vehicules industrielles

33



Batiments des bureaux

Traitement thermique

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Remains destroyed by fire on 3/4 March 1942

926 hh04

27

28



*Salle conseil administrative*



*Usinage cylindre*

29



*Seguin Halle montage*

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RENAULT FACTORY

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
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
RENAULT FACTORY: BILLANCOURT, PARIS, FRANCE.

ATTACKED 3/4 MARCH 1942

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926 hh/2

suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand.

4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Russia's "security" so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind M. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision.

5. M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises - ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments. Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic.....

a26102

on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty's Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem.

8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such a prospect would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant's return.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

25th February, 1942.

026104





A/666. IPRU. 27-4-42. F/36" →

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ROSTOCK / MARIENEHE

Heinkel Factory

K1312

Dupe Neg N°442.

A/666 1PRV 27-4-42 F/36 →

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ROSTOCK

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Düpe Weg NO46

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A/666 1PRU 27-4-42 F/56

123



C.I.U. DAMAGE PLOT  
ROSTOCK N° 1

Result of Raids 23-27 4 42  
Report N° K.1312



NEG N° 9437

236/104

121 6 A666 IPRUX 27-4-42 F36'←



Dupe Neg. N°452

K1312

ROSTOCK



A/666. IPRU. 27-4-42. F/36"←

131



226106

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1941.

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
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a summation of  
despatches received from Naval Attache  
London.

I thought the information important  
enough to bring to the President's attention.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

926j01

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DOD L... 5200.9 (9/27/58)

In reply refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1941

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- J. R. [unclear]

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN.

At a recent conference attended by the heads of all Admiralty Divisions, First Sea Lord, CINC Coastal Command, CINC Western Approaches, Adm. Subs, Vice Chief Naval Staff, Asst. Chief Naval Staff, Representatives CINC Plymouth, Operations Officer Home Fleet, and First Lord of Admiralty, the critical shipping situation was discussed and emphasized. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Pound) stated that the shipping losses for February were exceedingly serious, and he inferred that another month of such losses might be critical. This latter was concurred in by the Director of Trade Division. When questioned by Admiral Pound, the Director of Trade Division stated that the problem of air attacks was of more immediate seriousness than that of submarines.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Alexander) inquired of Air Marshal Bowhill (Head of Coastal Command) as to whether or not the Coastal Command could assure him that planes would be made available to counter the attacks on shipping by Nazi long range bombers. Air Marshal Bowhill stated in reply that there were no suitable planes available, and that even though large numbers of long range bombers from the Bomber Command were utilized as fighters, they could not successfully cope with the German long range bombers. The First Lord of the Admiralty then stated that he would have to tell the prime minister that the Coastal Command could not protect ships against the Condor bombers, and he inferred that a solution must be found at once. He further stated that he could not take the responsibility for losses that were beyond the control of the Navy.

When these Nazi long range bombers are attacking ships in the Atlantic, they make a very low approach parallel to the course of the ship being bombed, and practically lay the bombs on the deck, thus insuring a high percentage of hits. The British believe that a great number of short range anti-aircraft guns could defeat this attack, but the guns are not available. It was stated by the vice chief of Naval staff that the British could use ten thousand German guns. Every merchant ship should be provided with at least four of this type of gun in order to

a26j02

provide for four cornered defense. The Admiralty continues to stress the need for more and more short range anti-aircraft guns. Because of the seriousness of the threat of long range German bombers to British shipping, and the scarcity of the type of AA gun needed, it is suggested that serious consideration be given by us to the possibility of tentative plans to supplement the destroyers and patrol planes of our support force with carriers to meet the immediate dangerous situation.

Dictated by Lieutenant Mott  
Typed by R. Bulloch

a26;03



PX 71-35 (34)

C.I.U. DUPE NO - 76

K1274 1/18



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PX 71-35 (35)

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C.I.U. DUPE NO. 7

K1274 2/37



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


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
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K1274 H/33

C.I.U. DUPE NO 80



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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Paraphrase of Code Cablegram  
Received at the War Department  
at 11:29, June 23, 1941

Date-

Signature-

London, filed 17:00, June 23, 1941.

The strength and disposition of the Russian Air Force is currently estimated by the British as follows: 1600 aircraft in the area of Vladivostok, 4800 along the Western front. The ratio of bombers and fighters is about two to three. Most of the fighters are of the type of the British Gladiator. Of the Hurricane class they have around 1000 aircraft. Naval aircraft number about 200. Most of the Russian bombers, known as the SB, are similar to the Blenheim and have a speed of 250 miles per hour. Their long range bomber, called the DB-3, has a range of 1600 miles and carries 3000 pounds of bombs. The reserve of the Russian Air Force is estimated at thirty percent. The morale of the pilots is thought to be good, but they are not considered well trained, most of their training having been concerned with defensive operations.

1. British Air Activity over the Continent.

a. Night of June 21-22. During this night British bombers dropped 49 tons of high explosive and 5900 incendiaries bombs on Dusseldorf, 1100 incendiaries and 48 tons of high explosive bombs, including one bomb of 4000 pounds, on the railway center at Cologne, 26 tons of high explosive bombs and 3800 incendiaries on the industrial area at Cologne, 40 tons of high explosive bombs on Boulogne and 15 on Dunkirk.

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926K01

# CONFIDENTIAL

b. Day of June 22. The railway center at Hazebrouch was attacked by 17 Blenheims. Fighter protection for this operation was furnished by 12 squadrons of fighters. Patrols off the Atlantic coast of France and attacks upon enemy shipping were performed by 24 aircraft of the Coastal Command.

c. Night of June 22-23. Sent to attack the railway center at Bremen were 54 bombers, to the Bremen shipyards 26, to the industrial area of Wilhelmshaven 27, to Dusseldorf 1 and to Emden 3.

## 2. German Air Activity over Britain.

a. Day of June 21. Over the continent the Germans maintained defensive patrols with a force of 350 fighters.

b. Night of June 21-22. The Germans operated with 15 fighters and 60 long range bombers.

c. Night of June 22-23. During this night German aircraft operated over the Thames Estuary, the Bristol Channel, over Essex, the East Coast and that of Cornwall.

## 3. Aircraft Losses Reported.

a. British losses. During daylight operations of June 22 the Royal Air Force lost two fighters. One bomber crashed in England and two were lost by enemy action during the night of June 22-23.

b. Axis losses. Reported shot down during the day of June 22 were 29 ME-109's, probably destroyed were 5 and damaged were 7. Fifteen of those destroyed were ME-109F's.

## 4. British Air Activity, Other Theaters.

a. Middle Eastern Theater. Nothing new reported.

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600.016.5200.9 (9/27/58)

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5. Axis Air Activity, Other Theaters.

a. North African Theater. Slight damage was caused by an attack of enemy aircraft on the harbor of Alexandria during the night of June 20-21.

LEE

Distribution:

THE PRESIDENT  
Secretary of War  
State Department  
Under Secretary of War  
Chief of Staff  
War Plans Division  
Office of Naval Intelligence (2)  
GHQ  
G-3  
Air Corps

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DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/59

Signature- *g/m*

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926K03



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Paraphrase of Code Cablegram  
Received at the War Department  
at 09:50, July 10, 1941.

12.14.  
1.6  
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DDO L... 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- 8/12

London, filed 15:25, July 10, 1941.

1. With reference to your cabled instruction to send forward the digest of General Wavell's operations in Greece and Crete by mail, please be advised that it left here by air on July 2.

2. Russia.

a. Under the command of General Golikov, a Soviet military mission, containing officers of all branches, arrived in London the night of July 8-9 and was welcomed with enthusiasm by press and public.

b. Responsible informants here report that Stalin, in a conversation with the British Ambassador on July 9, claimed that although the Soviet position was strained it was none the less true that they had not yet set in motion their best defensive plans.

3. The following is a summary of British Military Intelligence information to the morning of July 10:

a. Syria. On July 4, British troops attained Kamichlive on the Turkish border in the neighborhood of Tel Kfuchek. In the valley of the Euphrates, Empire forces reached Raqqa on July 5. A flanking movement to the east around Damour has placed the British in a position to control the Beirut-Damour road. On July 9, General Dentz, High Commissioner of the Vichy Syrian Government, asked for terms of capitulation. No reports are available here concerning the provisions of the proposed agreement or if they have been accepted by General Dentz.

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b. Russia. The main German objectives seem at present to be towards Kiev from the direction of Novograd, Volynsk and and Shepetovka and in the neighborhood of Ostrov and Polotsk.

c. Libya. On July 8, minor detachments of Axis armored cars were repulsed by British advanced troops south of Bir Sheferzen (25 miles southwest of Sollum). The Axis blasting operation in the Halfaya-Sojum district, commented on in two of our cables, is now thought to reveal formation of defence positions containing deep shelters in the rocks of the escarpment. This would seem evidence that the Axis in that part of the border sector are taking up a defensive attitude.

~~SECRET~~

Distribution:

✓ THE PRESIDENT  
Secretary of War  
State Department  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
War Plans Division  
Office of Naval Intelligence  
G. H. Q.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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DBO DIA 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3/5/67

Signature- *[Handwritten Signature]*

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82.12  
B.M.  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1941.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This summary, showing the marked increase of British air activity over the continent, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL



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ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial F-10:5-41  
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-25, 2-49)

Monograph Index Guide No. 1000-500  
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See G. N. I. Index G.  
Make separate report for each main title.)

From Dir. of Naval Intelligence at Washington Date July 16, 1941  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference NA and NA reports received in DNI.  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Compilation from references Evaluation RELIABLE  
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GREAT BRITAIN - AIR OPERATIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN THEATRE  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Summary.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

**B R I E F.** A pronounced increase has taken place in the tempo and intensity of British night bombing operations against German-occupied Western Europe. Comparing the first ten days of July with the first ten of June, five to ten times as many bombers were sent out, and three to five times as many tons of high explosive and nearly ten times as many incendiaries were dropped.

Summary data are:

Date	Number of Bombers sent out	Tons of High Explosive dropped	Number of Incendiary Bombs dropped	(Number of Bombers reported lost in combat)
June 1-10	237 ±	354 ±	14,490 ±	4
11-20	1,571 ±	881 ±	22,900 ±	25
21-30	1,126 ±	1,029 ±	21,080 ±	45
July 1-10	1,664	1,643	138,400	55

**NOTE:** The present compilation is the first of its sort issued by D.N.I. It is issued at this time, mid-July, because there are now sufficient (and corroborative) data to make a reasonable and interesting evaluation. The marked increase of British air activity over the continent is clearly shown in this study. This gives further credence to the claim of British air superiority - at least temporarily - over Germany in the Western Theatre.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date 6/3/69

Signature J. H. [illegible]

1. For copying and copies of this report, see additional pages. Forward original and six copies. Officers preparing and those forwarding this report must submit a copy of this report to the Director, Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., when practical. If practicable, prepare additional copies for the Director, Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., when practical. If practicable, prepare additional copies for the Director, Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., when practical.



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**BRITISH BOMBING RAIDS AT NIGHT AGAINST WEST EUROPE**

Date (Night)	Number of Bombers sent out	Tons of High Ex- plosive dropped	Number of Incendiaries dropped	Number of Bombers reported lost in combat
<b>JUNE</b>				
1/2	None	-	-	0
2/3	186	167	14,490	4
3/4	None	-	-	0
4/5	None	-	-	0
5/6	None	-	-	0
6/7	None	-	-	0
7/8	14	73	-	0
8/9	37	?	?	0
9/10	?	?	?	0
10/11	?	114	?	0
11/12	149	169	12,900	8
12/13	339	165	-	6 (a)
13/14	173	155	-	0
14/15	164	?	?	0
15/16	?	?	?	2
16/17	222	?	?	4
17/18	193	64	1,600	1
18/19	163	173	2,400	0
19/20	40	42	6,000	2
20/21	128	113	-	2
21/22	125	178	10,800	1
22/23	111	86	6,700	2 (b)
23/24	144	161	10,400	2
24/25	136	106	15,500	3
25/26	131	72	4,000	4
26/27	102	130	5,700	4
27/28	156	126	16,000	12
28/29	17	minelaying	-	0
29/30	136	106	4,980	13
30/01	68	64	7,000	4
<b>JULY</b>				
1/2	57	69	-	3
2/3	161	162	16,000	4
3/4	162	123	15,500	7
4/5	149	202	-	4
5/6	208	246	17,300	4
6/7	215	200	7,700	6
7/8	301	297	27,200	9
8/9	139	116	33,800	10
9/10	140	121	11,900	6
10/11	132	107	9,000	2

Notes: (a) Two additional bombers crashed in England this night.  
(b) One additional bomber crashed in England this night.

**Evaluation:** The above figures are incomplete, especially for early June, and they are certainly inexact. Reports on the same night's operations from different observers rarely if ever agree in numerical detail. Bombers lost in combat are probably reported in full as shown above, but losses due to accidental bad landings and take-offs are almost never reported.

The figures as presented herein are regarded by IRI as the best available. There can be no doubt that the trend in air operations is accurately shown.

The figures are summarized for ten-day periods on the preceding page.

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*Ch. Post*

Up to October 1st of this year, the total orders placed in the United States for the account of the British Government amounted to \$1,600,000,000 and additional orders ready to be placed approximate another \$3,239,000,000. Of the \$1,600,000,000 of orders already placed, \$237,000,000 represents capital commitments for the purposes of plant expansion, personnel training, and the like. A capital commitment of \$100,000,000 has been allocated to the aircraft industry alone, while the remainder of \$137,000,000 has been committed for expanding the facilities of powder, munitions, and other industrial enterprises engaged upon the production of war material.

The British Government as of October 1st has placed orders for more than 11,000 airplanes and 27,000 engines. Additional orders to be placed by the British Government for aircraft and engines equal those already outstanding.

With respect to other war materiel the British have already placed orders for 68,489 tons of explosives and propellants; 1,105,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; and 254,117 small arms of various types, as well as for other items including tanks, tank engines, small boats, marine engines, and raw materials, especially iron and steel. In addition to the foregoing, the British Government is in the process of placing



orders for 1,175,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; 1,850 field guns; 22,600 medium guns; 54,275 small arms; 2,000 tanks; and other miscellaneous items.

Between June and October of this year certain surplus materiel was sold or exchanged by the United States Army and Navy for more modern equipment. All of this surplus materiel was eventually purchased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments from domestic corporations.

In summary, this surplus materiel included 890,000 rifles, 20,500 revolvers, and 86,583 machine guns, with 144,790,000 rounds of ammunition for the same; 895 field guns with ammunition; 316 three-inch mortars with ammunition; 8,500 tons of T.N.T.; 4,860 tons of powder; and 6,600 aircraft bombs. In addition to these items there were included large quantities of accessory equipment, such as ammunition chests, magazines, spare barrels, caissons, etc. All of this materiel so purchased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments was delivered just after the evacuation at Dunkirk.

In addition to the expansion in our own production capacity resulting from British orders, we have also obtained plans and specifications of British war materiel, such as the Rolls Royce Merlin engine, the power-driven aircraft turret, and

276-402

detailed technical information concerning anti-aircraft measures, anti-submarine measures, etc. Further, the use by the British of American-made planes and guns has given us valuable information as to the effectiveness of these weapons under actual combat conditions.

261023



PSF  
Safe File  
Gr. Britain

Draft note from His Majesty's Ambassador  
to Mr. Cordell Hull.

1.

Sir,

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to refer to the speech made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 20th. In that speech Mr. Churchill stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had decided some months ago that the interests of both the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defence of the western hemisphere against the attack of a hostile power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of western Europe and its resources.

I have now been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, are happy to give the assurance that in the hope of furthering and making still more cordial and enduring the existing good relations between Great Britain and the United States, and as a free contribution on their part towards the defence of the Americas, and the inhabitants thereof, they are ready to make available immediately to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in

Newfoundland/

226001

Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana, needed for the purpose of hemispheric defence, such areas to be leased to the United States Government for a period of 99 years.

His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases.

His Majesty's Government suggest that if their offer is acceptable to the United States Government, the two Governments should immediately determine by agreement the exact location of the areas within the territories abovementioned to be leased to the United States Government for its naval and air purposes, and the powers to be exercised within these areas by the United States authorities.

Draft note from Mr. Cordell Hull to  
His Majesty's Ambassador.

2.

Sir,

I have received your note of \_\_\_\_\_  
of which the text is as follows:-

(Here insert the text of the Ambassador's reply.)

The United States Government have noted with most grateful appreciation the readiness of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, to make immediately available to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana.

This assurance on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will certainly increase the national security of the United States and greatly strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the western hemisphere, and the offer of His Majesty's Government is gladly accepted.

The Government of the United States will immediately designate Commissioners to meet with Commissioners designated by His Majesty's Government to decide upon the exact location of the areas within which the suggested naval and air facilities are to be extended, the nature of those facilities, and the powers/

a26003

powers to be exercised within these areas by the United States authorities.

The United States Government note with appreciation that His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases to be granted to them.

At the same time, in view of the very material addition which this action by His Majesty's Government will make to the security of the United States, the United States Government wish for their part to make some contribution towards the security of the United Kingdom and the defensive strength of the British Navy in the Atlantic. They have therefore decided immediately to transfer to His Majesty's Government the following naval and military material:-

50 destroyers

20 motor torpedo boats

A certain number of aircraft  
and rifles.

The United States Government wish to make it clear that they do not desire any payment in return for this naval and military material.



Safe - Mr. E. A. Tamm

PSF

*Mr. Brittain*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that you approved recently a draft Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Great Britain. This draft Agreement was handed to the British Ambassador and has been the subject of extensive conversations between the Department of State and Lord Halifax. I am informed that Lord Halifax feels strongly that the British Government should agree to sign this draft at once in its present form and that he has strongly represented this point of view to the British Government.

A responsible officer of the British Government informed an officer of the State Department yesterday that in his opinion it would be exceedingly helpful if you expressed an interest in this Agreement to Mr. Churchill upon his return to Washington. He added that in his opinion if you suggested to Mr. Churchill that he discuss this matter with Lord Halifax the Agreement could be signed in its present form without further delay.

*CH*

26001

TO THE PRESIDENT  
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

*Good Sir*

*Boat*

C O P Y

Copy No. 28

To: Washington for Combined Chiefs of Staff.  
London for Chiefs of Staff.  
Prime Minister Australia.  
Army Australia.

From: ABDACOM No. 01226 of 15th February 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following just received from SINGAPORE.

"Owing to losses from enemy action, water, petrol, food and ammunition practically finished. Unable therefore to continue the fight any longer. All ranks have done their best and are grateful for your help".

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

AM: DI: 3

CABLEGRAM

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Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

U R G E N T

822A

M.

From LONDON

To MILID

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 FEBRUARY 19TH

PERSONAL AND ~~HIGH SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
HARRIMAN CLN PRESENT GOVERNMENT RESIGNING TONIGHT WITH NEW  
GOVERNMENT TO BE RECONSTRUCTED AND ANNOUNCED IN PRESS  
TOMORROW MORNING UNDER CHURCHILL AS PRIME MINISTER WITH WAR  
CABINET AS FOLLOWS CHURCHILL PRIME MINISTER ATLEE DASH  
DOMINIONS OFFICE CMA RETAINING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PD  
CRIPPS DASH LEADER OF THE HOUSE PD OLIVER LYTTTELTON DASH  
WITHOUT PORTFOLIO PD EDEN DASH FOREIGN OFFICE PD BEVIN DASH  
LABOR PD ANDERSON DASH LORD PRESIDENT PD BEAVERBROOK OUT  
OF THE GOVERNMENT ENTIRELY PD MORE FOLLOWS PD

MCCLURE

State

By J. Sch

FEB 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

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Received at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

U R G E N T

~~SECRET~~

844A

M.

From LONDON

To MILID

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION TWO FEBRUARY 19TH  
PART TWO PD OTHER MINISTERIAL CHANGES NOT FULLY  
SETTLED BUT UNDERSTAND LORD MOYNE IS OUT CMA WITH CRANBORNE  
MOVING FROM DOMINIONS TO COLONIAL OFFICE PD MARGESSON MAY  
GO OUT IF STRONG SUCCESSOR CAN BE DECIDED ON IN TIME PD  
MOST OF THE OTHER MINISTERS CMA HOWEVER CMA WILL REMAIN  
CMA INCLUDING DUNCAN CMA MOORE DASH BRABAZON CMA LEATHERS  
CMA ALEXANDER CMA SINCLAIR CMA MORRISON CMA LLEWELLYN CMA  
AND WOOLTON MORE WILL FOLLOW

MCCLURE

State

By J. Schar

FEB 19 1942

~~SECRET~~

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Received at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

9:27 A.M.

By J. Schaubert  
State Dept.  
From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To MILID

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION THREE FEBRUARY 19TH URGENT  
THIRD PART PD LYTTELTONS ACTIVITIES NOT YET

CLEARLY DEFINED PD WILL PROBABLY PRESIDE AT CHIEF OF STAFFS  
MEETINGS AND CERTAIN OTHER COMMITTEE AND COUNCIL MEETINGS  
WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY TAKEN SO MUCH OF PRIME MINISTERS TIME  
PD WILL GENERALLY ASSIST PRIME MINISTER IN THE DIRECTION OF  
THE WAR CMA PERHAPS INCLUDING SUPPLY CMA BUT THE PRIME  
MINISTER RETAINS COMPLETE CONTROL PD PARA

POSITION OF MINISTER OF PRODUCTION MAY BE ABAN-  
DONED WITH SOME OTHER SYSTEM OF COORDINATION SET UP PD  
PARA

IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPRAISE FULLY REASONS FOR  
BEAVERBROOKS RESIGNATION PD PRIME MINISTER OFFERED HIM  
ALMOST ANY POSITION IF HE WOULD STAY CMA LORD PRIVY SEAL  
AND AIR MINISTRY PD PARA

UNDOUBTEDLY HIS HEALTH IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR PD  
THIS IS TO BE GIVEN AS THE PUBLIC REASON PD OTHER REASONS  
UNDOUBTEDLY INCLUDE THAT HE IS TIRED OUT AND REALIZES THAT  
HIS BAD TEMPER INTERFERES WITH THE SMOOTH WORKING OF THE  
CABINET AS A TEAM

MCCLURE

~~SECRET~~

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CABLEGRAM

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Received at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

U R G E N T

935A M.

From LONDON

To MILID

~~SECRET~~ URGENT

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION THREE PART TWO FEBRUARY 19TH  
PD HE MAY DOUBT WHETHER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS  
REALLY STRONG ENOUGH AND MAY WANT TO RETIRE FOR A TIME  
CMA EXPECTING TO COME BACK AT A LATER DATE WITH INCREASED  
HEALTH CMA VIGOR AND PRESTIGE PD THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT  
IT IS HIS PRESENT SINCERE INTENTION TO SUPPORT CHURCHILL  
IN HIS PRESS AND OTHERWISE PD PARA HE PLANS TO LEAVE FOR  
AMERICA IN ABOUT A WEEK OR TEN DAYS ON A TRIP FOR HIS  
HEALTH PD PARA HIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE WELCOMED BY SOME  
BUT A SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE PUBLIC GENERALLY

MCCLURE

State Dept.  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 19 1942~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

REDIFORM-PATD.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

16

CABLEGRAM

AMD112  
7:23 PReceived at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 20, 1942

4:28 P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT

Copies furnished as noted:

NUMBER 2014 FEBRUARY 20, 1942

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
HARRIMAN CLN SUPPLEMENTING MY CABLE FEBRUARY NINETEEN  
REGARDING CABINET CHANGES IT NOW DEVELOPS THAT ON  
ACCOUNT OF BEAVERBROOKS RETIREMENT LYTTLETONS ACTIVITIES  
WILL BE LARGELY ON PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY PARA THE  
PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME TODAY THAT BEAVERBROOKS SPECIFIC  
RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON HAD NOT YET BEEN DEFINED  
PD TAKING CARE OF HIS HEALTH WILL BE THE FIRST CONSIDER-  
ATION PD THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE  
HIM BACK IN THE CABINET AT A FUTURE DATE

. MCCLURE

Action Copy



Safe: St Brit

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

19<sup>th</sup> Feb: 1942.

My dear Harry

The President may  
like to see this private telegram  
which I got from Archinleck  
I have sent Marshall a copy  
but otherwise have given it no  
distribution because of its extreme  
secrecy.

Yours truly  
Jack Dill

MOST IMMEDIATE

FROM: Mideast

TO: War Office rptd British Army Staff,  
Washington.

No: C.S/744 13th Feb.

Cairo, 18th February, situation review.

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Private for Field Marshal Sir John DILL, from General AUCHINLECK.

1. 15 Feb enemy moved forward German Afrika Corps of 15 and 21 Armoured and part 90 Light Divisions on North in area MARTUBA TMIMI TEMRAD and Italian Mobile Corps of Ariete and Trieste (believed to have absorbed Trento) Divisions to South round MECHILI.
2. Enemy advanced on broad front in relatively small columns each comprising some tanks lorried infantry and artillery. Generally enemy columns withdrew when engaged by our fighting patrols and mobile columns which have been most active and successful in keeping close touch with enemy movements throughout but on 14 Feb they pushed forward and shelled at long range our forward troops in Northern sector GAZALA position without effect.
3. Enemy air forces were also active divebombing and machinegunning our forward troops and also attacking rear installations particularly TOBRUK port and EL ADEM aerodrome. Our Air Force scored signal success against them and on 14 Feb out of formation 30, 20 enemy aircraft destroyed, 2 probably destroyed and 10 damaged mostly Italian. Enemy is using DERNA and MARTUBA as forward landing grounds.
4. On 15 Feb enemy forward troops withdrew from TEMPAD area apparently North West into GEBEL AKDAR while Italians retired to MECHILI whence considerable south west movement observed by air reconnaissance. This movement continued 17 Feb and by evening country south of line GAZALA MECHILI was reported by ground reconnaissance clear of enemy though MECHILI seemed held in some strength. Afternoon 17 Feb South African armoured cars reported NO enemy seen track TMIMI MECHILI. Enemy air force inactive yesterday possibly due bad weather.

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J.C.S.

1-17-43

By

RHP

MAR 28 1973

226502

5. Enemy intentions still obscure. If his movements were reconnaissance in force results almost certainly negligible. If he intended to launch blitz attack with object breaking through to TOBRUK and throwing us in confusion he has apparently changed plan for time being at any rate. Possible that enemy plan was to entice our armoured forces forward and then attack them on ground favourable to him out of support range of GAZALA positions. Enemy apparently so far unable use DERNA as supply port probably owing destruction carried out before we withdrew on BENGHASI which is being mined constantly by R.A.F. and his maintenance difficulties probably considerable.

6. Meanwhile our positions on line GAZALA BIR HACHEIM much strengthened and many minefields laid especially in most Northern sector and round BIR HACHEIM which is now strongly defended locality. Precaution against breakthrough by armoured forces ACROMA and EL ADEM converted into defended localities and entrances of TOBRUK perimeter also held.

7. Dispositions 13 Corps. Round GAZALA and South of escarpment 1 South African Division with 1 and 2 South African Inf Bde Gps and Polish Bde Gp under command. Next 150 Inf Bde Gp. 50 Division which has relieved French Bde Gp on left of Poles. 4 Ind Div with 5 and 11 Ind Inf Bdes Gps holds left sector main position to about 18 miles South of GAZALA.

1 Armd Div comprising 2 Armd Bde Gp and 200 Gds Motor Bde Gp to Southeast 4 Ind Div. 2 Armd Bde cruiser and General Stuarts with one regt of 50 Valentines of 1 Army Tank Bde temporarily attached. Free French Bde Gp BIR HACHEIM. 29 Ind Inf Bde Gp with 38 Ind Inf Bde under command holding TOBRUK and environs. 5 NZ Inf Bde Gp at EL ADEM pending relief by 50 Div from SYRIA and IRAQ. 50 Matildas 1 Army Tk Bde attached to Infantry Divs in GAZALA sector. Tank strength in forward area rising slowly but steadily as tanks are reconditioned and sent forward. 2 SA Div (3 Bdes) working on SALUM CAPUZZO defensive area and 7 Ind Inf Bde on MADDALENA defensive area.

8. Railway reached CAPUZZO 16 Feb.

9. General RITCHIE intends follow up enemy closely with fighting patrols and mixed columns while continuing strengthen intensively GAZALA - BIR HACHEIM - TOBRUK position, to form firm base for future operations and secure TOBRUK. Meanwhile offensive striking force will be built up as rapidly as possible in forward area.

26603



10. During these operations estimated from ground and air reports that enemy tank strength in forward area 100/120 German/Italian all types. Total enemy medium tank strength as estimated by Intelligence Staff 50/60 German 50 Italian. This does NOT rpt NOT include Italian Littorio Armd Div whose HQ now identified TRIPOLI and whose 140 Medium tanks may have reached LIBYA or be coming shortly.
11. Casualties to date CYRENAICAN campaign round figures Officers Men British 780 and 7500. Indian 60 and 1200. New Zealand 310 and 4200. Union Defence Force 220 and 4300. Polish 20 and 300. Australia 9 and 100. By categories killed 3300 wounded 7700 missing 8100 total 19100. Above NOT rpt NOT for publication in any form. Enemy prisoners to date passed through ALEXANDRIA or in Base Hospital German 260 and 9100 Italian 1080 and 22000. Total 32500.
12. Situation 9th and 10th Army fronts unchanged. Defensive areas finally settled and work proceeding well.
13. Political situation EGYPT improving though some soreness over recent events persists among officers of Army.
14. Relations with Free French good and improving.
15. NO immediate prospect arrival Polish contingent from Russian TURKISTAN.
16. Internal condition Greek and Yugoslav contingents thoroughly unsatisfactory owing internal dissension but hope may improve soon.
17. Political situation SYRIA PALESTINE IRAQ reasonably satisfactory but food shortage may complicate matters.
18. Position in IRAN NOT so good but Minister of State has this in hand.

226504



Box

100

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COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY, AMEMB,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11th February, 1942

Dear Harry,

I have just got the attached telegram which was sent to me for transmission to the President at the request of the American Ambassador in London.

Would you be so very kind as to pass it to the President.

Yours ever,

/s/ JACK DILL

Harry Hopkins, Esq.,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

COPY

COPY NO. 1

From: Troopers

To: Britman

No. 69606 M.I.3 (c) of 9th February

Personal for Field Marshal Dill from C.I.C.S.

Following is summary of military conversations held in Russia in December 1941 and report of JASON MACFARLANE on visit to Russian Front in January 1942. Full text follows by bag.

1. M. STALIN was informed that on conclusion of operations in LIBYA it had been hoped to send 10 squadrons of Hurricanes to the Russian Front but owing to changed situation in the Far East that was now impossible. Supply of tanks and aircraft however would continue. He fully understood we could not help in the way we had proposed.
2. STALIN enquired as to likelihood of opening second front in Europe. He replied that we should not be able to in immediate future but that one of the objects of the Libyan campaign was to secure a base from which we could attack ITALY.
3. Policy of Russians had been to fight continuous rearguard action thereby tiring the German troops. They were now able to make a counter-offensive which they proposed to continue throughout the winter. However they expected the Germans to attack again in the spring as the Germans still had a great superiority in tanks, whereas the Russians had only a slight superiority in the air.
4. When asked how he would view the situation if Russia became engaged on the Eastern Front STALIN replied that he would regard it without enthusiasm but by the spring troops that had been withdrawn from that theatre would be replaced by new formations so that it would then be as strong as it was previously. He believed the Japanese would attack the Soviet Union before the spring but if this did not repeat not happen he was prepared to resume conversations as to the advisability of Russia declaring war on Japan.
5. Russians suggested an operation to seize PITSANO, the Russians providing the land forces while we provided naval and some air forces. (This plan has subsequently been dropped at Russian instigation).
6. Transportation facilities on the PERSIAN GULF supply route were discussed. The Russians asked for capacity of 60,000 tons per month rising to 90,000 or 120,000 tons by April. Maximum we could offer was 90,000 by April. With regard to taking material by road to TABRIZ it was pointed out that we were trying to obtain vehicles for this but they would have to come from the U.S.A.

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73  
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

7. GENERAL NYE states "There was a general feeling of confidence in MOSCOW and morale of the army was high. MARSHAL SHAPOZHNIKOV (CSS) appeared to be clear headed, capable staff officer with all the qualities of a commander whereas GENERALS TIMOSHENKO and VOROSHILOV although they had great drive and energy did not repeat not impress him as having much intellect or general ability. STALIN'S confidence struck a more sober note and in private conversation he stated that Russia's strength would be so improved next year and the German army so shaken by its experiences that he thought it possible that war might be over by autumn 1942. GENERAL NYE felt that the Russians were inclined to over estimate not so much their resources as their military skill vis-a-vis the Germans and that they are only likely to obtain striking successes offensively if the morale of the German army cracks.

Following is a summary of GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE'S report on his visit to 16th Division of 5th Army on the MOZHAIISK sector 26th to 28th January.

General Situation. 5th Army attacking on 37 mile front astride MOSCOW-SMOLNSK Road 6 miles east of GZHAISK. Considerable resistance especially in centre where Germans hold positions in considerable depth which they clearly intended holding. 5th Army apparently intend to maintain pressure on centre while right wing conforms to southerly movement by next army on right.

Climatic Conditions. Temperature minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit and snow 2 feet 6 inches in open country and from 3 to 5 feet in forests. Medium and heavy tanks can get across country slowly and with difficulty. Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry largely confined to proximity of roads.

German Defensive Tactics. Germans hold towns and villages linked up by well defended localities. In retirement Germans employ tanks and anti-tank guns on all roads leading to their positions. Before withdrawing everything is scorched. On front of 5th Army are five infantry and one Panzer divisions, latter's tanks being distributed among all divisions.

Russian Offensive Tactics. Consist chiefly of infiltration of Infantry and Ski Troops. Latter work round defended localities and pin down garrison while infantry attack. Russians do lot of night fighting at which they excel. Russian Artillery was deployed in depth along main road.

Air. German activity on this front almost negligible while Russians showed considerable activity.

Russian Commissariat. Troops had no blankets but their clothing provided adequate protection. All troops wear felt not leather boots. Endeavors made always to provide two hot meals a day also have haversack ration.

Miscellaneous. All German light tanks have been withdrawn. Prisoners interrogated by GENERAL MACFARLANE were ill-clad and depressed. Russians say captured letters show low morale of home front. GENERAL MACFARLANE much impressed by senior Commanders and Commissars, also by group of partisans he met.



General Impressions. Seven months of war had made veterans of Russians. Russians started war with relatively untrained staffs but their officers are neither uneducated nor unintelligent. No signs of bragging or of under-estimating Germans but healthy confidence that tide has turned. Under present climatic conditions Red Army is definitely superior to Germans. Their equipment apparently still adequate and no shortage of man power. Possibility of German comeback realized but High Command intends giving them no respite. Definite deterioration of German fighting ability since beginning of campaign. Danger exists that Red Army may outrun its transportation but leaders intend to keep contact with enemy and not let him disengage to refit and regroup. Russian staff work and administration typically Russian and gets progressively worse higher up but end is usually achieved. Red Army in bad way in autumn but its tail is now up.

Full summary of telegrams follow by air mail.

DISTRIBUTION:

Field Marshal Sir John Dill (2)  
Admiral Little  
General Lemys  
Air Marshal Ewill  
Secretary  
Admiral Stark  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
PAT  
CABLEGRAM

195 Safe by at Britain  
MARCH 11, 1942

8:10 A.M.

From LONDON

To MILID

LONDON NO. 2150 MARCH 11

By J. S.

72  
FEB 4 1972

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT COLON BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND CRIPPS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF CRIPPS GOING  
TO INDIA REPRESENTING WAR CABINET TO NEGOTIATE PROPOSALS  
PD PARA I GATHER THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULTIES  
IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
CRIPPS DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS MEMBERSHIP ON WAR  
CABINET PD NOW CMA HOWEVER CMA THE PRIME MINISTER IS  
WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED  
BETWEEN THEM AND FEELS CRIPPS IS OF REAL HELP TO HIM  
PD HE REGRETS THAT CRIPPS HAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY  
AT THIS TIME BUT THE MISSION IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE  
PD FROM HARRIMAN

MCCLURE

The making of an exact copy of this message is  
forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary  
will be made and marked SECRET. This copy will be safe-  
guarded with the greatest care and will be returned to the  
A. C. of S., G-2, without delay

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

a26u01

AM  
War Room

14.3.42.

DETAILED DAMAGE REPORT NO. K. 1274.

Photographs taken by No. 1 P.R.U.  
on 4.3.42 and 6.3.42.

SORTIE A/380.

F.24", F.14", F.5".

Low Obliques.

Flying height: 500 ft.

Mean time of photography: 1250 hrs.

SORTIE A/392.

F.40", F.8".

Contact scale: 1/7,000.

Flying height: 23,600 ft.

Mean time of photography: 1530hrs.

LOCALITY: S.W. SUBURBS OF PARIS.

MOTOR ARMAMENT PLANT (RENAULT): BILLANCOURT.

Damage resulting from recent night attack upon the target is assessed from excellent low obliques taken on the following day and poor quality verticals of a reasonable scale taken 4 days later. There is ample evidence supplied by these two sorties of the high degree of success obtained in the operation. Damage is distributed very evenly over the entire area of the Works and considering the scale and intensity of the attack the proportion of civilian damage is surprisingly small and concentrated mainly at the boundaries of the target.

PROBABLE EFFECT OF DAMAGE.

It is now considered that the destruction caused will probably mean that it will be impossible to use the Plant again on anywhere near the same scale as before until large scale repairs and re-construction are completed. If this is attempted, which is unlikely, it will undoubtedly take a period of years to accomplish since many vital parts of the plant, such as special tools, casting machinery etc., will have to be replaced.

The only sections of the Plant which appear to be either intact or suffering from only slight damage are the Diesel Engine Assembly Shop, the Artillery, part of the Tyre Manufacturing Plant and a few other less important departments. It is interesting to note that the least damaged shops lie on the extreme eastern boundary of the Ile Seguin and the main Works on the H. Wing.

It is also interesting to note the amount of damage which has been caused by fire, and since the number of incendiaries carried was not considerable, it appears likely that H.E. falling on Sections of the Plant, such as furnaces, heat processing, cellulose paint spraying etc., resulted in burning material being distributed over a wide area, causing many heavy fires. Owing to this fact it is extremely difficult to differentiate between damage caused by fire and by H.E.

NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHS.

An attempt has been made to analyse the fire tracks on the films of the night photographs and to tie them up with the actual damage seen. In all, approximately 70 fire tracks were analysed and 30 approximate plottings of fires attempted. The information obtained is in most cases very approximate and is mainly used for confirmation.

In most cases fires are seen to spread in a N.E. direction and in some cases the spread is very rapid indeed, which indicates that the strength of the wind was very suitable for fire attack. It is quite obvious from the number of fire tracks which are seen to be diminishing towards the end of the attack that the A.R.P. Services were making efforts to obtain control, but the damage on the day photographs proves that the scale and accuracy of the attack proved too much for them.

/ DETAILS OF DAMAGE.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Memo 1-17-43

By RT Date APR 5 1973



DETAILS OF DAMAGE

Index to Damage Mosaics.

A/380  
Print No.

Before.   After.

THE SEQUIN.

A.

1.

THETIC POWER STATION. (65,000 K.W).

Roof damage is seen to the Power Station apparently caused by blast. The building gives the appearance that internal damage has been caused, in which case the plant on the island will have been put out of action (quite apart from other damage caused).

An oblique view of the same damage. 1/18  
Item 1.

B.

WOODWORKING SHOPS.

2.

The roofs at the western end show signs of damage and it is possible to see down into the building. At the eastern end lighter roof damage is apparent

3.

Crater on waste land west of shops. Blast from this near miss may be responsible for some of the roof damage seen.

This damage can be seen more clearly on 1/18 the oblique view. Item 2.

C.

BODY PRESS SHOP.

The roof of this shop appears intact except one point towards the western end.

5.

This shows what appears to be the seat of a fire. The roof is scorched across the entire width of the shed.

Shows another view of these shops of the 2/37 damage referred to above. It can also be seen on this print that the roofs of the shed covering the western half of the island bear distinct charring marks, indicating that there is probably severe internal damage. Item 1.

D.

TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

6.

Heavy destruction has been caused at the western end of these shops.

Close up illustrating the same damage. 12/37 Item 2.

Severe damage should have been done to the overhead travelling assembly system.

Night Photograph Evidence.

This fire was seen in progress on night photographs at 2205 hrs. From then onwards it appears to diminish and is seen as a very light track later. It does not appear to register on prints taken after 2230 hrs. This

/would appear to

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



Before. After.

would appear to indicate that some measure of control was obtained. Although the area is large and the damage is severe it must be remembered that the shops contain cellulose spraying cabins and stores of paint, and that the resulting fire would have been difficult to overcome.

7. Severe damage at the eastern end of the same shops.

A close-up of the damage.

3/1  
Item 1.

Several turretless frames, probably A.F.Vs, most of which appear wrecked.

Item 2.

Charring marks and severe destruction of the roof is seen far away from the seat of the fire, proving that probably the entire work-shops have been destroyed.

Item 3.

#### Night Photo. Evidence.

From a close study of the night photographs it is considered that this fire began at 2205 hrs. with a very large explosion (undoubtedly the result of H.E). A wide double fire-track is seen at 2210 hrs. and persists throughout many of the night photographs taken in the said until about 2230 hrs.

E.

#### THE DIESEL ENGINE ASSEMBLY SHOP.

8.

With the exception of some minor roof damage at the western end of this shop the building appears intact. However, the proximity of the heavily damaged assembly shops leaves little doubt that interior damage has been done.

#### THE SOUTH BANK.

F.

#### TYRE MANUFACTURING PLANT.

9.

Some severe damage has been caused to a small section of this plant at the western end. The entire shed appears to have been burnt out.

An oblique view of the same damage.

2/37  
Item 3.

10.

Damage to the west end of one of the main sheds, probably by fire.

An oblique print illustrating the same damage.

2/37  
Item 4.

11.

Further roof damage to the plant which suggests internal destruction. There is no certain confirmation of a fire in this area on night photographs.

/ G.

EXPORT PACKING DEPT.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Before.   After.

G.

EXPORT PACKING DEPT.

11 A.

With the exception of the extreme western end, the three sheds reported to be in the Export Packing Dept. have been destroyed, apparently by both fire and H.E. 10 craters are seen in the road and on open ground S.W. of the building.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The fire track at approximately this point is seen at 2145 hrs. and persisting throughout the raid. It is of a fairly constant intensity but decreases considerably towards the end. It is last seen on a photograph taken at 2224 hrs.

THE NORTH BANK.

H.

THE ARTILLERY.

12.

From both vertical and oblique photographs no damage is apparent to this part of the Works with the exception of some minor roof damage. No fire tracks are seen on night photographs in the area.

I.

REPAIR SHOPS.

13.

This building is seen to be completely destroyed. The damage has probably been done by fire.

Oblique view showing the damaged repair shops at the N. end.

1/33  
Item 1.Night Photo. Evidence.

From night photographs it can be seen that those fires started at the S. end of the shops and gradually spread N. until the whole building was ablaze. No fire tracks are seen on photos. taken during the early part of the attack but they were visible at approximately 2202 hrs. when they appear as a double fire. At 2230 hrs. they still appear as a double fire but the point of origin appears to be moving N. through the building. At 2220 hrs. the fire track is still apparent, but diminishing in size and at 2232 hrs. it appears to have been extinguished (or alternatively it may have been obscured by dense smoke).

J.

ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS.

14.

The Southern end of a block of offices belonging to the Administrative Buildings has been badly damaged. This appears to be a hit by H.E. although it may have been further complicated by fire. The roof appears intact for at least 3/4 of its length.

Oblique view of the damaged end of block of offices.

1/33  
Item 2.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

926V04

Before. After.Night Photo. Evidence.

It is fairly certain that this fire is seen as a track on night photos. It may have started from H.E. or may have been a continuation of the fire in the Repair Shops.

15. Note: Unidentified Building.

The large 6-bay building in the E. also appears to have been severely damaged by fire which may have originated from the same source.

16. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - MAIN BLOCK.

This building is considered to have been completely destroyed by fire.

Prints showing the damaged offices with the fire still burning in the N.W. corner.

1/33  
Item 3.

Another oblique view of the damaged offices.

1/15  
Item 1.

Night Photo. Evidence.

This fire is first seen in progress at 2200 hrs. and is seen burning at 2232 hrs. It appears to be linked very much in its history with a fire burning at the S. end of the COMPONENT SHOPS. Sometimes these are seen as one fire; sometimes as two developing in intensity together.

K.

COMPONENT SHOPS.

17. Shows damage to the S. part of the shops although it is almost certain that destruction has been caused to the entire building.

An oblique view showing the damage. The seat of the fire appears to have been at the S.E. and E. sections.

1/15  
Item 2.

Night Photo. Evidence.

See notes on the fire in the Administrative buildings.

L.

AIRCRAFT COMPONENT SHOPS.

18. The S. part of the shops do not appear to have sustained material damage although the roof is severely charred at the W. end indicating that the fire in the adjacent Component Shops has spread Eastward beneath the roof before control was obtained.

Oblique view of the damage.

1/33  
Item 4.

/ Shows severe damage

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



Before.

Before. After.

19. Shows severe damage to the Northern shops in this department.
20. A very large fire has occurred at this point and finally 6 bays of the building have collapsed.

An oblique view of the collapsed building.

3/13  
Item 1.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The damage at 19 and 20 can be linked up with fire tracks seen on photos. At 2201 hrs. they were seen as a group of small fires, probably incendiaries taking hold on the roofs. At 2205 hrs. they were seen as one large wide fire track. This evidence indicates a very rapid speed of spread. The fire appears to have continued on the same scale throughout the period during which night photos. were taken and is seen as one of the largest fires burning during the attack.

M.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR SHOP.

21. Severely charred roof indicates fire damage. This framed building appears to have received a direct hit. The roof is probably composed of reinforced concrete. There is an indication of a hole in which the bomb may have fallen and penetrated several floors before exploding. Debris is seen in the yard at the foot of the wall.

1/33  
Item 5.

Night photo. Evidence.

A small fire track is seen at approximately this point on a print taken before 2200 hrs. but is not seen on subsequent prints.

N.

DELIVERY DEPARTMENT.

22. Shows one of the largest buildings in the plant with severe damage by H.E. and probable fire at the S.E. corner.

An oblique view showing major part of the damaged sheds. No fires were traced in this area on night photographs.

3/13  
Item 2.

O.

SPARE PARTS SHOP.

23. Considerable damage has occurred at the West end of the shops. It is not considered that the shops are completely destroyed although there are indications of damage by blast and falling debris throughout its whole length.

P.

HOT STAMPING SHOP.

24. Only the girder skeleton of the roofs of this shop appears to remain. The damage was probably caused by fire spreading Northwards from the Press Shop.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED / Night Photo. Evidence.

270106



Before.

After.

Night Photo. Evidence.

A fire track at this point was seen burning at 21.42 and again at 22.32 with about the same intensity. Occasionally on the night photographs it disappears. This may be due to the effect of drifting smoke.

Q.

PATTERN SHOP.

25 Two sheds appear to have been gutted by fire.

The same damage seen on an oblique photograph. 3/13  
Item 3.

26 The site of a H.E. incident at the Eastern section of the Pattern Shop. A small building has collapsed and much damage has been done by blast and falling debris.

The damage of the Pattern Shop is seen more clearly on two oblique views. 1/15.  
Item 4.

R.

ENGINE SHOPS.

27 All the shops appear to have been damaged severely, practically none of the roofing remaining intact.

28 An area of extensive destruction caused by H.E., probably during the progress of a fire.

29 Two other severely damaged incidents in the area. A low oblique showing the intensity of the damage to the Engine Shops.

The two severely damaged points referred to above which are typical of H.E. incidents. 1/15  
Item 5.  
1/15  
Item 6.

Night Photo. Evidence.

Large volumes of smoke were seen drifting from approximately this point on night photos., after 22.15 hours.

S.

THE METAL STORES.

30. While the roof appears to have been severely damaged, the girder structure is intact and rigid. It is considered that the damage here is not as severe as elsewhere, and it has been caused by blast. The contents of the sheds should not be of an easily destructible nature.

T.

POWER STATION.

31. Severe damage is apparent to the Power Station, There are one or two large holes in the roof. The frame of the buildings appears intact and there are no definite signs of charring. The damage is probably due to neighbouring blast. The two chimney stacks are still standing.

Night Photo. Evidence.

Before.   After.

Page 8.

4/30.  
Print Nos.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The fire was seen to start during the attack at 2200 hrs. and continues to 2205 hrs. It has spread and is last seen on a print at 2220 hrs. NOTE: This evidence is contradictory to the damage seen on day photographs and it is possible that the fire cannot be pinpointed correctly.

U.

THE FORGE.

32.

The roof and interior have been severely damaged at the S.W. corner. Although the remainder of the roof of the Southern portion appears more or less intact, it is probable that the interior damage is intensive.

33.

This is apparently the site of a severe fire which has caused considerable internal damage.

The damaged point at the S.W. corner seen from oblique view.

2/35  
Item 1.

The damage at the North end of the building can be seen more clearly. The Northernmost shed appears severely damaged.

2/35  
Item 2.

On the road North of the shops there is debris and men can be seen handling fire-hose or rope.

2/35  
Item 3.

V.

IRON AND STEEL FOUNDRY.

34.

Very extensive damage has been done to this part of the works. Damage to the roof of the E. section seen at 5 main points probably the result of H.E. The section contains the seat of what must have been an enormous fire. The roofs of most of the sheds have collapsed. Local debris damage suggests additional H.E.

A close-up showing damage to E. end of foundry.

2/35  
Item 4.

This shows a clearer view of the section of what was probably one of the most severe fires during the attack.

Item 5.

Night Photo. Evidence.

Fire tracks on night photos. suggest that the fire began in the S.W. corner as a group of scattered incidents which appear to spread Northwards. They were first seen on a print at 2200 hrs. and at 2220 hrs. they were seen as a double track.

X.

PRESS SHOPS.

35.

It can be seen that the Press Shops are almost completely destroyed. Considerable damage

/ has been done

Before. After.

has been done by H.E. which has undoubtedly caused fires.

The oblique view of the damaged Press Shops.

2/35  
Item 6.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The night photo. evidence appended to the damage notes on the hot stamping shop relates closely to the fires seen in this area.

Y.

CHEMICAL PRODUCTS SECTION.

36.

Destruction to this section of the plant is on the same severe scale and the buildings appear to be completely burnt out.

This shows an oblique view of the damage with fire still burning.

2/35  
Item 7.

Z.

KELLNER TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

This part of the plant is said to be entirely under German control, manned by German engineers and workmen.

Damage appears to have been caused to the main shops and to a number of small sheds within the area of the assembly shops.

37.

It seems probable that the main sheds were severely damaged by the end of a stick of H.E. The stick appears to have been laid diagonally.

38.

The gas-holder which appears to have received a direct hit caused a fire. Although the cradle does not appear to have been damaged, the container itself is buckled.

39.

This shows what may be the other end of the H.E. stick. Damage by H.E. to the GEAR and GEAR SHOPS.

This shows the damaged shops with tanks parked in the yards. One damaged heavy tank has been thrown by blast into the centre of the yard.

Close up of the damaged Kellner Shops.

1/18  
Item 3.

AA.

THE GEAR AND GEAR BOX SHOPS.

40.

The broad area of damage is visible across the centre of these shops. With the exception of one or two points the roof girders appear unbroken. This suggests that damage was caused by a combination of H.E. and fire.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The night photos. generally show a fire in roughly this position spreading laterally which conforms approximately to the shape of the



SPR  
after  
before

Page 10.

1/380.  
Print No.

Before. After.

damage. The position of the fire track indicated that the fire tended to spread W. rather than to the E. and that it probably began in the E.

BB.

REPAIR SHOPS.

41.

Extensive damage is seen and there is considerable charring and fire damage at the N. end.

Night Photo. Evidence.

One or two smallish fires are seen at different times in the "charred" area and these remain small to the end. Unfortunately this is inconsistent with the damage seen since one would have expected a heavy fire track.

CC.

WESTERN TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

This is reported to be a new extension of the Renault works undertaken by the Germans. There is some evidence of recent constructional activity but this has been very slow. Undoubtedly the shops are being used for tank assembly. Tanks are seen in the yards and damaged shops, some fully equipped, others turretless.

42.

Stick of H.E. through the yard which has caused severe damage to adjacent sheds and among the parked tanks.

43.

Direct hits on N. sheds.

44.

Near misses to the Works.

Close up of the damaged sheds.

2/24  
Item 1.

The crater in the road E. of the sheds.

The N. sheds with broken girders are clearly visible. Tanks, some parked, can be seen ranked on the floors.

2/24  
Item 2.

Night Photo. Evidence.

At 2145 hrs. a fair sized 3-point fire is seen which is still visible as a 2 or 3 track fire at 2232 hrs., diminishing later.

DD.

BRONZE AND ALUMINIUM FOUNDRY.

This foundry is operated on a complicated chain system which if damaged would be extremely difficult to repair.

44.

Severe roof damage is visible with hardly any charring which suggests that blast was the primary cause. It is impossible to say to what extent the plant has sustained interior damage though some has obviously been caused.

/ EE. SPRING SHOPS.



Before. After.

EE.

SPRING SHOPS.

45A.

Damage does not appear to be very extensive although the near miss on the road W. of the shops must have affected the building laterally.

FF.

COLD STAMPING SHOP.

46.

The hole is seen in the roof at the N. end where it is possible that H.E. caused severe internal damage.

47.

Another large hole at the N.W. corner where the girders do not appear to be broken. The remainder of the roofs of these shops appear to have suffered only slight damage by blast and debris.

Night Photo. Evidence.

At 2145 hrs. at approximately this point a fairly large double track is seen on night photo. films which later breaks into two smaller fires which continue throughout the period night photos. were taken.

SECRET.

P.A.F. STATION,  
MEDFORTH.

K/EMG/C.

DISTRIBUTION:-

Reports. Photos.

Air Ministry

P.A. to C.A.S.	1	1
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H.C.E.C.

C. in C.	1	1
G.C. Ops. for		
S.A.S.O.	1	Nil.
Int.	1	Nil.
P.I. Sub-Section	1	Nil.
Narrative Officer.	2	Nil.
Groups & Stations	98	98
Ops. B.	1	Nil.
Wing Commander TAI.	1	3
O.R.S.	1	Nil.

M.E.W.	1	1
M.H.S. (W/Cdr. Lowe)	1	1
P.R.U. Benson (Int)	1	1
C.I.U.	12	Nil.

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DETAILED INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.K.1312

Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. on 26.4.42  
and 27.4.42.

SORTIE A/655 & A/666

Scale: 1/7,800 and 1/6,000

LOCALITY: ROSTOCK.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

Both sorties are of good scale and excellent quality and the town and environs are well covered, though most of the centre and western parts of the town are obscured by smoke on 26.4.42 and some fires are still seen burning on 27.4.42. Where not otherwise stated, print numbers quoted refer to Sortie A/666.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

This report covers damage which occurred on the nights of 25/26.4.42 and 26/27.4.42; the result of the raids of 23/24 and 24/25.4.42 was seen on Sortie A/644 (Interpretation Report No.K.1310).

GENERAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

The whole of the town with the exception of parts of the western and southern suburbs has now suffered severely. Damage in the centre of the town is seen to be extremely heavy and over 70% of the old Town has been devastated.

The three HEINKEL factories have all been damaged, and the aerodrome at MARIENHE is temporarily unserviceable.

Further damage has been caused to warehouses on the water-front and a number of large sheds most of which probably contain stocks of timber have been totally destroyed.

Both the CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION and the FRIEDRICH FRANZ STATION have been extensively damaged and there are a number of points of damage to railway tracks and roads.

DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE.

Damage from the first two raids was mainly localised to the west and south-east of the old town; and some damage to buildings in the HEINKEL Factory at MARIENHE was seen. There was little damage to the centre of the town.

The raids of 25/26 and 26/27.4.42 have resulted in very heavy and concentrated damage to the Old Town, to residential areas immediately to the west and south, and to commercial property to the east.

There is further damage to the HEINKEL Works at MARIENHE, and a number of sticks of bombs have fallen in and near the housing estate at SCHULTOW to the South-West of the factory.

A number of craters and scattered incidents are seen to the S.W., E. and N. of the town and the village of DIENKOW, 1½ miles N.N.E. of ROSTOCK has been badly damaged by fire.

NOTE: A damage plot showing the total damage to the town, from all four raids is distributed with this report.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE.

1. RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

(a) OLD TOWN.

This part of the town has been the most severely damaged, approximately 130 acres of nearly ½ of the old town having been devastated. 5/121  
5/123

No statistics are available concerning the type and density of buildings in ROSTOCK, but it is estimated that at least 1000 houses have been destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the Old Town area alone.

The devastated area stretches the whole length of the Old Town  
/and continues....

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By RT Date APR 5 1973

a26w01

and continues beyond it to the West; this area is about a mile long at its greatest length and  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile wide at its greatest width. It can be roughly divided into two approximately equal areas at either end of the town, connected by a narrow strip which is somewhat obscured by smoke.

This damage was almost entirely caused by the raids of 25/26 and 26/27.4.42, and is largely the result of fire, though some H.B. incidents are also seen. The old town area is much obscured by smoke on 26.4.42 and some fires are still burning on 27.4.42 though they are probably under control.

Three churches, the Road Post and Telegraph Office, the Law Courts, the Supreme Court and the Hospital are among the buildings destroyed.

(b) TOWN AREA OUTSIDE THE OLD TOWN.

5/121 & 123.

There is an area of devastation by fire about 700 yds. long and 50-200 yds. wide on both sides of FRIEDRICH FRANZ STRASSE immediately south of the old town.

South of this is a second area between AUGUSTIN and PAUL STRASSE about 500 yds. long and of varying width.

Many smaller areas and single points of damage are seen in this part of the town, between the old town and the main Railway Station.

Considerable further damage including one area of approximately 220 by 150 yds. is seen to the already badly damaged district west and north west of KARLSTR. at the Western end of the old town. Many houses have been destroyed, and a brewery has been damaged.

(c) SUBURBS.

Several bombs have fallen on both sides of the LUBECKER STRASSE in the suburb of BARNSTORF (North), and a number of tenement houses or blocks of flats have been damaged by blast. 4/655 5/48

Over 50 bombs have fallen in or near the suburb of SCHUTOW/REUTERS- HAGEN S.W. of the main HEINKEL factory. Several houses have been destroyed or damaged, but the majority of bombs have fallen in open ground. 5/23, 48.

(d) OTHER DAMAGE.

Five large barns, possibly for grain storage, and several farm buildings and dwelling houses in the village of DIEMOW  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles N.W. of ROSTOCK have been burnt out, and bombs have fallen in the housing estate adjoining the village demolishing one house and damaging others.

Three or four scattered farm houses have been destroyed.

East of the river WERROW several small factories have been destroyed or damaged mostly by fire, including a paste factory south of the KASSEBOCHER WIESEN.

2. HEINKEL AIRCRAFT FACTORIES.

(a) MAIN FACTORY AT MARIEWER.

5/130.

Considerable damage to the factory is visible.

A stick of heavy bombs has fallen diagonally across the Main Assembly Hanger destroying the roof over an area of at least 305 x 135'. The damage extends possibly over a larger area as the strip camouflage which covered the roof has remained in position over the edges of the hole.

The Assembly Shop for the final assembly of prototypes has been damaged by blast and several craters are seen on the tarmac immediately outside.

Part of the Machine Shop has been destroyed by fire.

The Paint Shop has been hit by a medium bomb and partly destroyed.

/Part of the Store.....

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26W02



Part of the Store for Chemical Products has been destroyed by a direct hit, and blast has affected the rest of the buildings. Two large workshops have been damaged by blast.

Other buildings destroyed or damaged include the Canteen and Medical Office, the Technical School Main Building, and a number of sheds, smaller buildings and living Quarters.

(See Appendix A. for annotation of print distributed). 5/130

(b) SUB-FACTORY SOUTH OF NEPTUNE YARDS. 5/141

The main building has been hit at the S.E. corner by the second bomb of a stick of three; there is a hole in the roof approximately 70 x 40 feet and the roof has been affected by blast over an area of approximately 150 feet square.

The first bomb of the stick has fallen in open ground about 25 yds. West of the building, and the third has demolished dwellings to the West of the factory.

(c) SUB-FACTORY ADJOINING THE GAS WORKS. 5/121

One of the factory buildings was burnt out during the raid of 25/26.4.42.

After the raid of 26/27.4.42 the roof of the Main Building is seen to be discoloured and slightly damaged, either by blast or scorching.

Many of the Heinkel Dwelling Houses adjoining the South end of the factory have been burnt out.

### 3. PORT AND STORAGE FACILITIES.

(a) NEPTUNE SHIPBUILDING YARD.

Two buildings have suffered slight roof damage from blast. 5/141.

A large shed, possibly included in the NEPTUNE Yard, has been badly damaged by a direct hit.

(b) QUAYSIDE NORTH OF OLD TOWN. 5/121, 123.

Several small buildings in and adjacent to OTTER LUDEWIG & J. MOLLERS Shipbuilding Yard have been burnt out.

Two further warehouses on the Town Quay have been destroyed.

The large storage Depot at the West end of the Town Quay has been burnt out except for a few buildings at the Western end.

A vessel thought to be an icebreaker is seen with her stern submerged to the East of the Coaling Quay. A/655, 5/65.

(c) EAST OF THE TOWN. A/686, 5/121

Practically the whole of the extensive storage facilities to the East of the town have been destroyed by fire.

Twelve storage sheds, some of them large, have been completely burnt out in the Timber Store North of the PETRIDAM, and the smaller store South of the PETRIDAM has been further damaged.

The large storage depot to the South of this, which included four very large storage sheds, has been almost completely destroyed by fire.

### 4. COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION. A/655, 5/39, A/666, 5/123.

The Main Railway Station was severely damaged in the raid of 25/26.4.42. The entrance hall, booking office, etc. have been burnt out, and a large part of the roofing over the platforms has also been destroyed by fire. It is likely that debris blocked the line temporarily.

/On both.....

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APPENDIX "A."

REFERENCE TO ANNOTATION OF PRINTS DISTRIBUTED.

OLD TOWN AND VICINITY.

Print Nos.

- A. Main area of devastation. 5/121 and 5/123.  
B. Area of devastation on both sides of FRIEDRICH FRANZ STRASSE.  
C. Area of devastation between AUGUSTEN and PAUL STR.

1. Small factory gutted. 5/121.  
2. Destruction of storage facilities at East of town.  
3. OTTER LUDWIG and J. MOLLER. Buildings in shipbuilding yard and adjoining destroyed.  
4. Warehouses on Town Quay burnt out.  
5. Lawcourts destroyed by fire.  
6. Head Post and Telegraph Office gutted.  
7. FRIEDRICH FRANZ Station. Offices etc. gutted.  
8. FRIEDRICH FRANZ Station. Goods station buildings burnt out.  
9. HEINKEL sub-factory. Factory building gutted.  
10. HEINKEL sub-factory. Main factory building roof damaged.  
11. HEINKEL dwellings gutted.  
12. Craters nearby.  
13. Further damage to Gasworks (already severely damaged in previous raids).  
14. Hit on edge of railway. Damage to tracks and buildings.  
15. Hit on small quay adjoining MUELEN DAMM.

1. Main Railway Station etc. gutted. 5/123.  
2. Central part of Main Railway station destroyed.  
3. Damage to tracks and buildings alongside caused in previous raids.  
4. Hospital burnt out.  
5. Supreme Court burnt out.  
6. Warehouses and storage sheds destroyed by fire.  
Note: All other fresh areas or points of damage to residential property are outlined or indicated by arrows. 5/121  
5/123.

HEINKEL FACTORY AT MARIENHE.

1. Damage to Main Assembly shop and crater nearby. 5/130.  
2. Assembly shop for final assembly of Prototypes: damage by blast.  
3. Craters nearby.  
4. Slight blast damage to two large workshops.  
5. Badly damaged sheds.  
6. Damage by fire to Machine shop.  
7. Long building destroyed by fire.  
8. Sheds and buildings destroyed by fire.  
9. Craters and buildings damaged by blast.  
10. Damage to railway. Workmen repairing tracks.  
11. Technical School Main building damaged.  
12. Offices partly destroyed by fire.  
13. Direct hit on Paint shop.  
14. Damage to railway from near miss.  
15. Damage by fire and H.E. to Canteen and Medical Office.  
16. Store for chemical products damaged by blast.  
17. Damaged aircraft.  
18. Craters on landing ground.  
19. Buildings destroyed in the two previous raids.

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18.4.42.

DETAILED INTERVIEW WITH P. R. U. 12.4.42.

Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. on 12.4.42.

Sortie A/566.

Scale : 1/19600

Locality : LUBECK.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

The town and suburbs are well seen on these photographs of good scale and quality.

Factories and shipyards on both sides of the river TRAVE to the north of the town, and the shipyards at HERRENWYK are not covered.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

No previous damage report has been issued on LUBECK.

All damage visible can be attributed to the raid of 28/29.3.42 fifteen days before these photographs were taken.

GENERAL STATEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE.

LUBECK is the most heavily damaged German town yet seen.

Damage to the town and suburbs is on a scale almost comparable with the most heavily "blitzed" areas in this country.

Well over 2,000 houses have been totally destroyed or damaged beyond repair; and a great many more have probably been damaged.

A dozen factories have been damaged, two or three of them being totally destroyed.

Damage is concentrated largely in the centre of the town and in the suburbs of ST. LORENZ to the West and ST. JURGEN to the South. Severe damage has been caused probably by a 4000lb bomb in the Suburb of MARLI to the East.

The concentration of damage in built-up areas and the lack of craters in open country indicate the high degree of success obtained during the attack. (See Damage Plot).

DETAILS OF DAMAGE.

1. RESIDENTIAL.

INNER TOWN.

The inner town is a closely built residential area containing mainly 3-5 storey houses, shops, public buildings etc. The total area covered by the island (including the relatively open area around the Cathedral) is 570 acres, and the population of the inner town was approximately 35,000. 5/103

It is estimated that approximately 200 acres or 40% of the inner town built-up area has been devastated and that probably 1,500 houses have been destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Apart from this, buildings on the perimeter of devastated areas will probably have suffered from lateral blast and scorching. It is likely that casualties were heavy.

A. The main area of devastation stretches from South of the Cathedral to the swing bridge and from the River TRAVE to the KONIGSTRASSE. This area is over 1/2 mile long and varies in width between 200 and 600 yards.

Destruction has been caused almost entirely by fire and though a number of H.E. bombs have fallen here, the whole area is so severely gutted that incidents of damage by blast are almost indistinguishable.

Fires undoubtedly took hold and spread rapidly and the fire fighting services do not appear to have gained control until some hours after the raid was over.

A number of roads appear to be still impassable, though the majority have been cleared of debris.

/B. A Secondary

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By                      Date APR 5 1973

B. A secondary area, covering approximately 270 x 250 yards has been destroyed by fire.

Two or three small areas or single items are seen.

The following buildings of interest have been destroyed or damaged :-

1. The Cathedral is burnt out, the twin towers have fallen in, and the outer roof collapsed leaving the vaulting.
2. The greater part of the Cathedral Museum (Museum of Arts & Crafts) has been destroyed by fire.
3. The Cathedral Schools are gutted.
4. The Church of St. Peter destroyed by fire.
5. Town Hall. Part of the Municipal buildings have been burnt out.
6. The Church of St. Mary is gutted.
7. The Central Electric Station is burnt out.
8. The Market Hall is gutted.
9. The Reichs bank is gutted.

#### ST. LORENZ (SOUTH).

Large areas of devastation chiefly by fire cover a total of approximately 65 acres and there are a number of single incidents of destruction by fire or H.E. A total of about 400 houses have probably been affected. (See Appendix A).

5/165

#### ST. LORENZ (NORTH).

Severe damage has been caused to houses again chiefly by fire, and probably about 100 houses have been destroyed.

5/142.

On the S.W. outskirts a heavy bomb, probably 4,000 lb, has totally destroyed 7 or 8 tenement houses or blocks of flats and damaged others. (See Appendix A).

#### ST. JURGEN.

Many single houses have been destroyed by incendiary fires. +5/127

A probable 4000 lb incident has occurred at the junction of UHLAND and FRIEDRICH WILHELMSTRASSE. Two houses have been completely demolished and five badly damaged.

A total of about 40 houses have been destroyed in this area.

#### MARLI.

One very severe H.E. incident is seen between WERDER & BULOW STRASSE undoubtedly caused by a 4000 lb bomb. 8-10 houses have been totally destroyed and about 45 very badly damaged. In addition 5 houses on the outskirts of this area have been destroyed by fire.

The area of complete destruction covers about 1 acre, and of severe damage approximately 5 1/2 acres.

This is probably the most severe damage so far seen as a result of a 4000 lb bomb. (See Appendix A).

## 2. COMMERCIAL.

#### BRACHENBERG.

This works, which is reported to be making oxygen apparatus for submarines and aircraft, and service pattern respirators, has been very seriously damaged. 5/165

A large number of sheds and small factory buildings have been gutted by fire and one or two damaged by H.E.

Part of the main building has been damaged probably by blast.

There is a direct hit in the roadway running through the centre of the factory.

/EWERS & MIESNER

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EWERS & MIESNER HARTGUSSWERK.

The greater part of this foundry has been destroyed by fire.

JAGER LUBECKER APPARATE & MOTORENBAU.

Factory making engines and ancillary equipment.  
One building, possibly offices, has been gutted.

BLUNK & OLTMANN.

5/142.

This factory is engaged in the production of tar products and roof materials.

1 shed type building is gutted.

FR. EWERS & CO.

Canning and preserving factory.  
The whole factory is gutted.

ERNST HOHMANN.

Factory engaged in iron construction work, machinery and repairs.

The greater part of the factory is destroyed or damaged by fire.

CARL THIELE & SCHNE.

Enamel factory.

A number of factory buildings have been destroyed by fire and blast.

OTHER FACTORIES.

The slaughter house, the HANSA brewery, a sawmill, and several unidentified factories have been damaged or destroyed.

3. PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES.

CENTRAL ELECTRIC STATION.

This has been totally destroyed by fire.

5/103.

GASWORKS II.

A square building in the gasworks has been gutted.

+5/167.

TRAM DEPOT.

The tram depot in ST. LORENZ SUD has been damaged.

5/165.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

MAIN RAILWAY STATION.

5/165.

Part of the main railway station, probably containing the administrative buildings, left luggage etc. has been gutted, and the footbridge over the railway tracks damaged by fire.

It is likely that debris blocked the line temporarily.

GOODS YARD (ST. LORENZ).

Part of a goods shed is gutted.

/RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS

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# RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS (ST. JURGEN).

Two sheds are burnt out.

## OTHER DAMAGE.

South of the Slaughterhouse (ST. LORENZ, NORD), a direct hit has caused part of the railway embankment to collapse over the line.

One or two near misses to railway tracks are noted, but it is unlikely that these will have caused damage.

## 5. PORT FACILITIES.

The northern part of the port is not covered.

A large warehouse on the BEHN QUAY has been destroyed by fire over a length of 360 feet.

One warehouse on the KULENKAMP Quay has been destroyed by fire and two thirds of a second destroyed or damaged.

A number of small sheds and buildings fronting the basins have been destroyed or damaged by fire.

Damage Plot and annotated prints Nos. 5/103, 5/109, 5/142, 5/165 distributed. Prints Nos. 5/104, 5/110 and 5/164 included for stereo examination.

Prints marked x not distributed.

## R.A.F. STATION, MEIMENHAM.

LAW /EP/A.

## DISTRIBUTION.

<u>H.Q.E.C.</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Prints</u>
C. in C.	1	1
G/C Ops for S.A.S.O.	1	-
Intelligence.	1	-
P.I.S.S.	4	3
Narrative Officer.	2	-
Groups and Stations.	98	98
Ops. 1 (b).	1	-
W/Cdr. Nav.	1	-
C.R.S.	1	1
W/Cdr. T.A.I.	1	3
<u>H.Q.C.C.</u>		
A.D.I. (Ph).	1	1
Intelligence.	1	1
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War Room.	2	2
A.I.3.(c) S/Ldr Burgess.	1	1
D.D.A.T.	1	1
D.D. Photos.	2	1
P.A. to C.A.S.	1	1
D.P.R.	2	2
<u>Miscellaneous.</u>		
M.E.W. (Air Liaison)	1	1
M.H.S. (W/Cdr Lowe)	1	1
Admiralty (N.I.D.).	2	2
P.R.U. Benson (Int).	1	1
C.I.U.	10	-

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18.4.42.

APPENDIX A.

REFERENCE TO ANNOTATION OF PRINTS DISTRIBUTED.

LUBECK/ST. LORENZ, SUD.

A. Devastated residential areas.

5/165

1. Single houses destroyed or badly damaged.
2. Damage to LUTHER GEM SAAL.
3. Area of destruction in DRAGERWERK factory.
4. Main building of DRAGERWERK damaged.
5. Other damage to same factory
6. EWERS & MIESNER HARTGUSSEWERK, Maschinen - fabrik Comb. Greater part of the factory destroyed by fire.
7. Tramway depot damaged by blast.
8. Unidentified works destroyed by fire.
9. Square building adjacent to the gasworks destroyed.
10. Damage by fire to Main Railway Station.
11. Part of shed in Railway Goods Yard gutted.
12. Craters.

LUBECK/ST. LORENZ, NORD.

1. Building in BLUNK & OLTMANN factory gutted.
2. Area of devastation caused probably by 4000 lb bomb.
3. Areas devastated mainly by fire.
4. Houses gutted.
5. FR. EWERS & Co Factory destroyed by fire.
6. ERNST HORNHANN factory almost entirely destroyed by fire.
7. CARL THIELE and Sohne factory. Many buildings destroyed by fire and blast.
8. SLAUGHTER HOUSE. Heavy bomb has destroyed and damaged shed type buildings.
9. Hits in commercial buildings and direct hit on railway embankment.
10. Near miss on railway line.
11. Warehouses and sheds in the Port of Lubeck destroyed or damaged.
12. Buildings in HANSA Brewery damaged.

5/142

LUBECK/MARLI.

1. Area of devastation caused by 4000 lb bomb and incendiary fires.
2. Other buildings destroyed by fire.

5/109

LUBECK/TOWN AREA.

5/103

Reference to annotation of print is contained in the body of the report.

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8.6.42.

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 1333.

Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. and 105 Sqdn. between  
1.6.42 and 5.6.42.

SORTIES A/840, A/844, A/849, A/856  
A/867, A/865, M.N.105.

Contact Scales: 1/14,500; 1/9,600, 1/9,000, 1/9,700.

LOCALITY: COLOGNE.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

These seven sorties taken together cover with photographs of variable quality the whole of the town and suburban districts on both sides of the Rhine.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

These sorties were taken after the attack on 30/31.5.42. The last report on COLOGNE (K.1325) was issued on 9.5.42.

GENERAL STATEMENT.

Damage seen in COLOGNE resulting from this raid is on a larger scale than anything yet seen in any German city.

Damage is heavy and widespread. Not only are large areas of the centre of the city devastated, involving the destruction of public and administrative buildings and business premises, but industrial and residential property in all the suburban areas have been seriously affected by fire and H.E.

Apart from devastation extending over approximately 300 acres in the centre of the city, areas of particularly severe damage are seen in the W. suburbs and in the industrial districts on the E. bank.

It is estimated that over 250 factory buildings and workshops have been either destroyed or seriously damaged, and that well over 3000 houses are now uninhabitable.

Of the whole area over 600 acres have been destroyed.

DETAILED STATEMENT.

(All measurements are approximate)

CENTRAL CITY AREA.

Many serious incidents are seen in every part of the Central City, in addition to the following areas of devastation.

3 areas are seen in the vicinity of the NEUMARKT. To the N.W. is an area of 32 acres, in which most of the buildings are gutted. 50-70 buildings are affected, including the METROP THEATER, the APOSTELN KIRCHE, and the offices of the BROWN COAL SYNDICATE.

To the S. in an area of 11 acres, 30-35 buildings are gutted or damaged.

A third area of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  acres occurs to the S.W. of the NEUMARKT, where 18-20 houses are burnt out.

An area of 4 acres, off the SALLER RING, is devastated. Approximately 75 houses, a school, and several small factory buildings are involved.

Several buildings in an area of 2 acres S.E. of MAURITIUS PLATZ are gutted.

In an area of 5 acres adjacent to the above 40-45 houses are gutted or destroyed by H.E.

/ A devastated area

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By RT Date APR 5 1973



A devastated area of 18 acres lies to the W. of ULRICH'S GASSE, in which about 80 buildings are gutted by fire. About 20 buildings are damaged by fire or H.E. in the vicinity of SEVERIN STRASSE.

S.W. of the HANGE BRUCKE, in an area of 75 acres, 300-400 buildings have been burnt out or destroyed. This includes severe damage to the BURGER Hospital and a number of churches.

In the RHEINAU HAFEN, two warehouses of 190' x 40' and 290' x 70' are seen to be gutted.

In an area of 17 acres between the CATHEDRAL and the HANGE BRUCKE, 40 or 50 buildings are gutted or very severely damaged. Buildings immediately adjacent to the S.E. wall of the CATHEDRAL are gutted. There is no photographic evidence of damage to the CATHEDRAL, although the damage to the adjoining buildings suggests that some minor damage may have occurred.

In an area of 35 acres extending from the LAW COURTS and the NEUMARKT westwards almost to the HOHENZOLLERNRING, some 200 - 300 houses have been destroyed, including the POLICE HEADQUARTERS.

An area of 3½ acres between ST. GEREONS CHURCH and the HOHENZOLLERNRING has been completely burnt out.

An area of 4½ acres N. of CAECILIEN STRASSE, including a POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH OFFICE and 30 - 40 buildings has been devastated.

10 or 12 buildings on the E. side of MOHE STRASSE have been damaged by fire and H.E.

A number of devastated areas occur round the HAUPTBAHNHOF. To the N.W., in an area of 4 - 5 acres 30 - 40 houses and buildings are destroyed. ST. URSULA KIRCHE is very severely damaged. Another area of 3 acres to the N.W. of the station, has 20 - 25 houses gutted by fire.

N. of the station 80 - 100 houses are affected by fire and H.E. Between the HAUPTBAHNHOF and the KAISER FRIEDRICH UFER, in an area of 8 acres, 5 or 6 large buildings including the RAILWAY INSPECTORATE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICES are severely damaged.

Many other serious incidents occur along both sides of the main line running W. from the station.

The POST OFFICE ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS, at the corner of CLAVER STRASSE and WORTH STRASSE are severely damaged.

E. of St. Kunibert's Church 12 - 14 houses have been severely damaged by fire and H.E.

On the W. of the city area, N. of RATHENAU PLATZ, about 40 houses are gutted by fire.

Within the S. limit of the Central City area, around the UNIVERSITY, many points of damage by fire and H.E. are seen. About 100 houses are affected.

In the same area the City Water and Electricity Works are damaged. The roof of the main building is damaged, the end portion of the roof of a long shed is stripped, and the end of another shed damaged.

In the area to the W. of the city between the S. and W. stations and the SACHSEN, SALIER AND HOHEN STAUFEN RINGS several areas of severe damage are seen. To the N.W. of the SUD BAHNHOF in an area of 14 acres, 40 - 45 buildings are gutted by fire. In other areas around the SUDBAHNHOF over 90 houses are gutted. N. of RATHENAU PLATZ a further 40 houses are burnt out. Near the WESTBAHNHOF about 65 houses are destroyed by fire. Severe damage to the upper floors of the AUGUSTA HOSPITAL near the SUD BAHNHOF is seen.

#### INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL

Apart from a large number of factories which have not been identified, the following have been destroyed or damaged.

/A. WEST BANK

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INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1333 (Cont'd)
A. WEST BANK.

ELEKTRA STAHLDRAHT FABRIK: (Steel-Rope factory): 20 buildings destroyed.  
 ALLGEMEINE OEL-HANDELS-GES (Oil Storage): almost completely destroyed.  
 EISEN STAHLGLESSEREI FLEISSNER (Foundry Products): 8 factory buildings gutted.  
 A.G. VULCAN (machine construction): 3 buildings gutted.  
 EHNAG, ELEKTRA-HOCH-UND-NIEDERSPANNUNGS APPARATE: 7 buildings gutted.  
 BRUNO LAMPEL (Dye Stuffs): 2 or 3 buildings destroyed.  
 KÖLN EHRENFELDER MASCHINENBAU ANSTALT (machinery): 2 large buildings gutted.  
 VEREINIGTE DEUTSCHE METALLWERKE (Metal Works): 10 sheds gutted.  
 JAK SCHLOSSER (warehouses for Chemical products): 7 buildings gutted.  
 A. SCHMETZ (Sheet Iron): almost completely burnt out; at least 12 buildings destroyed.  
 ATLANTIC GUMMIWERKE ALOYS WEYERS (Rubber factory): Large workshop demolished.  
 MAUSER K.G. (Steel factory): 7 sheds destroyed.  
 NUSSBAUM & CO. (Dye factory): 4 buildings with roof damage.  
 STEINHART ELEKTRA MAGNETBAU (Electric Magnet Works): Almost completely destroyed.  
 L. BOCK: (Electric Motor Repairs) Workshop completely gutted.  
 RAILWAY WORKSHOPS (NIPPES): Main building and 2 sheds gutted by fire and damage to large workshops and other buildings.  
 FRANZ CLOUTH (Rubber Works): 2 large and 2 small sheds almost entirely destroyed; a fire seen still burning.  
 POHLIG A.G. (Machinery) 8 sheds demolished by H.E.  
 THOMAS & CO (Rubber Works) and ULLMANN ALB. (Metal Goods): At least 12 sheds destroyed.  
 BALFER EWALD (Engineering): 9 sheds and other buildings demolished.  
 KÖLNER WERKZEUG MASCHINENFABRIK (Machinery): 1 shed gutted.  
 HARTMANN & CO. (Glassware): 2 sheds gutted and damage to other buildings.  
 BERLIN ANHALTISCHE MASCHINENBAU (Blast furnaces & chemical works): 1 shed destroyed, 3 partly demolished and 3 or 4 sheds damaged.  
 MASCHINENFABRIK RHEINLAND EHRENFELD: Long shed has had part of roof stripped.  
 KÖLNER BAUMWOLLE SPINNEREI: extensive damage; only the walls remain standing.  
 / B. EAST BANK.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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B. EAST BANK.

KÖLNISCHER GUMMI-FADEN FABRIK (Tyre factory): the main shop and 5 other buildings have been completely destroyed.

VEREINIGTEWEST - DEUTSCHE WAGGON FABRIKEN (Rolling Stock): One large building and 10 other buildings seriously damaged.

HUMBOLDT DEUTZ MOTOREN (Submarine engines): 6 buildings destroyed and 2 severely damaged.

HUMBOLDT DEUTZ MOTOREN (KALK) (Submarine Engines): additional damage.

FELTEN and GUILLEAUME CARLSWERK (undercarriages): 7 large buildings severely damaged and 3 gutted.

HAGEN GOTTFRIED A.G. (accumulators & batteries for submarines): Severe roof damage to a factory building.

CHEMISCHE FABRIK, KALK (Chemical Works): Damage to roof of building.

WERKZEUGSMASCHINENFABRIK SCHÜTTE (machine tools): large factory building destroyed.

NUNK and SCHMITZ A.G. (machinery): One shed partly demolished.

ANDRAE CRIST (velvet manufacturer): 3 large factory buildings gutted.

RESIDENTIAL

W. BANK.

Serious damage to residential property is widespread in suburban districts. More than 50 houses in SULZ, 120 in LINDENTHAL, 75 in EHRENFELD, 40 in RIEHL and 170 in NIPPES-SECHZIG have been completely destroyed or so seriously damaged as to be uninhabitable. Incidents of fire and H.E. are seen in every district covered by the Sorties.

E. BANK.

Damage to residential property on the E. bank appears to be less serious than in the W. suburbs, but at least 125 houses, scattered over the whole area of DEUTZ, KALK and MULHEIM appear to have been made untenable.

Extensive damage is seen to the EXHIBITION BUILDINGS and to the RHEIN MUSEUM.

COMMUNICATIONS.

A striking feature of the raid was the amount of damage done to the railway communications of the city, causing serious, if only temporary, interruption of the traffic.

At MULHEIM STATION considerable damage is evident and it is probable that 5 tracks have been affected.

/ The Engine Sheds

shop and 5 other  
s have been com-  
pletely destroyed.  
One large  
other  
ly damaged.

Page 4

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1333. (Cont'd)

The Engine Sheds and Passenger Storage Sidings at KOLN - GERICHT have been affected by blast and a number of coaches of two electric trains appear to have been completely destroyed and others damaged by fire.

The branch line at EHRENFELD has been severely damaged by 3 direct hits.

Some sheds in the EIFELTOR MARSHALLING YARD have been demolished and trucks scattered by H.E.

The track and embankment works west of the SUD BAHNHOF have been damaged by direct hits.

The signal control tower at the end of the North platform of the HAUPTBAHNHOF has been destroyed.

Some minor damage is seen to the S.E. portal and lattice work of the HOHENZOLLERN BRIDGE but this does not appear to have seriously affected communications.

Appendix A refers to annotated mosaic covering Central City Area and E. Bank.

Appendix B refers to COLOGNE W (EHRENFELD)  
Town plan used Pharus Plan.

<u>SECRET</u>	<u>Distribution.</u>	<u>Reports.</u>	<u>Prints.</u>
R.A.F. STATION, <u>MEDMENHAM.</u>	<u>H.Q.B.C.</u>		
K/WW/B	C. in C.	1	1
	G/C.Ops. for S.A.S.O.	1	-
	Intelligence.	1	-
	P.I.S.S.	4	3
	Narrative Officer.	2	-
	Groups and Stations.	98	98
	Cps 1 (b)	1	-
	W/Cdr. Nav.	1	-
	O.R.S.	1	1
	W/Cdr. T.A.1	1	3
	<u>H.Q.C.C.</u>		
	A.D.I. (Ph)	1	1
	Intelligence.	1	1
	<u>Air Ministry</u>		
	War Room.	2	2
	A.I.3 (c) S/Ldr. Burgess.	1	1
	D.D.A.T.	1	1
	D.D.Photos.	2	1
	P.A. to C.A.S.	1	1
	D.P.R.	2	2
	A.D.I. (Ph)	6	6
	<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
	M.E.W. (Air Liaison)	1	1
	M.H.S (W/Cdr. Lowe)	1	1
	Admiralty (N.I.D)	2	2
	P.R.U.Benson (Int)	1	1
	C.I.U.	12	-



APPENDIX 'A'.

1. School buildings in PALESTER STRASSE partly damaged by H.E.
2. 18/20 houses in ARNULF and KONRAD STRASSEN gutted by fire.
3. 1 large shed gutted and 4 M.T. and timber sheds destroyed in the PLUS FABRIK CHEMISCHES PRODUCTE Co. factory.
4. 8 small factory sheds destroyed by H.E. at the S. end of the POHLIG A.G. (MACHINERY) WORKS.
5. REAL GYMNASIUM and row of 6/8 houses in GIRHOF STRASSE gutted.
6. 4/5 houses of a houseblock, in KERPERER STRASSE partly destroyed.
7. 5 small buildings in BERRENWATHER STRASSE demolished.
8. Approximately 12 sheds belonging to THOMAS & CO., RUBBER MANUFACTURER and ULLMANN ALB. METAL GOODS, in LUXEMBURGER STR. and AEMILIAN STR. completely demolished.
9. 4/5 small sheds in LUXEMBURGER STR. demolished.
10. 3 large sheds or warehouses and 3 other buildings destroyed. Roof damage to the Station, in the GOODS STATION (KÖLN BONNER KREISBAHN).
11. 2 large sheds gutted and damage to other buildings in H. HARTMANN (GLASSWARE) works, LUXEMBURGER STR.
12. 3/4 houses gutted in ZULPICH STR.
13. Damage to the upper floors of the AUGUSTA HOSPITAL and 6 houses gutted by fire.
14. 2/3 houses in GABELSBERGER and STOLZE STRASSEN gutted by fire.
15. Large building in the Eifel PLATZ, partly gutted by fire.
16. Approximately 75 houses, a school, and 2/3 small factory buildings N. of SUD BAHNHOF, involving MOSEL, LUXEMBURGER, PFALZER, BURGUNDER STRASSEN and SALIER RING, gutted by fire.
17. Approximately 25 buildings between VOLKSGARTEN STR. and SACHSEN RING, gutted.
18. 40/45 houses, a school and probably the Dominican Monastery, N.W. of SUD BAHNHOF involving ROON, BEETHOVEN and MOZART STRASSEN gutted by fire.
19. 2 buildings in HANDEL STR. gutted.
20. 18/20 houses, between RUBENS STR. and SCHAAFEN STR. gutted.
21. 2 houses in JAHN STR. gutted.
22. 40/45 houses, POLICE STATION and the KLARA ELISEN STIFT in WEYER, WEDENRACH, MAURITIUS and PANTELON STRASSEN are gutted or damaged by H.E.
23. 75/80 buildings including one or two schools are destroyed by fire and H.E. The main streets involved are WAISENHAUS GASSE, SACHSEN RING, VOR DEN SIEBENBURGER TRIER.
24. ULREPORTE and a block of 2 houses, on the corner of WALL PANTALEONS and ULRICH GASSE, are gutted.

/25. 4/5 houses in KARTEHAUSER

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25. 4/5 houses in KARTHAUSER STR. gutted.
26. 4/5 houses destroyed or severely damaged by H.E. in ISABELLAN STR.
27. 5/6 houses and school gutted in SEVERIN STRASSE.
28. 12/14 buildings destroyed or damaged by H.E. in the vicinity of SEVERIN STRASSE.
29. Severe damage by fire to a corner house in the HOLZMARKT.
30. A warehouse gutted in RHEINAU HAFEN.
31. A warehouse gutted in RHEINAU HAFEN.
32. A warehouse damaged by fire in RHEINAU HAFEN.
33. An area of approximately 75 acres in which between 300 and 400 buildings have been gutted or destroyed, including severe damage to the BÜRGER HOSPITAL, a monastery and 3 churches.
34. A large building in GEORG PLATZ gutted.
35. A building in WEISS BUTTEN GASSE gutted.
36. 4/5 buildings gutted in an area South of MAURITIUS CHURCH.
37. 30/35 buildings south of NEUMARKT completely burnt out.
38. 50/70 buildings including the METROP THEATRE and the APOSTELN KIRCHE have been destroyed or severely damaged.
39. 10/15 buildings between ST. GERBONS KIRCHE and HOHENZOLLERN RING completely burnt out.
40. An area of devastation mostly by fire of approximately 35 acres involving between 200 to 300 buildings including the POLICE HEADQUARTERS, ST. MARIA MONASTERY, a HOSPITAL and SCHOOLS. The south-east tower of ST. GERBONS KIRCHE has been damaged.
41. The centre of a block of buildings in GLOCKEN GASSE burnt out.
42. 2 buildings burnt out and 1 damaged on the corner of NEUMARKT and CAECILIEN STRASSE.
43. An area of devastation by fire and H.E. involving between 30 and 40 buildings north of CAECILIEN STRASSE including the POSTAL TELEGRAPH OFFICE, ELIZABETH KLOSTER and an ORPHANAGE.
44. 10/12 buildings on the east side of HOHE STRASSE gutted or damaged by H.E. and fire.
45. 5/7 buildings damaged by fire and H.E. west of NEUMARKT.
46. Severe damage to 8/10 buildings in an area west of NEUMARKT.
47. Corner block of buildings gutted by fire in IN DER HÖHLE.
48. Severe damage to two sides of a block of buildings in HOHE STRASSE.
49. 3/4 buildings gutted in HERTZOG STRASSE and PERIENPFUEL GASSE.
50. Severe damage to the roof of the MINORITEN KIRCHE.
51. An area between the CATHEDRAL and HANGERBRÜCKE in which 40 or 50 buildings including a MUSEUM, the STAPELHUS ST. MARTIN KIRCHE and the DOM HOTEL are  
/either gutted or very severely

APPENDIX 'A' (Cont'd.).

- either gutted or very severely damaged.
52. A block of buildings south-east of the CATHEDRAL, gutted.
  53. A large building gutted in RICHARTZ STRASSE.
  54. 3/4 houses in MARIENGARTEN STRASSE severely damaged.
  55. 10 buildings burnt out in an area between KLEINE NEU GASSE and KATTENBURG.
  56. A block of buildings partly destroyed by fire between ENG GASSE and HUNNEN RÜCKEN.
  57. Corner of block of buildings in MOHRENS and GERDONS STRASSE.
  58. 6/8 buildings destroyed by H.E. and fire in CHRISTOPHSTRASSE.
  59. 20/25 houses gutted by fire in an area north-west of the HAUPT BAHNHOF.
  - 59A. Block of buildings on corner of VICTORIA STRASSE and EINTRACHT STRASSE.
  60. An area of 4/5 acres immediately N.W. of the HAUPT BAHNHOF between MARZELLEN and N. side of EINTRACHT STRASSE containing 30/40 houses and buildings and ST. URSULA CHURCH almost completely devastated
  61. Signal Control Tower at the N.W. end of the HAUPT BAHNHOF destroyed.
  62. 5/6 large buildings including the RAILWAY INSPECTORATE and ADMINISTRATION OFFICES between the KAISER FRIEDRICH UFER and the HAUPT BAHNHOF severely damaged.
  63. 12/14 houses gutted or severely damaged in the vicinity of ST. KUNIBERTS KIRCHE.
  64. Adjoining N. side of the HAUPT BAHNHOF about 10/12 houses and buildings severely damaged by fire.
  65. An area of devastation by fire and H.E. north of the HAUPT BAHNHOF involving 80/100 houses and buildings.
  66. 15/20 buildings in PLANK GASSE GERDONS WALL and HANSA RING.
  67. Part of large block of buildings in HANSA RING and house in GERDONS WALL destroyed by fire.
  68. 8/10 houses in vicinity of RIGELSTEIN TOR gutted
  69. House in DOM STRASSE gutted
  70. Roof and upper floor of DREKONIGS SCHOOL destroyed.
  71. 3 houses gutted between MACHABAER STRASSE and TÜRMOHNS-WALL.
  72. 2 houses gutted in KUNIBERTS STRASSE,
  73. Direct hits on roadway in KAISER FRIEDRICH UFER.
  74. Large building and 4/5 houses in DAGOBERT STRASSE severely damaged or gutted.
  75. Houses gutted in TÜRMOHNS WALL,
  76. 4/5 houses severely damaged at the corner of RIEHLER and SCILLING STRASSEN.
  77. House gutted in LUPUS STRASSE

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77. House gutted in LUPUS STRASSE.
78. Building block burnt out in BELFORT STRASSE.
79. 2 large buildings burnt out and another severely damaged at the corner of AM DER KUNZE and KAISER FRIEDERICH UFER.
80. 1 house gutted and another severely damaged at the corner of WORTH STRASSE.
81. POST OFFICE administrative buildings severely damaged at the corner of CLAVER STRASSE and WORTH STRASSE.
82. Damage to the east end and pier of the HOHENZOLLERN BRIDGE.
83. Small building in the RHEIN MUSEUM destroyed.
84. Youth Hostel partly destroyed.
85. Another building probably belonging to the Youth Hostel gutted.
86. Small building in the LEUCHT BRUNNEN gutted.
87. 3 halls of the EXHIBITION BUILDING gutted and other damaged.
88. Roof damage to the DEUTZ BAHNHOF.
89. 6/7 houses gutted in BARNER PLATZ.
90. 1 small and 5 large buildings of the KÖLNISCHER GUMMIFÄDEN FABRIK (Tyre Factory) completely demolished.
91. 1 very large building of the same factory and 3 other buildings completely destroyed.
92. Hole in the roof of a large building in the LEUCHT BRUNNEN.
93. The PARK-HAUS gutted.
94. 1 large building of the VEREINIGTE WEST-DEUTSCHE WAGGON FABRIKEN destroyed and 10 other buildings damaged.
95. 3/4 houses in SANDT PLATZ severely damaged.
96. 4/6 houses gutted in ALSEN STRASSE.

SECRET.

R.A.F. STATION,

MEDMENHAM.

/G/A.

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at the corner

SECRET  
100-300

7.6.42.

APPENDIX "B".

COLOGNE - EHRENFELD.

1. A factory between Aachener Str. and MELATENGÜRTTEL gutted.
2. The tramway depot in SCHEIDEWEILER Strasse gutted.
3. Aachener Str. 4 houses gutted. 5 sheds gutted
4. A factory in MELATENGÜRTTEL has 1 4-bay building, 1 7-bay building and 1
5. The Eisen Stahlgießerei Pleissner (Foundry Products) in Oskar-Jäger Str. has 8 factory buildings gutted.
6. The Oskar-Jäger Str. 2 sheds gutted.
7. The Molatongürtel. 4 sheds gutted.
8. A factory in Oskar-Jäger Str. has 1 building gutted and 1/3 of large building at E. end.
9. In WIDDERSDORFER Str. 3 sheds and 2/3 of 1 large building have been gutted. These are probably connected with the Gasworks.
10. The Allgemeines Oel-Handels-Ges (Oil Storage) in Oelstrasse has been almost completely destroyed by fire and H.E.
11. The Elektro Stahldraht Fabrik in Oskar-Jäger Str. (Steel ropes) has 20 buildings destroyed by H.E. and fire, the main damage being at the N. and S. ends of the factory.
12. The A.G. VULKAN in Lichtstrasse (Machine construction) 3 buildings gutted.
13. The EHMAG, Elektro-Hoch-und-Niederspannungs Apparate in Molatongürtel, 7 buildings gutted.
14. BRUNO LAMPEL (Dye-stuffs) in GRÜNER WEG the part of the factory W. of the railway line 2/3 of the buildings destroyed.
15. KOLN EHRENFELDER MASCHINENBAU ANSTALT (Machines) in Vogelsanger Str. has 2 large buildings gutted.
16. Buildings adjoining item 15 the S. end of large building gutted and 2 sheds gutted.
17. Area between Vogelsanger Str., Stamm Str., Plus Str and Ehrenfeld Gürtel at least 45 houses have been gutted and 6 sheds gutted.
18. A small building belonging to the Gasworks gutted.
19. Goods Station buildings in Vogelsanger Str. has 1 large building destroyed, and 3 bays of 6-bay building destroyed.
20. Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke (Metal works) in Vonloor Str. has 10 sheds gutted.
21. Sonofolder Str. 4 houses gutted.
22. Schonstein Str. 3 sheds gutted.
23. Hütten Str. 1 building 2/3 gutted.
24. Electrical works in HELMHOLTZ Str. has long building with roof part stripped.
25. Jak Schlosser in Vogelsanger Str. (Warehouses for chemical products) has 7 buildings gutted.
26. In Vonloor Str. 15 houses destroyed.
- 27A. Schmitz (Iron sheets) in Marionstrasse almost completely burnt out. 6 houses and 1 shed in immediate vicinity gutted.
28. Nussbaum & Co. (Dyes) in Leyendecker Str. 4 buildings have roofs stripped. In immediate vicinity 12 houses destroyed.
29. Mauser K.G. (Steel goods) in Subbölrather Str. 7 buildings destroyed. 4 houses adjoining factory gutted.
30. Steinhart Elektro Magnethau (Electro-magnet works) in Takustrasse is almost completely destroyed by H.E. and fire.
31. L. Bock (Electric motor repair workshop) Vonloorstrasse completely gutted.
32. 2 buildings gutted in Vonloor Str.
33. 10 houses destroyed in Vonloorstrasse.

/34. A house....

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34. A house gutted in Rochus Str.
35. 2 buildings gutted in Venloerstrasse.
36. E. of Am Rosen Garten, 2 houses partly destroyed.
37. GRÜNER BRUNNEN-WEG, 1 house gutted.
38. Just off Felten Str., S.E. end of large building gutted.
39. A church in Rochus Str. totally destroyed.
40. N. of Felten Str., 1 house gutted.
41. 2 houses gutted in Tokustrasse.
42. Building adjoining church in Ansgarplatz destroyed by direct hit.  
Church probably suffered damage from blast.

OTHER.

R.A.F. Station,  
Medmonham.

9.3.42.

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.K.1338.

Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. on  
7.3.42.

Sortie 1/896.

Contact Scale: 1/6,350 (F/36")  
Flying Height: 29,000'  
Time of photography: 18.00 hrs.

LOCALITY: EMDEN.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

The whole of the town and docks are well covered on prints of excellent quality and good scale.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

The last detailed Damage Assessment Report on EMDEN was No. K.1276 of 16.3.42.

GENERAL STATEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE.

Damage is equally divided between industrial buildings in the dock area and the residential and business part of the town. This is probably the most successful attack which has been made on EMDEN. In addition to considerable damage in the town, important industries have suffered severely, notably the NORDSEEWERKE, HERINGSFISCHEREI A.G., SCHULTE and BRUNS, and the area around the MAIN RAILWAY STATION. Damage is by H.E. and fire, the latter predominating.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE.

1. INDUSTRIAL (including PORT AND RAILWAY FACILITIES).

VEREINIGTE STAHLWERKE A.G. (NORDSEEWERKE).

The Shipbuilding and Repair Yards, have suffered heavily, 10 acres being devastated.

A large newly constructed shop in the N. of the works has been gutted. Two other large shops in the S.W. corner of the works are also gutted and seen still burning.

Two other shops nearby are entirely destroyed and a third half destroyed. In the S. area a long erecting shop is half gutted, a block, probably administrative is partly gutted and the N.W. end of a pair of shops is severely damaged by fire.

In addition at least 8 smaller sheds in the whole area of the works have been destroyed.

EAST SIDE OF BINNENHAFFEN.

On the ZUNGENKAI a row of warehouses has been destroyed and around the ALTER LIEGE HAFEN 4 dockside sheds and a shed in the GOVERNMENT YARD have been destroyed.

S. of the RAILWAY DOCK 2 sheds of the HERINGS FISCHERIE were severely damaged prior to 13.3.42 (not previously reported); 2 warehouses along the dockside have been destroyed.

Five small RAILWAY buildings, probably workshops and stores, N.W. of the roundhouse are gutted and a direct hit by a large bomb has damaged several tracks and 2 or 3 wagons on the GOODS SIDINGS. There is another crater on disused lines N. of the Roundhouse.

North of the RAILWAY DOCK, the HARBOUR OFFICES and the CUSTOMS HOUSE are both destroyed and at the MAIN RAILWAY STATION, 2 buildings probably Station Offices are gutted. A long shed and a smaller

/building N.E. of the

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J.C.S. Memo 1-17-73

By 21 Date APR 5 1973

building N.E. of the RAILWAY DOCK are gutted and still seen burning.

One building in the town GAS WORKS is gutted and another is severely damaged.

#### WEST SIDE OF BINNENHAFEN.

There has been a direct hit on a road and a raised pipeline running from the docks across the KAISER WILHELMS POLDER. There has also been a direct hit on the quayside of the NEUER BINNEN HAFEN as well as on the FLUGELDEICH opposite the E. AUSSENHAFEN STATION.

A group of 11/12 sheds of the HERINGS FISCHERIE A.G. DOLLIANT, have been destroyed, one building is seen to be still on fire.

On the N. side of No. 1 HAFENBECKEN nearly all the buildings of SCHULTZ & BRUNS, builders of small sea craft, have been gutted and two buildings on the W. quayside of the ALTER BINNEN HAFEN, just N. of the SWING BRIDGE are also gutted.

## 2. RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

#### THE TOWN AND SUBURBS.

45 acres of the town-itself consisting mainly of business and residential property have been devastated. This area includes damage probably caused by a 4000 lb. bomb which has completely demolished a large block of buildings south of the BOLLWEK and damaged many others; the area of total destruction measures approx. 1 acre. It is estimated that at least 150 houses have been destroyed or seriously damaged in the whole area.

In addition to this nearly 100 houses have been destroyed in other parts of the town.

Amongst the more important buildings destroyed are the WILHELMS GYMNASIUM (College), the LANDRATS AMT (Head District Office), the LUTHERAN CHURCH and two buildings of the HAMBURG - AMERICA LINE.

The Harbour Workmen's Dwellings on KAISER WILHELMS POLDER have again been hit, 12 more houses having been gutted.

#### MILITARY BARRACKS.

Although the BARRACKS themselves are undamaged, two houses adjacent to them, probably officers' quarters, and a large M.T. garage on the Drill Ground, are burnt out. A number of houses immediately S. of the barracks are gutted.

Two prints distributed. Damage Plot to follow.  
MAPS used: C.B.1818 No. 57.

/DISTRIBUTION



INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1333 (contd).

DISTRIBUTION

<u>Reports</u>	<u>Prints</u>		<u>Reports</u>	<u>Prints</u>
H.Q.B.C.			Air Ministry	
C. in C.	1	1	War Room.	2
G/C Ops. for			A.I.S. (c) S/Ldr. Burgess.	1
S.A.S.O.	1	-	D.D.A.T.	1
Intelligence.	1	-	D.B.Ops.	1
P.I.S.S.	4	3	P.A. to C.A.S.	1
Narrative			D.P.R.	2
Officer.	2	-	A.D.I. (Ph).	6
Groups & 1				
Stations.	98	98	Miscellaneous.	
Ops. 1 (b)	1	-	M.B.W. (Air Liaison)	1
W/Cdr. Nav.	1	-	M.H.S. (W/Cdr. Lowe)	1
O.R.S.	1	1	Admiralty (N.I.D.)	2
W/Cdr. T.A.L.	1	3	P.R.U. Benson (Int.)	1
			C.I.U.	10
H.Q.C.C.				
A.D.I. (Ph).	1	1		
Intelligence.	1	1		

SECRET

R.A.F. Station,  
REDMENHAM.

W/S /PTW/C.

APPENDIX 'A'

K.1333

(Reference to Annotation of Prints distributed)

A/889

Print 5-13  
(Dupe Neg. No. 696)

1. 3 craters, one causing damage to railway serving the IRON and ORE QUAY.
2. NORDSEEWERKE. Two large shops gutted and still burning; two smaller shops destroyed and another severely damaged.
3. ditto. Long shed (probably Erecting Shop) half gutted.
4. ditto. Large Workshops severely damaged by fire and 7 smaller sheds destroyed. Building, possibly the Office Block and a shed severely damaged.
5. ditto. Large new shop and 2 smaller buildings gutted.
6. ZUNGENKAI. Row of warehouses gutted.
7. ALTER LIEGE HLFEN. 4 dockside sheds gutted.
8. GOVERNMENT YARD. 1 shed gutted.

/9. House in row adjoining

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



**SAFE FILE: Greenland**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1940.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

**DECLASSIFIED**

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with the President's instructions concerning equipment for the country mentioned in the attached despatch, I have to inform the President that the material went forward via Coast Guard vessel CAMPBELL on Thursday, May 30, 1940.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

027a01

Jan: Chief said  
from K  
Coordinate  
S, T, N.  
Pa

u a27a02

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (Br.)

Godthaab  
Undated  
Rec'd May 24, 1940  
3 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Called on Governor Svane. Brought up the question of defense of the cryolite mine, emphasized the vulnerability of the mine and expressed fear that sabotage might be attempted by Nazi sympathizers at Ivigtut. He asked whether it would be feasible for an American military detachment to be stationed there as soon as possible. And as an alternative suggested the stationing of an armed ship such as a Coast Guard vessel at Ivigtut. He stated that it would undoubtedly be possible to organize a defense corps of Danes to patrol the mine property. He also expressed some concern over the possibility of a raid on Ivigtut. I said that it was my impression that the United States Government would hesitate to station a military force in Greenland but that it might consider extending other assistance in connection with defense measures for the mine. In view of Fischer's statements outlined in my telegram No. 3 Svane's fears may be somewhat exaggerated.

HOWEVER,

a26a03



hsm -2- Undated, Rec'd May 24, 1940, from Godthaab

However, the latter does not appear to be an alarmist and he states that he has discussed the matter thoroughly with Governor Brun of north Greenland who is in entire accord with him. In view of Svane's obvious concern in regard to this matter and other factors of which the Department is aware, it is respectfully suggested that as favorable  
/consideration as possible be given to Svane's request.

The Department will be kept informed of developments.

PENFIELD

RR

a27903

**SAFE FILE: Lord Halifax**

125-20000  
1304  
PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]  
-----

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 30th, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I lost no time in reporting to the Prime Minister the suggestions which you had made during our conversation on Wednesday. I have now had a reply from him explaining that he has telegraphed to you direct through the United States Embassy in London giving his views on the different points which you raised. He was obviously immensely pleased with your suggestions.

The Prime Minister has at the same time asked me to inform you that the code names for the operations mentioned in the second paragraph of this telegram sent through the American Embassy are: Puma, Baseball and Thruster in that order. The Prime Minister's telegram goes on to explain that he regards it as most important that these operations and their code names should not figure in any one document and I should therefore be grateful if you would be so kind as to bring this point to the notice of those officers in the Navy or War Departments to whom you pass on the names selected by the Prime Minister.

Just as I was dictating this I got a telegram from Mr. Eden asking me to tell you how delighted everyone in London was to hear of the splendid reception which your speech on Tuesday has had in the United States. Mr. Eden assures me that your speech was as deeply and greatly appreciated in London.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,  
Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

228901

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 30th, 1941

Dear Mr. Foster,

I enclose herein a letter from Lord Halifax to the President. This contains a very confidential message from the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax would be grateful if you would be so good as to arrange for it to be safely delivered to the President as soon as convenient.

Yours sincerely,

*H. K. H. H. H.*

Mr. Rudolf Foster,  
White House,  
Washington, D.C.

928902



PSF Sale

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 22nd, 1941.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. President,

In continuation of my letter of December 17th regarding the naval and military conference at Singapore, I enclose herein two copies of a telegram which I received yesterday from Mr. Duff Cooper summarising the findings of this conference.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States

of America,

Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State Dept

telegram 1-12-72

By JS Date FEB 8 1972

arrival of reinforcements.

a28601

4. Our dispositions to impl  
(a) land forces disposed to h  
advance to maximum degree pos  
reconnaissance established as far north as

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State Dept

telegram 1-12-72

By JS

a28602

TOP SECRET.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM, DATED 20TH DECEMBER,  
1941. FROM MR. DUFF COOPER, SINGAPORE.

Part One.

Inter-allied representatives (group undecypherable) Singapore on December 18th. All countries originally suggested were represented with (? exception of) Chungking, from which no reply to (? telegram of) invitation was received. The Prime Minister of New Zealand authorized me to act at their representative with the assistance of Commander St. Aubyn, R.N., who has been working for a long time in New Zealand.

2. General agreement was reached on matters under discussion. In the first place it was felt that importance of Singapore to the war in the Far East and to (? world) war could not be exaggerated. Its loss would clearly be followed by that of Netherlands East Indies, would confer on enemy not only power to isolate Australia and New Zealand from West, to separate British Far Eastern Fleet and American Asiatic (? Fleet) but would also put at his disposal vast oil supplies and practically all the rubber supplies of the world. Hardly less serious would be the loss of Netherlands East Indies which would (? isolate) Singapore and deprive the Allies of (? a) naval base of vital importance.

The Philippines are also of first-rate importance as an advanced and (group omitted) and flanking base for offensive action against Japanese (? aggression)s.

3. Our immediate plan is to dispose of our combined forces now available in (? Siamese) area so as (a) to keep the enemy as far north in Malaya as possible and hold him in the Philippines. (b) to prevent the enemy acquiring (? desirable) territory and particularly aerodromes, which will threaten arrival of reinforcements.

4. Our dispositions to implement this are (a) land forces disposed to hold up (? enemy) advance to maximum degree possible, (b) air reconnaissance established as far north as

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of State Dept  
Telegram 1-12-72  
By JS

228602

practicable, (c) naval surface forces: United States Tasmanian forces in Apia-Sourabaya area; Dutch West Java Sea; British Singapore-Sunda and defence South Malaya and Jo (sic ? Johore) (? Straits), (d) United States and Dutch submarines operating offensively in South China Seas and off East Coast of Malaya, (e) air striking forces operating from Singapore Lucalan West Borneo and Eastern archipelago.

5. Our urgent and immediate need is for reinforcements. We have taken (? note of) steps being taken to (? provide for) these and are agreed that they must be on a scale not only to meet present scale of attack but also those likely to be put in the field against us. (?We are) also agreed as to necessity to concentrate our available naval strength to ensure safe passage through Far Eastern area.

6. We are agreed that the (?plans) (? must) include unloading convoys at Netherlands East Indies ports (? should) waters further north become unusable, aircraft being flown to destination, troops and stores ferried. It is also agreed that United States convoy at present directed to Brisbane should proceed to Sourabaya for aircraft to be assembled there and flown on to destination decided upon.

7. It is necessary to keep open the following air lines of communication: (a) Australia-Java, Australia-Philippines, (b) Middle East-India-Burma-Sumatra-Philippines or Malaya and Honolulu, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Malaya and following sea lines of communication: (a) (group undecypherable) (India)-Netherlands East Indies-Philippines-Malaya, also Red Sea and Persian Gulf (b) Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Malaya, via Sunda or Malacca Straits (d) (sic) Australia and New Zealand to North and South America.

8. It is most desirable that Chinese should be asked to maintain maximum pressure upon the Japanese, first in order to contain as many divisions as possible and subsequently to provide bases for long distance bombing attacks on Japanese.

9. Any effort of same (? nature) with (group undecypherable) on the part of (? Russia) would also plainly prove of highest value.

10. Finally it was the view of the conference that situation, although serious, need not give rise to undue pessimism provided necessary reinforcements are supplied in available time.

11. Time is essential factor.

12. A sub-committee of conference has outlined immediate plans and its recommendations follow in Part Two of this message.

*State Dept*  
*Telegram 1-12-72*  
*JS*



Part II.

Begins.

The situation is serious and it is recommended following steps be put into immediate operation:

(a) Pass air reinforcements to Malaya via Burma, Sumatra and Java.

(b) Pass air reinforcements to Philippines via Australia and Netherlands East Indies. Eventually establish a regular air traffic system from Australia to the Philippines.

(c) Maintain the strongest possible striking forces in South China and West Java numbers built up on British and Dutch naval forces now available. Reinforce submarine force now based at Singapore.

(d) Maintain the strongest possible striking force in Celebes Sea and Macassar Straits area, built up on Tasmanian Force 5 and local Dutch naval forces.

(e) Pass American air convoy now proceeding to Brisbane through (? to) Sourabaya with the help of Australian forces and United States Tasmanian Force 5.

(f) Pass land reinforcements for Malaya through Sunda Straits with the help of combined air forces, Dutch and British naval forces, United States Tasmanian Force 5.

(g) Secure aerodromes in Northern Sumatra and West Borneo.

(h) Eventually pass land reinforcements to the Philippines from the South.

2. With the situation as it is today, we consider the minimum reinforcements for Malaya immediately required to stabilize the situation are as follows:

Air. 4 Fighter squadrons  
4 Bomber squadrons  
1 P Escorting flight  
1 Transport flight

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By Authority of State

Dept telegram 1-12-72

By JL

028604



Reserves collected 100% for fighters and 50% for bomber aircraft to complete existing squadrons and their reserves, i.e. approximately 50 single-engine fighters and 12 Hudsons.

Land. 1 brigade group  
1 division  
3 light A/A regiments and  
2 heavy A/A regiments

( /? one of/ each type for Dutch aerodromes).

1 anti-tank regiment  
reinforcements for 9th and 11th divisions  
50 light tanks  
350 anti-tank rifles  
Bofors ammunition  
500 Tommy guns with ammunition unit (sic)  
first (sic) transport vehicle (? "S" omitted).

3. The requirements in paragraph 2 are immediate as to stabilize the position.

4. We are not in a position to assess the reinforcements required for the Philippines. The Japanese have (? 5) divisions still available for operation against Malaya. To meet this (? threat) further large reinforcements are necessary.

5. It will be realized that in order to comply with the wishes of the President of the United States this telegram had to be prepared in haste.

- 4 -

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State


Dept of Telegram 1-12-72

By         

a28605

*PSF Sale Halifax*

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PERSONAL 

December 31st, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a telegram which I have just received from our Ambassador in Cairo. This telegram is headed "Following from Mr. Bullitt and Captain Lyttleton".

I am having a copy sent to the Prime Minister.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED

By authority of

*State Dept*

*telegram 1-12-72*

By *JS*

Date *1-12-72*

*a28c01*

Telegram from Cairo, dated December 31st, 1941.

~~REDACTED~~  
Following from Mr. Bullitt and Captain Lyttleton.

Please convey simultaneously to President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister personally.

Begins.

This telegram represents the agreed views of Mr. Bullitt and myself on the subject of possible invasion of Tunisia if and when all Tripolitania should be occupied by His Majesty's Forces. We have had the advantage of a general discussion with Catroux, particularly upon the French officers in Tunisia, but we could not carry on the discussion very far for obvious reasons.

2. We assume the following premise applies to-day:

(A) That some resistance by the French in Tunisia is certain and that French blood would be shed.

(B) That the strain on shipping and Naval escorts would preclude the immediate supply of substantial forces in Tunisia from Alexandria and that, therefore, the bulk of any supplies for these forces must come through the Western Mediterranean.

(C) That it would be impossible to supply forces through the Western Mediterranean if the French in Algeria and Morocco should be engaged in hostilities against us. We must count on the probability that German Air reinforcements would cross to Algeria and Morocco and operate against our shipping from those bases. We must also count on the probability that the Vichy French fleet would operate against us.

3. ~~REDACTED~~  
State Dept  
Telegram 1-12-72  
By JR Date 1-12-72

3. The Commanders in Chief have not yet completed their study of the problem and the above premises may consequently be qualified, but we do not think they can be materially changed.

4. Catroux put the minimum force necessary to invade Tunisia from the South at six Divisions. We think this should be accepted with reserve but taking into account the possibility of large reinforcements being brought from Algeria and Morocco we consider the force must be substantial.

5. We consider that in view of 2 (C) above operation would not be sound unless simultaneous with the invasion of Tunisia United States Forces should seize Casablanca or possibly Agadir. Such an operation would seem to involve preliminary seizure or control of Canaries, the Azores and Maderia; we think invasion of Tunisia must not be considered in isolation from the problem or of reactions of all French North African Colonies. We believe there would be French resistance to landing of American forces unless careful preparations should have been made within French North African Colonies. We think it may be possible to have American forces welcomed in French North African Colonies provided certain French leaders can be approached and informed that an American landing in force at either Casablanca or possibly Agadir is to be expected.

6. Above opinions are based on the present situation remaining unaltered. We believe the Germans may take action which would bring the majority of the French in North Africa over to our side if we should be in a position to give them effective and

immediate/

By State

By State

By State

a28c03



immediate aid.

7. We therefore recommend that if resources permit (A) British forces in Middle East which are already estimated to be considerably short of minimum required for defence of two fronts, should be reinforced; (B) U.S.A. should immediately start preparations for Casablanca expedition; (C) propaganda and subversive activities in all French North African Colonies should be immediately concerted between the United States and Great Britain.

8. With regard to 7 (A) considerable supply problems will be involved in employing forces in Tripolitania and if premise 2 (B) is correct we must look to supplies and reinforcements for Tunisia after its occupation being shipped through Western Mediterranean.

9. With regard to 7 (C) the nature of the propaganda is one of nice judgement and Bullitt and I propose to sketch tentative plan for submission to you.

10. We would emphasize that this is a preliminary telegram which is sent by us to reach you while the Prime Minister is still in Washington and that it is sent without full consultation between Commanders in Chief. It appears however to us that if resources are available in the near future the planning must start at once in order that we may either be ready to undertake invasion by force at a later date or reach the highest possible state of preparations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity produced by German action against France.

State Dept  
Telegram 1-12-72  
J

a28c04

**SAFE FILE: Harriman, W. Averell**

*Safe File*  
*PSF Harriman*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. H.

Will you attend to this as  
soon as you have collected on your  
last bet?

F. D., R.

1129a01

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Harmon*

*But.*

October 13, 1941

MISS TULLY:

This cable was answered  
on October 12 in a telegram  
answering other questions also.  
Reply stated that Marshall had  
already instructed Chaney to  
return at once.

L. BERNEY

029101



PM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

London

Dated October 10, 1941

Rec'd 4:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4842, October 10, 10 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HOPKINS FROM HARRIMAN:

Request that General Chaney be allowed to return  
to Washington with me and other members of mission  
early next week.

DEEM this essential because recommendations  
we are making regarding aircraft have been worked  
out in detail with the British and the Russians  
under his direction. These require substantial  
sacrifice and adjustment of their program on the  
part of British and by our Air Corps as well.

In addition, I know you will want his personal  
report of his impressions and those of the American  
airmen in Russia regarding the Russian air force.

Would appreciate earliest reply possible.  
Chaney is adjusting his work here for quick trip  
Washington if ordered.

WINANT.

WVC

a29c01

TELEGRAM

OCTOBER 9, 1941

TO: AMEMBASSY  
LONDON

FOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES  
THE GREAT SATISFACTION I HAVE WITH THE SUCCESSFUL  
CULMINATION OF YOUR MISSION IN MOSCOW. I THINK THAT  
YOU ALL DID A MAGNIFICENT JOB.

ROOSEVELT

29d01

**SAFE FILE: Mary Hayward**

*Safe : Hayward*

**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice**

MEMORANDUM

Mary Hayward, a native of the United States, was born in Indianapolis, Indiana, on December 24, 1915. She is thought to be the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. F. L. Hayward who are reported to reside at 4051 Ruckle Street, Indianapolis, Indiana. It is thought that she first moved to New York City about October 1, 1939, at which time she resided at the Midston Hotel, 22 East 38th Street, New York City, where she rented a room at a weekly rate of \$10. She was a resident of this hotel until March 29, 1940. Shortly after arriving at the Midston Hotel she was joined by her brother Jack W. Hayward who was associated with the United Press Association. At this hotel she was also associated with a Miss Betty Billings who is presently married to a Mr. Geoghegan a banker residing in New Rochelle, N. Y. She also had a second friend, by the name of Dorothy Freed who presently resides at 220 Harding Court, York, Pennsylvania. Miss Freed is reported to be the sweetheart of Jack W. Hayward.

After leaving the Midston Hotel, Miss Hayward leased a two room apartment in the Town House which is located at 108 East 38th Street, New York City. She paid a rental of \$140. per month at the Town House. She had very few friends or associates while a patron of the Town House. Her lease at the Town House expired on September 30, 1940. It was determined from the manager, Mr. William F. McCoy of the Town House that after the termination of the lease that Miss Hayward leased an apartment at 300 Park Avenue, New York City; that this is one of the most exclusive apartments in New York City.

The apartment house at 300 Park Avenue is owned by the New York State Realty & Terminal Company, 406 Lexington Avenue, New York City. This Company is a subsidiary and is wholly owned by the New York Central Railroad Company.

Mr. E. T. Davis of the New York State Realty & Terminal Company states his records disclose that Miss Mary Hayward occupies an apartment at 300 Park Avenue paying a yearly rental of approximately \$3,500. He stated that Mr. Albert Murrel was superintendent of the apartment house and would be aware of Miss Mary Hayward's activities. Mr. Davis also states that the rentals at 300 Park Avenue are handled by the Douglas L. Elliman Company, 15 East 49th Street, New York City. At this Company it was determined that Miss Mary Hayward executed a

a30a01



lease to the Company on October 1, 1940; that this lease expires on September 30, 1942. The rental for the first year is \$3,400., and for the second year the rental is \$3,500. The records at the Douglas L. Elliman Company further reflect that Miss Hayward is a confidential secretary for Mr. E. T. Weir, President of the Weirton Steel Company and Chairman of the National Steel Corporation. These records also disclosed that Miss Hayward had an account at the Chase National Bank, Grand Central Branch, New York City. Miss Hayward listed as a reference Mr. and Mrs. Gordon S. Rentschler, Locust Valley, Long Island, N. Y., and a Mr. and Mrs. Talbot, address unknown.

Mr. Gordon S. Rentschler is President and Director of the National City Bank of New York, 55 Wall Street. He is married, his wife being the former Mary Coolidge Atkins of Boston, Massachusetts. He has three children. Mr. Rentschler and his family reside at 933 Fifth Avenue, New York City, in a private four story brick dwelling assessed in his name for \$275,000.00. ~~The National City Bank of New York is one of the larger banks located in the City of New York. Branches of this bank are located in New York and throughout the world. The bank is said to have a thirty million dollar surplus and ten million dollars in undivided profits.~~ Mr. Rentschler's name appears as Director of banking institutions, finances, securities, insurance and manufacturing concerns throughout the United States. He is also listed as a Trustee of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York and a Director of Anaconda Copper and Mining Company and of the Union Pacific Railway Company. ~~He is one of the leading financiers of New York City.~~

It was determined through the Credit Bureau of Greater New York that Miss Mary Hayward is employed as secretary at the National Steel Corporation, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York City, and had been so employed for a period of two years. She is said to have a responsible position and a good income. It was ascertained that Ernest T. Weir is Chairman of the Board of the National Steel Corporation; that the National Steel Corporation is a million dollar organization and is a producer of iron and steel at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. ~~It was also determined that the Corporation has ten subsidiaries among them being the Weirton Steel Company located at Weirton, West Virginia.~~

At the office of the Immigration Commissioner, Ellis Island, N. Y. the records disclosed that on December 5, 1940, Mary Hayward, age 24, native of Indianapolis, Indiana, returned to the United States from Bermuda aboard the SS Santa Paula.

Mr. Albert Murrel, superintendent of the apartment located at 300 Park Avenue, stated that Miss Mary Hayward moved into Apartment 17F on approximately October 1, 1940; that she had the apartment thoroughly renovated and had secured the services of an interior decorator to decorate the apartment for her. He also stated that Miss Hayward purchased new furniture for the apartment and that the apartment she occupies is the best furnished apartment in the building.

He also advised that Miss Hayward <sup>drives</sup> ~~was the owner of~~ a 1940 Cadillac coupe automobile; that he had determined that this automobile was registered in the name of E. T. Weir, Union League Club, New York City. Mr. Murrel informed that Mr. Weir made frequent overnight visits to the apartment of Miss Hayward. He also stated that a Mr. Miller, a much younger man, also made overnight visits to Miss Hayward's apartment. It was determined that Mr. Miller is office manager for the Weirton Steel Corporation.

Mr. Murrel further informed that Miss Hayward employed a maid and a housekeeper. He stated that Miss Hayward made many weekend trips and had made one or more cruises since she resided at the apartment. It was also determined that Miss Hayward had an unlisted telephone in her apartment. From this unlisted telephone a call was placed on November 3, 1940, to Mr. C. B. Goodspeed, Diversey 2430, Chicago, Illinois. On November 3, 1940, a call was placed by Mr. E. T. Weir to George Humphrey. A telephone call was also placed on the same date to Greenwich, Connecticut. On December 6, 1940, a telephone call was placed to a Mr. DeMiko, care of William Penn Hotel, Salisbury, Massachusetts. On the same date a telephone call was placed to Mayflower 2044, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It was also determined that a number of telephone calls were placed through the apartment house switchboard. The names of the subscribers to the various numbers called were secured and an investigation was conducted concerning the identity of the subscribers. It was determined that a John M. Smith who resides at 100 West 138th Street was called. This person had no credit record at the Credit Bureau of Greater New York. Inquiry in the vicinity of 100 West 138th Street disclosed that all persons residing in this vicinity are of the colored race. It was also determined that a telephone call was made to A. J. Keehe, an attorney at 1170 Broadway, New York City. The Credit Bureau of Greater New York disclosed little information concerning this attorney. The records disclosed that his rating is unsatisfactory. A call was also placed to Charles W. Frankel, 10 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, N. Y. Mr. Frankel is employed by the D. H. Silberg & Company, New York City, as a bond salesman. He is married and his wife is employed as a saleswoman at the Abraham & Strauss department store in Brooklyn, N. Y. Mr. Frankel is a native of America, of Hebrew extraction. He furnished as a reference the Trust Company of North America. The various other calls made from the telephone of Miss Hayward were made to various department stores and dry cleaning establishments.

Inasmuch as it is known that Miss Mary Hayward has a checking account at the Chase National Bank, Grand Central Branch, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York City, it was ascertained that on November 30, 1939, Miss Hayward, 61st floor, 405 Lexington Avenue, opened an account known as a special checking account with an initial deposit of \$120. It was explained that the term "special checking account" meant that Miss Hayward in order to avoid service charges because of small balances she expected to maintain, purchased a book of ten checks for \$2.00 which enabled her



to draw against her account without being assessed any additional service charge. This special checking account was closed by transfer of the balance of \$15.70 to a regular checking account on July 1, 1940. The initial deposit to this new account was in the amount of \$1,011.65 consisting of checks and \$700. in cash. An examination of the account indicated that Miss Hayward prior to the transfer of the account from the special checking account to a regular account was depositing \$195.95 on the first of each month which would indicate this was the amount she received as a secretary to the Chairman of the National Steel Corporation. On May 23, 1940, the account showed a deposit of \$500. in cash. On July 29, 1940, the account showed a deposit of \$1,950., \$1,900. of this amount being in cash. The account showed withdrawals of approximately \$1,300 during the month of August. On September 12, 1940, the account showed a deposit of \$880, \$830 of this amount being in cash. On October 3, 1940, there was a cash deposit of \$1,000. On October 7th a withdrawal of \$1,103.13 was shown. The account showed a cash deposit on October 11th of \$500 and on October 31st a deposit of \$1,249.50, of this amount \$1,200 being in cash. On December 2nd there was a cash deposit of \$3,000 and on December 9th an additional cash deposit of \$2,000. On December 12th there was a withdrawal of \$3,253.77. A search of the bank records disclosed that this amount was deposited for the credit of Saks, Fifth Avenue Department Store. On December 30th a cash deposit of \$2,225.00 was made, the \$2,000 item consisting of a check drawn by E. T. Weir to the order of cash which check bore the endorsement of Mary Hayward.

On January 2, 1941, a check for \$150. was drawn on Mary Hayward's account made payable to Dr. Robert J. Lowrie, and on the same date a check for the amount of \$1,629.72 was given to William Gleason Adair. The Credit Bureau of Greater New York disclosed that their records reflect that William Gleason Adair is an interior decorator and that Dr. Robert J. Lowrie is a practicing physician. The records disclosed that both of these gentlemen are reputable persons.

The records further disclose that on January 3, 1941, a deposit of \$1,054.45 was made. This deposit included one item for \$710. This item was a check drawn by E. T. Weir against his account at the Farmers Deposit National Bank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and was to the order of cash. It also bore the endorsement of Mary Hayward.

The account also showed many miscellaneous withdrawals which have not been checked. At the present time the account has a balance of approximately \$1,200.

Mr. Albert Murrel, superintendent of the apartment house at 300 Park Avenue is keeping in close contact and is observing the activities of Miss Hayward.

**SAFE FILE: Stephanie Von Hohenlohe**



PSF: *Sal* : Hohenlohe

*Simon*  
*Jack Bost*

October 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM

RE: PRINCESS STEFANIE VON HOHENLOHE  
WALDENBURG, with aliases

Princess Hohenlohe has been a very close confidante of Fritz Wiedemann, the former German Consul General at San Francisco, and over a period of time has been suspected by the French, British and American authorities of being an international spy for the German Government. She is known to have very close connections with high officials of the Third Reich, is described as being extremely intelligent, dangerous and clever, as an espionage agent to be "worse than ten thousand men", to reputedly be immoral, and capable of resorting to any means, even to bribery, to gain her ends.

As Stephanie Richter, Princess Hohenlohe was born in Hungary in 1891. Her father is described by some to have been a small town dentist, by others an insignificant lawyer in Vienna, Austria. Her mother is reportedly a Jewish woman of very low birth.

Princess Hohenlohe entered the Ballet School of the Imperial Opera at Vienna around 1906 but did not continue this career after having met men who supplied her with a means of living. At the early age of seventeen she was very well known in the circle of wealthier men and extended her field of action to Berlin and Paris. She became the lady friend of Archduke Leopold Salvator, through whom she gained access to military circles during the World War and many of her "connections" date from those days. She reportedly forced Prince Hohenlohe Schillingfurst to marry her upon the claim that she was pregnant by him and thus obtained the title of "Princess", which she still uses. Doubt exists in the Hohenlohe family that her son, Prince Franz, is in fact a Hohenlohe. The Almanach de Gotha, 1939 Edition of Justus Perthes, verifies this information to the extent that it reflects the marriage of Stephanie Julianne Richter to Francois, Prince of Hohenlohe Waldenburg, in London, England, on May 12, 1914, and the birth of her son in Vienna, Austria, on December 5, 1914. She obtained a divorce in Budapest, Hungary, on July 29, 1920.

Following her divorce Princess Hohenlohe entered the field of international intrigue and, following her reputation as a "gold digger", endeavored to marry John Warden of the original Standard Oil family, and later became the mistress of Donald Malcolm, an international banker.

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A photograph of Princess Hohenlohe, known to be in her possession, shows her in a group including Hitler, Goebbels and Fritz Wiedemann. She possesses an autographed photograph of Adolf Hitler inscribed "To my dear Stephanie", and by her own admissions has been an intimate friend of Hitler. She gave a tea for him on one occasion at Baden-Baden, and although she is reputedly Jewish, she is reported to have been serving as an emissary of Hitler on this occasion. In March of 1940 she was reported by a well informed and reliable source to be an important worker under Dr. Goebbels on German propaganda and to have been for some time prior to the war concentrating her energies through a society known as the Anglo-German Fellowship; and to have always enjoyed the close friendship of Fritz Wiedemann.

Princess Hohenlohe is reported on good authority to have been exiled from France in 1932 because of espionage activities, at which time she proceeded to London where she cultivated her old friendships and soon offered her services to the Nazi chieftains who realized the tremendous value of her connections to the Third Reich. She acted as intermediary between the Nazi leaders in Germany and the society circles in England, introducing Fritz Wiedemann to her "high class" friends in London in 1938 and acting as hostess to Henlein in London during the same year.

She appears to have played some role in arranging meetings between Lord Runciman and the Sudetan Nazis during the summer of 1938 and toward the end of 1938 was reported to have been in Syria with Wilhelm Fluegge, on which occasion they were both suspected of being Nazi agents. On the same trip she later went to Istanbul and was seen in the company of the son of Marshal Badoglio. Princess Hohenlohe is also known to be a personal friend of Goering.

Prior to her coming to the United States in 1939 Princess Hohenlohe was involved in a lawsuit against Lord Rothermere, in which she contended that Lord Rothermere had agreed to pay her \$12,000 a year for life. Lord Rothermere testified that he had paid her "around \$250,000 for less than six years' service", and her activities in behalf of Lord Rothermere involved her close associations with high Nazi officials and Lord Rothermere's interest in re-establishing a monarchy in Hungary with German assistance. The court reportedly termed a portion of the Princess' testimony in this litigation as "nebulous" and "unreliable", and judgment was entered in favor of Lord Rothermere.

A confidential source has reported that Princess Hohenlohe has in her possession a longhand notation on a scrap of paper, believed to be in Rothermere's own handwriting, reading, "I believe the Black

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Shirts will rule Britain within three years", as well as communications between Hitler and Rothermere, transmitted through Princess Hohenlohe, in which Rothermere expresses his high esteem for Hitler and his interest in Hitler's success. Princess Hohenlohe claims to have conferred with Hitler in Rothermere's behalf on at least fifty different occasions.

It is rumored that Hitler gave to Princess Hohenlohe the Leopoldskron Castle in Salzburg, which had been confiscated from the German theater director Max Reinhardt, where lavish parties were held and where it is reported that the fate of Czechoslovakia was finally sealed; that Princess Hohenlohe joined in celebrating the fall of Czechoslovakia at this castle. Other sources, however, report that this castle was rented by Princess Hohenlohe as a residence with financial assistance from Lord Rothermere.

During the time the Baron Louis Rothschild was being held by the Hitler regime in Vienna, Austria, the Rothschild family, then in exile in Paris, was approached by a Swiss who claimed he was representing Princess Hohenlohe and that for sufficient monetary consideration she could effect the release of the Baron. This offer, however, was not accepted.

Immigration records reflect that Princess Hohenlohe first visited the United States in 1931. She returned to the United States on November 25, 1937, on the same boat as Fritz Wiedemann. On this occasion Princess Hohenlohe was present when Wiedemann was interviewed by representatives of the press at the time the ship docked, and she told him what to say in his statements to the press on that occasion. She last arrived in the United States on December 22, 1939, from London, England, on a non-immigrant visa to visit her son and indicated that she would remain for five months and intended to return to England. As late as October 1, 1940, it was learned through a confidential source that Princess Hohenlohe was undoubtedly in personal communication with individuals in Germany.

On May 29, 1940, Princess Hohenlohe met Fritz Wiedemann at Fresno, California, and they spent that night together in a cabin in Sequoia National Park as "Mr. and Mrs. Fred Winter" of San Francisco, California. From the Park they proceeded to San Francisco where Princess Hohenlohe resided at the residence of Fritz Wiedemann as his house guest. A confidential source reported that on July 19, 1940, Princess Hohenlohe mentioned to Wiedemann that she had received two letters from "Number 34 and Number 35" and requested instructions as to what Wiedemann wished to be done in the matter. She continued to reside at Wiedemann's house even though he moved his residence from Hillsborough, California, into the city of San Francisco.



Through manipulations of Princess Hohenlohe, conversations were arranged at San Francisco, California, between Fritz Wiedemann and Sir William Wiseman on October 1 and November 27, 1940, concerning a possible peace move between Germany and Britain. These conversations met with no success. It is interesting to note, however, that both conferences were dominated by Princess Hohenlohe and that in fact she proposed that she could approach Hitler as one possible solution toward effecting the proposed peace treaty. Wiseman, in reporting the conversations on November 27, 1940, mentioned that Princess Hohenlohe had referred to one Volkers, who was working for a bureau in Berlin headed by one Canaris. Canaris is reputedly one of the chiefs of the German intelligence service.

On September 3, 1940, Princess Hohenlohe, as Mrs. H. Warden, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, registered at the Palace Hotel, San Francisco. She checked out of the hotel on the same date and an immediate inspection of the room which she had occupied reflected that intimate relations had existed during the time that the room was occupied by "Mrs. Warden".

During early December of 1940 Princess Hohenlohe was endeavoring to obtain an extension on her visa. She secured an extension to January 11, 1941, apparently through the Hungarian Legation in Washington since Wiedemann is reported to have claimed he could do nothing for her as she was an Hungarian and not a German subject. Fritz Wiedemann advised her that she should submit a sailing date as to her contemplated departure since this would satisfy the Immigration authorities and she accordingly evidenced her intention to sail for Lisbon on January 11, 1941. On December 23, 1940, she began evidencing signs of nervousness and subsequently suffered from a "nervous breakdown" due, in part, to excessive self-administered sedatives. She apparently broke with Wiedemann and finally left his residence on December 30, 1940, taking an apartment in Palo Alto, California, under the care of Mrs. Velma Owler-Smith, an individual of pro-Nazi tendencies and a distributor of pro-Nazi literature, who was closely associated with Fritz Wiedemann.

On January 13, 1941, a deportation warrant was served on Princess Hohenlohe and \$25,000 bond was furnished by Mrs. Owler-Smith. Delay in her deportation was sought on the ground that she could find no country of refuge that would receive her and that her native land was dominated by the Nazis. On March 8, 1941, she was taken into custody by the Immigration authorities and on March 10, 1941, she was released in custody of Mr. I. F. Wixon, the District Director of the United States



Immigration and Naturalization Service at San Francisco. Wiedemann expressed the opinion in June of 1941 that reports to the effect that Princess Hohenlohe had revealed information harmful to him were merely a "blind" to effect her release.

Princess Hohenlohe left San Francisco, California, about July 1, 1941. As a result of reservations previously made by Major Lemuel B. Schofield, Director of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, United States Department of Justice, for "friends", Princess Hohenlohe took up residence in the Raleigh Hotel in Washington, D. C., on July 4, 1941, where she remained until July 28, 1941. It was reported that Major Schofield had succumbed to the tears of Princess Hohenlohe and become very soft hearted and that Princess Hohenlohe had remonstrated with him over the fact that he had not lived up to his promises.

Major Schofield makes his residence in the Raleigh Hotel and it has been reported through confidential reliable sources that on the occasions when Schofield would be in the hotel at the time the Princess stayed there, he spent all of his time with Princess Hohenlohe either in her room or in his own and on one or two occasions it was apparent that Princess Hohenlohe spent the entire night with Major Schofield since she was found in his room as late at 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Major Schofield and Princess Hohenlohe, according to the confidential sources, indulged in a great deal of drinking on these occasions.

About September 1, 1941, Princess Hohenlohe, together with her mother and son, rented a house at 612 Beverly Drive in the Beverly Hills section of Alexandria, Virginia, on which occasion the Princess used the name of Nancy White. As Nancy White the Princess was occupying this address as late as October 27, 1941.

Articles have appeared in the press to the effect that Princess Hohenlohe has furnished the Government with "some very interesting information". It is reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has attempted for a considerable period of time to obtain a copy of the statement that Princess Hohenlohe allegedly made to Major Schofield, which reportedly justified allowing the Princess to remain in the United States. When a copy of this statement was finally furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a review thereof failed to indicate or reveal any information of an intelligence nature in any way justifying withholding the deportation of this woman.

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